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Abstract
The cautious treatment of natural disaster risk constitutes a major challenge for governments of
affected countries. In the evaluation of public risk reduction interventions it should always be
warranted that the scarce invested means are allocated efficiently and thus possess the potential
to increase social welfare. In the present thesis public risk reduction projects are considered as
investments and are evaluated on basis of a social cost benefit analysis. In the first part of the thesis
an innovative risk management framework is developed, that allows to systematically identify the
social exposure to natural hazards and to quantify disaster risk probabilistically both before and
after implementation of the risk reduction measure. The second focus of the thesis constitutes the
economic evaluation of human safety. In particular, general cost benefit rules for pricing enhanced
human safety on basis of the willingness to pay (WTP) concept are derived. Special emphasis is
given on the Life Quality Index (LQI) concept, which has recently gained increasing attention as a
risk management tool in civil engineering. For the latter a new time consistent derivation method
is developed in a general equilibrium model that clearly reveals the economic reasoning behind the
index. Based on this the conventional LQI based safety pricing rule is extended and improved
in its calibration. In the last part of the thesis the concept of real options is firstly applied to
the evaluation of public disaster risk reduction interventions and the traditional net present value
criterion is replaced by more extensive decision rules in the presence of uncertainty. Eventually,
a detailed case study for the seismic risk management of San Francisco based on the disaster loss
estimation program HAZUS demonstrates the practical applicability of the presented methodology.

Zusammenfassung
Der planvolle Umgang mit Naturkatastrophen stellt eine große Herausforderung für Regierungen
betroffener Länder dar. Bei der Beurteilung öffentlicher Risikoreduktionsmaßnahmen sollte stets
gewährleistet sein, dass die aufgewendeten begrenzten Ressourcen effizient eingesetzt werden und
potentiell zu einer Erhöhung der gesellschaftlichen Wohlfahrt beitragen. In der vorliegenden Ar-
beit werden gesellschaftliche Risikoreduktionsmaßnahmen als Investitionen betrachtet und anhand
einer sozialen Kosten-Nutzen Analyse bewertet. Im ersten Teil der Arbeit wird hierzu zunächst
ein innovatives Risikomanagementkonzept entwickelt, das es ermöglicht, die Gefährdungssituation
einer Gesellschaft systematisch zu erfassen und das damit einhergehende Risiko vor und nach
Durchführung der Risikoreduktionsmaßnahme probabilistisch abzuschätzen. Der zweite Schwer-
punkt der Arbeit liegt in der volkswirtschaftlichen Bewertung menschlicher Sicherheit. Hierbei wird
speziell die wichtige Fragestellung behandelt, wie die Zahlungsbereitschaft einer Gesellschaft zur
Rettung von Menschenleben ökonomisch erfasst werden kann und welche Position der ingenieur-
wissenschaftliche Life Quality Index (LQI) in diesem Kontext einnimmt. Für Letzteren wird im
Rahmen eines gesamtwirtschaftlichen Gleichgewichtsmodells eine neue konsistente Herleitungsmeth-
ode bereitgestellt und darauf aufbauend das bestehende LQI basierte Akzeptanzkriterium erweit-
ert und in seiner Kalibrierung verbessert. Im letzten Teil der Arbeit wird das in der Betrieb-
swirtschaft zunehmend an Bedeutung gewinnende Konzept sogenannter Realoptionen auf Risiko-
reduktionsmaßnahmen von Naturkatastrophen übertragen und schließlich das traditionelle Barw-
ertkriterium durch innovative Entscheidungsregeln in der Gegenwart von Unsicherheit ersetzt. Eine
detaillierte Fallstudie für das Erdbebenrisikomanagement von San Francisco unter Verwendung des
Naturkatastrophen-Simulationsprogramms HAZUS demonstriert die Anwendbarkeit der Methoden
und rundet die Arbeit ab.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Natural disasters appear in many shapes and sizes. Most of them are related to the weather.
Some are largely predictable - like a hurricane. Others, like an earthquake, come surprisingly.
Generally speaking, a natural event is a sudden and violent change of the environment due to
extreme atmospherical, hydrological or geological natural forces. A natural event per se might not
have an impact on human activities and turns into a natural hazard only if it encounters exposed
human assets. A natural hazard on the contrary converts into a natural disaster, if the extreme
natural forces strike vulnerable elements and cause considerable harm to the affected region. A
natural disaster can result in serious damage to buildings and infrastructure, in injuries and loss of
life, in the devastation of the environment and in the loss of cultural, social and historical assets.
Figure 1.1: Great natural disasters 1950-2007 [Munich Re Group 2007 [99]]
An exponential population growth coinciding with the new and often fast colonization of hazard
prone areas such as riversides and coastlines as well as the change of environmental conditions has
led to a permanent increase in natural disaster occurrences throughout recorded history, as depicted
in Figure 1.1. It is easily verified that windstorms, floods and earthquakes take the lead in the great
disaster occurrences of the last 60 years, roughly accounting for a little less than one third each.
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According to the understanding of the Munich Re Group [98], an event is declared as being a great
disaster if it causes either substantial overall losses in relation to the country’s economy or results
in thousands of fatalities or hundreds of thousands of people made homeless, making interregional
or even international assistance inevitable.
Major natural catastrophes caused economic losses estimated at an average of US$ 66 billion per year
throughout the 1990s and resulted in an average annual number of 79,000 fatalities [26], accompanied
by innumerable injuries and people that were made homeless. Whereas the major part of absolute
economic losses occurred in developed countries, the number of fatalities and economic losses in
relative terms, as a fraction of domestic GDP, were substantially larger in developing countries
[165]. This shows evidence that despite a high concentration of values in the developed world,
people and property enjoy a higher level of protection due to risk reduction measures that have been
implemented in the past. Hence, there is the urgent need for national governments to engage in risk
reduction activities in order to prevent the impacts of natural hazards from becoming devastating
and thus, to guarantee an adequate safety level for their citizens.
Several studies have demonstrated that social risk reduction measures can bring about large benefits
in terms of reduced disaster consequences and thus represent a sound investment. The World Bank
and the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that an investment of US$ 40 billion into preventative
disaster risk mitigation strategies could have led to a reduction of US$ 280 billion economic losses
worldwide in the 1990s [25]. Independently, the U.S. National Institute of Building Sciences [190]
claims that on average, a dollar spend by the FEMA1 on hazard mitigation provides the United
States around US$ 4 in future benefits.
1.1 Problem Specification
A rational response to these extreme natural events requires a collaboration of researchers from many
different disciplines. Natural scientists are needed to estimate the hazard characteristic parameters
such as probability of occurrence and intensity for a special location. Engineers are required to
analyze, how endangered buildings and infrastructure elements are likely to respond due to natural
disaster loads. Economic expert judgments are necessary to estimate the monetary consequences
of the damage and harm to the affected region both short and long term. Politicians then have to
process the accumulated information by deciding on how to handle the peril to protect people and
property in the best possible way.
The necessity to consider disaster management throughout several disciplines and for distinct nat-
ural hazards has led to the development of a great diversity of risk management definitions and
methods within scientific community. So far no consistency in the risk management terminology
has been achieved, making problems in communication inevitable. Different definitions as well as
ways to estimate and evaluate risk frequently lead to results which are not comparable as the un-
derlying range of consequences that is included in the calculation is quite uneven. Contributing to
this problem is the fact that numerous risk management methodologies presented in literature lack
a clear mathematical formulation of the risk defining terms and of steps to be performed within
the respective approach. Therefore, costly risk studies often do not provide sufficient assistance to
1FEMA = Federal Emergency Management Agency (U.S. government agency tasked with disaster mitigation,
preparedness, response and recovery planning)
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decision makers and accordingly, huge mistakes can be made. A unified and structured methodology
to define and to calculate risk throughout various disciplines is indispensable for a rational quan-
tification, comparison, and treatment of risks. Only if the frequency and the impact of potentially
threatening hazards can be reliably estimated and communicated in the same language, will it finally
be possible to identify and implement efficient risk reduction strategies.
The economic evaluation of public risk reduction projects is an important task within disaster man-
agement. From an economic point of view, a public risk reduction measure is characterized by a flow
of benefits and a flow of cost that occur uncertainly at different points in time over the effective pe-
riod. Whereas the cost arise mainly due to the material and labor needed to implement and maintain
the measure and are assessable with sufficient accuracy, the benefits are represented by the reduced
expected disaster consequences, that occur over a wide range of categories and are highly uncer-
tain. They appear in terms of reduced damages to buildings and infrastructure elements, reduced
economic losses, prevented fatalities and environmental damages and the preservation of cultural
social and historical assets. In order to judge on project desirability, the various intangible benefits
have to be converted to monetary value to compare them to the project cost. The estimation of a
social price for intangible goods is further complicated by the fact that society consists of numerous
heterogeneous individuals, trying to cultivate their own subjective understanding of valuation. This
often results in a conflict of interest.
In particular, the evaluation of human safety constitutes a controversial and highly debated field of
research. While each individual supplements her safety level herself to a certain extent by the daily
choices that are made in favor of certain consumption goods and labor provision, the state, federal,
and local governments often take the lead in providing a baseline safety level that applies to all
[145]. Consequently, it is largely the government that decides what level of safety its limited public
resources can afford. There is an increasing cost to a fixed increment of safety. Absolute safety
cannot be obtained and the level provided for a reasonable cost requires a compromise. Allocating
resources in disaster risk reduction means taking resources away elsewhere, such as health care,
education and social services that also have the potential to enhance safety [195]. Therefore, trade-
offs are inevitable in the decision processes of competing needs in order to finally achieve an efficient
and affordable safety provision for society.
This ambition can be reached only if a reasonable way has been found to derive an economic value
of human life. Instead of placing a value on the life of any particularly identifiable individual,
which would obviously contradict with our ethical understanding that human life is priceless and
unpayable, economic valuation focuses on the value of preventing statistical deaths ex ante. Seen
from this perspective, prevented fatalities or "statistical lives" saved result in small reductions in
the probability of death that are in turn enjoyed by any member of society. Accordingly, safety
becomes an economic good that increases the wellbeing of individuals and can therefore be valued
by economic theory.
The concept of willingness to pay (WTP) is one important approach to the valuation of safety. The
technique is based on the principle that the maximum amount of money an individual is willing to
pay for an incremental increase in her safety level is an indicator of the value of safety to her. In
order to determine a social value of safety, the individual WTPs then have to be aggregated over
all individuals that comprise society. It becomes clear intuitively, that the WTP concept is based
on individual preferences for safety, in accordance with the basic postulate of welfare economics. As
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
individual preferences are highly heterogeneous and context specific, they are difficult to assess reli-
ably and consequently, a great variation of statistical life values is observable throughout literature.
The range varies from about US$ 400,000 to US$ 30 million in industrialized countries as, among
others, Blaeij et. al. [29] demonstrated in their meta analysis.
A conceptually distinct approach to the valuation of safety is the use of compound social indicators,
that capture the quality of life the average individual of society enjoys from living under particular
circumstances. The value of safety is then determined by the exchange rate between two indicators,
so that total life quality is maintained. Here, the individualistic concept is abandoned and quick and
stable estimates of statistical life values are enabled. This however comes at the cost of a violation
of the individualistic principle of welfare economics in general, as the economic reasoning behind
this approach is justifiable only under restrictive conditions. A prominent example of such a social
indicator is the Life Quality Index (LQI), that recently gained increasing attention as a safety pricing
tool in civil engineering.
1.2 Objectives of the Thesis
This thesis deals with the evaluation of public risk reduction interventions by means of a social cost
benefit analysis, with the ambition to provide a rational decision basis for project approval in social
sense. Addressing the above illustrated problem, the objectives of this thesis are threefold:
1. The first goal constitutes the development of an innovative disaster management model that
provides a clear and well structured approach to managing disaster risk. Starting from delineat-
ing the model domain and addressing the intensity and frequency parameters of the hazard, the
model enables a consistent assessment, evaluation and treatment of risk. By clearly illustrating
the steps to be performed in mathematical terms and providing statistical characterizations
of the risk defining parameters, the presented risk model is expected to contribute to a more
homogeneous understanding of disaster risk and lead to greater transparency in performing
risk based calculations.
2. The second objective of this thesis concerns the derivation of a social price for safety improve-
ments. In particular, the influence of safety in a market economy is modeled and cost benefit
rules for incremental safety increases are presented. The first developed approach follows the
individualistic (i.e. bottom up) approach to derive a social WTP (SWTP) for safety and intro-
duces the representative consumer model for safety pricing in general equilibrium. The other
approach discusses the estimation of a SWTP in a macroeconomic (i.e. top down) context with
special emphasis on the LQI. Here, a new LQI derivation approach is presented that allows
far reaching interpretations and enables an improvement of the conventional LQI based safety
pricing rule.
3. The third aim is to explicitly account for the uncertainties inherent in the benefit estimation
process, by developing a real option approach for disaster risk reduction investments. The
methodology develops a pricing rule for the flexibility to postpone the risk reduction investment
to a future point in time. The possibility to delay the investment may pay because it allows
to collect further information about possible project developments and thus enables more
informed decisions.
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis
To provide a comprehensive discussion on the problem of evaluating social risk reduction projects,
this thesis is subdivided into eight chapters each of which contains valuable information. Figure 1.2
displays the logical order of the thesis; parts that contain own contributions are emphasized in red.
Chapter 2 introduces the innovative general risk management framework, provides clear definitions
of the basal terms and gives an interpretation of other commonly used risk definitions. Then, risk
reduction projects are mathematically characterized. Chapter 3 presents the essentials of welfare
economics and cost benefit analysis and serves as the theoretical basis of this work.
Figure 1.2: Organizational overview
Chapter 4 discusses the influence of safety in a market economy and introduces first social WTP
rules for safety pricing in a bottom up fashion. Furthermore, commonly applied strategies to estimate
the WTP for safety in practice are presented. Based on these results, Chapter 5 discusses the LQI
in depth and provides a new derivation of the index in a general equilibrium setting that clearly
reveals the economic reasoning behind the approach and its relative standing towards alternative
safety pricing methodologies. In addition, an innovative LQI based safety pricing rule is developed.
Chapter 6 presents a novel real option approach that enables the proper treatment of uncertainties
involved in the benefit estimation process by evaluating the possibility to delay the risk reduction
investment to a future point in time. With the option value on hand, sound recommendations
whether to invest immediately, to postpone or to reject the risk reduction project are derived.
Chapter 7 presents two applications of the proposed methodology. In particular, earthquake risk
for the city of San Francisco is assessed and treated based on the computer loss-estimation program
HAZUS. Chapter 8 concludes and gives an outlook where future research could be directed to.
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Chapter 2
Management of Disaster Risk
This chapter introduces an innovative general risk management framework that provides reasonable
definitions and a standardized language for communicating and managing disaster risk among stake-
holders. To do this in a justifiable manner, firstly risk definitions and concepts existing in literature
are reviewed and out of these, classes of risk calculation schemes are extracted. Subsequently, an
exhaustive risk management concept is presented that covers the whole risk management chain,
starting from risk identification over risk assessment up to risk treatment. The discussion of the risk
management’s workflow is accompanied by consistently defining the basal risk terms mathematically
and schematically illustrating their interrelations. Then, the extracted risk definitions are integrated
in the concept to demonstrate its generality and their advantageousness with respect to different
application fields are discussed. Eventually, the essentials about public risk reduction projects are
presented and their effects on disaster risk analyzed.
2.1 Statistics on Natural Disasters
The occurrence of a natural disaster rests upon the convergence of three central factors. The first
is the hazard factor, which is the risk of an earthquake, hurricane, flood or an other natural event
and is based on the geological, meteorological or ecological characteristics of a region. The second
constitutes the exposure factor, which is best described as the number of people or property at risk
of being potentially harmed by a hazard’s occurrence. The third is the vulnerability factor, which
describes the susceptibility of the exposed elements towards the impact of a hazard, leading to loss
of lives or property, injuries or the disruption of livelihoods and economic activity.
Since 1900, more than 11,000 natural disasters have been recorded in the EM-DAT database [74].
Out of these registered events, more than 9,000 or around 80% have occurred over the last thirty
years. The reason for this strongly increasing trend can be seen on the one hand in the fast coloniza-
tion and the accumulation of human assets in hazard prone areas, exponential population growth
and changing climate conditions but is also attributed to an improved data collection and hazard
observation. In particular, advancements in surveillance technology and the launch of active data
collection by the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Centre for Research on
the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) in the 1970ies have led to an improved gathering of small
to medium size events in the databases. Out of all recorded disasters, geophysical events take a
share of around 12%, hydrological disasters of 36%, meteorological events of 29% and disasters of
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other categories such as droughts, wildfires and extreme temperatures are represented by a fraction
of 23%.
Affected country Event type Occurrence date Number of fatalities
China Flood 01.07.1931 3,700,000
China Flood 01.07.1959 2,000,000
China Flood 01.07.1939 500,000
Bangladesh Storm 12.11.1970 300,000
China Earthquake 27.07.1976 242,000
China Earthquake 22.05.1927 200,000
China Earthquake 16.12.1920 180,000
Indonesia Earthquake 26.12.2004 165,708
Japan Earthquake 01.09.1923 143,000
China Flood 18.04.1905 142,000
Table 2.1: The ten worst natural disasters in terms of fatalities 1900-2009 [EM-DAT [74]]
In Table 2.1 the ten worst disasters with respect to the number of fatalities are listed that have
occurred after 1900. It might seem self-evident that disasters have a greater human impact on
poorer countries with less developed economies. This relationship has been well documented in
literature [100] and is due the fact that poor populations often end up living in high risk or envi-
ronmentally degraded areas, have the least access to social disaster risk reduction initiatives or save
infrastructure and have few savings or available credit. These factors collectively create conditions
that increase a population’s vulnerability to hazards, and hence lead to the more frequent occurrence
and devastating impacts of disasters.
South and East Asia, particularly Bangladesh and China, are in the highest vulnerability category
with a high proportion of its population being affected by natural disasters. These countries have
areas of high population density, especially in river basins, and are home to populations whose
livelihoods are often based on agriculture. When floods occur, the number of affected people quickly
reach into the hundred thousands, and in some cases, millions as tragically evidenced by the three
deadliest disasters that have occurred in China.
Although the absolute number of affected people has increased over the last decades, the number of
fatalities has declined and there remains a decreasing trend in mortality through recent years [100].
Most likely, this reduction can be partially attributed to the effects of increasing risk awareness and
substantial advancements in disaster prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.
In Table 2.2 the ten worst disasters in terms of economic damage costs are registered that have
occurred since 1900. It becomes obvious that richer countries tend to rank frequently in these listing
of the most expensive disasters, while they are clearly underrepresented in the fatality listings. This
shows evidence that despite a high concentration of exposed valuable assets, the safety standards
are on a comparatively high level, mainly attributed to effective risk mitigation measures that have
been implemented in the past. Japan, Italy and the United States, for example, often appear on top
of the list for earthquakes, which are the least predictable of all natural disasters. In addition, the
time span between an earthquake threat and occurrence is the briefest among all major disasters.
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Partly due to this, earthquakes top the scale of immediate mortality and structural destruction in
more recent disaster events.
Affected country Event type Occurrence date Damage cost
(US$ 2007 million)
Japan (Kobe Earthquake) Earthquake 17.01.1995 136,000
U.S. (Hurricane Katrina) Storm 29.08.2005 132,500
China (Sichuan Earthquake) Earthquake 12.05.2008 81,731
Italy (Irpinia Earthquake) Earthquake 23.11.1980 50,400
U.S. (Northridge Earthquake) Earthquake 17.01.1994 42,000
U.S. (Hurricane Andrew) Storm 24.08.1992 39,220
China (Yangtze River Flood) Flood 01.07.1998 38,100
Japan (Chuetsu Earthquake) Earthquake 23.10.2004 30,800
U.S. (Hurricane Ike) Storm 12.09.2008 28,846
Turkey (Izmit Earthquake) Earthquake 17.08.1999 24,800
Table 2.2: The ten worst natural disasters in terms of damage costs 1900-2009 [EM-DAT [74]]
With the exception of floods and wave surges, developed nations rank on top in every other disaster
category. Also because of higher property values linked to higher labor costs for reconstruction,
richer countries constitute those with highest losses. The two disaster events associated with the
highest losses ever recorded are the 1995 Kobe Earthquake and Hurricane Katrina, which stroke in
particular the city of New Orleans in 2005.
Examining disaster data worldwide by the number of occurrences in each country provides valuable
information about which countries suffer more from disasters. The U.S., together with South and
Southeast Asia and Australia, are particularly prone to natural disasters, followed by Latin America,
Russia and some European countries, such as Italy. However, looking at the total number of disasters
relative to a country’s surface or the total number of people affected relative to a country’s total
population might provide a different perspective on natural disaster occurrence and impact. Such
an analysis accounts for variability among countries with very large and very small populations,
although some countries covering large areas still come out on top.
As an indicator of severity also economic losses in absolute terms can clearly be misleading and
should not be used except to compare countries with similar economic conditions. For international
comparison, it is rather recommendable to apply a system of standardization by looking at the cost of
a disaster relative to a country’s total market value of goods and services produced, namely its gross
domestic product (GDP). Thus, a clear picture emerges of the intensity of economic consequences
of a disaster on a particular country. This makes comparisons between countries easier. The Kobe
disaster listed above, which constitutes the most expensive disaster in absolute terms (US$ 136
billion), in fact represented less that 3% of Japan’s GDP, while the devastating earthquake that
occured in Guatemala in 1976 accounted for almost 25% of its GDP. Similarly, Hurricane Katrina
which hit New Orleans in 2005 and is the second largest disaster in terms of cost in the EM-DAT
database, represented only about 0.93% of the total U.S. GDP.
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Figure 2.1: Natural disasters country overview 1900-2009
Figure 2.1 compares the impacts of natural disasters on selected countries that occurred since 1900.
In the plane region of the graph the annualized fatality rates are standardized to one million inhab-
itants and the annualized damage costs are set in proportion to the countries’ previous year GDPs.
Using the year of the disaster might be misleading due to an often observed abrupt change in the
country’s GDP as a consequence of the disaster. The height of each country’s pie chart displays
the GDP per capita as an indicator of wealth, whereas the pies’ surface sizes indicate the absolute
number of disaster occurrences since 1900. The surface of each pie is further subdivided into the
diverse disaster types to show the relative importance of particular events on the countries’ total
disaster exposure. It is distinguished between earthquakes, floods, storms and other events, which
subsume droughts, extreme temperatures, volcanic eruptions and wildfires.
In line with the above discussion it is clearly seen that the disaster events arrogate the highest relative
death tolls in developing countries such as Bangladesh, China and India, while Japan and Italy also
rank comparatively high due to devastating earthquake events that have occurred in the previous
century. In terms of relative economic damage cost it becomes obvious that Bangladesh takes the
lead with annualized disaster damage costs of 0.08% of total GDP, followed by Japan, China, the
U.S. and Italy. The UK, Germany and France in contrast, rank very low in both categories and are
thus statistically comparatively weakly affected by natural disasters. With respect to total recorded
disaster occurrences the U.S. is mostly hit, followed by China, India and Indonesia.
Scientific predictions and evidence indicate that global climate change will increase the number
of extreme events in the future, creating more frequent and intensified natural hazards [228]. In
addition, population growth, urbanization and the inability of poor populations to escape from the
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vicious cycle of poverty makes it more likely that there will be a further increase in the number of
people who are vulnerable to natural hazards, with a resulting increase of natural disasters. All these
facts highlight the urgent need for developing risk management strategies that make the systematic
assessment and treatment of disaster risk more tractable and help to protect people and property
in the best possible way.
2.2 The Ambiguity of Disaster Risk
The analysis and management of natural disaster risk is a highly multidisciplinary field of research.
It involves the work of natural scientists to determine the hazard characteristic parameters such as
probability of occurrence and intensity of an event for a specific location, followed by a profound
engineering analysis about the building structure and infrastructural responses due to natural disas-
ter loads. Moreover, investigations of economists are needed to estimate the monetary consequences
of the damages and harms to the affected region, resulting in a political discussion about how to
handle the peril in order to guarantee an adequate safety level for society.
The necessity to consider disaster management from the perspective of a great variety of sciences
has led to the development of various quantitative as well as qualitative approaches towards disaster
management. Each field is trying to cultivate its own understanding of the disaster related terms.
As a result, communication within the disaster management community is often accompanied by
misunderstandings and confusion due to colliding definitions and concepts. Therefore, a homoge-
neous understanding of disaster management is crucial for an efficient coordination of the important
sub-steps and collaboration throughout the various disciplines.
Due to this problem an extensive literature review has been performed. In the following, exemplary
disaster risk definitions are provided to demonstrate the far reaching risk terminology existing in
literature.
• "The risk associated with flood disaster for any region is a product of both the region’s exposure
to the hazard (natural event) and the vulnerability of objects (society) to the hazard. It
suggests that three main factors contribute to a region’s flood disaster risk: hazard, exposure
and vulnerability." Hori et al. [117]
• "Risk is the product of hazard (H) and vulnerability (V) as they affect a series of elements (E)
comprising the population, properties, economic activities, public services, and so on, under
the threat of disaster in a given area." Alexander [7]
• "The probability of harmful consequences, or expected loss of lives, people injured, property,
livelihoods, economic activity disrupted (or environment damaged) resulting from interactions
between natural and human induced hazards and vulnerable conditions. Risk is conventionally
expressed by the equation: Risk = Hazard x Vulnerability." UNDP [251]
• "Risk is the probability of an event multiplied by the consequences if the event occurs." Einstein
[72]
• "A combination of the probability or frequency of occurrence of a defined hazard and the mag-
nitude of the consequences of the occurrence. More specific, a risk is defined as the probability
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of harmful consequences, or expected loss (of lives, people, injured, property, livelihoods, eco-
nomic activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from interactions between natural
or human induced hazards." European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON) [183]
• "Risk is an expression or possible loss over a specific period of time or number of operational
cycles. It may be indicated by the probability of an accident times the damage in dollars, lives,
or operating units." Hammer [101]
Out of these citations basically five widespread classes of disaster risk definitions are extractable:
1. risk := hazard · vulnerability · exposure
2. risk := hazard · vulnerability
3. risk := probability · consequences
4. risk := probability · loss
5. risk := probability · damage
These risk formulae as well as the exemplary verbal definitions evidence that the different under-
standings of the term risk are mainly due to diverse comprehensions of the terms hazard, vulnera-
bility, exposure, damage and loss. Obviously, the definition boundaries are blurred and intersecting
between the authors’ grasps. Therefore, there is the need to clearly clarify what is understood by
each term. Furthermore, it is evident throughout the definitions that no clear formula is used to
define the risk. Whereas some authors define risk as a product of several terms, others even avoid
any mathematical deepness by simply arguing that risk is a function of several expressions. This
observation has also been made by Thywissen [248], who even goes a step further in arguing:
"Risk is seen as a function of hazard, vulnerability, exposure and resilience, while the
mathematical relationship between the variables is unknown."
In this sense, also the above collected risk formulae (1)-(5) are not to be understood too mathe-
matically, but rather illustratively to emphasize the composition of disaster risk. The only clear
mathematical formula to quantify risk, that is known by the author, is the PEER equation for
earthquake risk that is provided in Baker et al. [21].
In the next section a fully developed disaster management methodology is presented that clearly
outlines the important sub-steps of risk management and supplies unambiguous definitions of the
risk defining terms. After this introduction, the theoretical background is sufficient to demonstrate
how the above listed definitions interrelate and can be included in the framework.
2.3 The Probabilistic Risk Management Framework
The proposed risk management framework that is presented in this section has been developed in
close correlation to Pliefke et al. [201, 208] and is structured in compliance with AS/NZS 4360 [19]
that define a risk management process as the:
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"Systematic application of policies, procedures and practices to the task of identifying,
analysing, evaluating, treating and monitoring risk."
The additional value of this chapter in comparison to [201, 208] lies in the development of a sound
mathematical description of all risk defining terms and steps to be performed within the framework.
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the three main components of the framework are given through risk
identification, risk assessment and risk treatment and are performed sequentially throughout the
risk management process, accompanied by a risk review step and continuous risk monitoring.
Figure 2.2: The general risk management framework
The risk review process is assigned to the task to constantly include all new information, knowledge
and experience about the risk and to indicate its evolution within the process over time. Thus, the
risk is updated on a regular basis. It should be emphasized that the risk review process is only
performed for risks that have already run through the whole process at least once. Consequently,
in each risk review iteration the effectiveness of possibly implemented risk reduction interventions
becomes visible. The risk monitoring procedure in contrast, captures the exchange of information
of all persons actively or passively involved or participating in the risk management process. This
exchange of information is necessary to guarantee a smooth collaboration between interdisciplinary
researchers and to discover new hazards due to the ever changing environment.
2.3.1 Risk Identification
The prerequisite for performing the risk identification phase and therefore to initiate the operation
of the risk management chain is the condition of being aware of a dangerous situation. If this
is met, first of all the boundaries of the model domain have to be circumscribed by defining the
system under analysis. The system can be composed of a single building or infrastructure element,
a city, a region or even an entire country. Next, all sources of events that potentially endanger the
functionality of the system have to be identified and are characterized by the term hazard. Thus,
the risk identification step leads to an answer to the question "what can happen and where?". As
soon as this analysis is completed for a particular location, it is proceeded with the risk assessment
phase.
2.3.2 Risk Assessment
After having outlined the model domain and identified all possible hazards to the system, the
risk assessment phase starts to operate, representing the first crucial step of the risk management
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framework. The risk assessment itself consists of two sub-procedures, namely risk analysis and risk
evaluation, whose tasks are to be seen in quantifying the risk and comparing it to other competing
risks, respectively. A brief overview of the risk assessment procedure is provided in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: The risk assessment phase
2.3.2.1 Risk Analysis
The risk analysis procedure, depicted in Figure 2.4, represents the most sophisticated part of the risk
assessment phase, whose major objective lies in the quantification of the risk defining parameters
and finally the risk itself, most desirably in monetary units per time unit (i.e. US$ /year). In order
to reach this ambition, first of all a hazard assessment is being performed, where the hazard itself
as well as its diverse impacts on the different elements of the system are evaluated.
Hazard Assessment The hazard assessment subroutine starts with a hazard analysis where the
intensity and frequency parameters of each identified hazard type with respect to the predefined
system are estimated. As the calculation of these parameters depends largely on historical data, so
called return periods play an important role in hazard analysis. These return periods are computed
from a set of recorded past events in combination with expert judgments and sophisticated statistical
techniques, which are employed to include changes in environmental conditions as well as rare events
for which few observations are available or recorded history is exceeded. Formally speaking, a return
period for a certain hazard intensity is the expected mean time (in years) between the occurrences
of two hazard events reaching or exceeding the given intensity level.
To exemplify, a return period of 20 years for a hazard of intensity x signifies that during the previous
100 years, a hazard with intensity x or greater has occurred within the system about five times.
So the average time span between two hazard events with intensity x or greater is 20 years and
therefore the event is often being referred to as a "20-year event".
Return periods are traditionally used to express the frequency of occurrence of an event, although
it is often confused with the probability of occurrence or the probability of exceedance of that
event. As it is aimed at evaluating the risk on an annual basis, the latter two expressions are clearly
advantageous in the following risk calculation as they reflect information about the annual frequency.
Formally, the following relationship holds between the return period Tr of a hazard intensity x and
the probability P that the actual hazard intensity HI will exceed x within one year [97]:
P (HI ≥ x) = 1
Tr(x)
(2.1)
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Figure 2.4: The risk analysis phase
Assuming that hazard data are available for all thinkable hazard intensities x, the (continuous)
exceedance probability curve φHI is easily obtained. It yields the probability that a hazard with
a given intensity will be reached or exceeded during a one year interval. Therefore, the following
relation is satisfied:
φHI(x) = P (HI ≥ x) (2.2)
From this exceedance probability curve φHI the cumulative distribution function FHI for the hazard
intensity x can straightforwardly be obtained:
FHI(x) = 1− φHI(x) (2.3)
Consequently, both the annual exceedance probability curve φHI as well as the cumulative distri-
bution function FHI contain exactly the same information about the hazard for a given system and
differ only in the way of presentation. They can therefore be both taken into account to calculate
the risk subsequently. In this context it is often more convenient to include the hazard intensity
by means of probability density functions (PDF), which can be either determined on basis of the
cumulative probability function or the exceedance probability curve:
fHI(x) =
d
dx
FHI(x)
=
d
dx
(1− φHI(x))
=
∣∣∣∣ ddxφHI(x)
∣∣∣∣
(2.4)
To draw a conclusion, the result of the hazard analysis subroutine is a realvalued function φHI , FHI
or fHI respectively, that captures information about the annual probability of occurrence for different
hazard intensities. A comprehensive discussion on how to estimate the probability of occurrences
specifically for different hazard types is provided in [268].
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Once the hazard data for the system have been quantified, it needs to be analyzed which components
of the system are exposed, i.e. potentially endangered by the impact of the hazard of a given
intensity. In this way, a subdivision of the system into elements at risk (EaR) and elements at
non risk (EaNR) is performed, depending on the hazard under consideration:
Exposure(x) :=
{
0, if Element is not exposed for hazard intensity x
y, if Element is exposed for hazard intensity x
(2.5)
As the EaNR are by definition not exposed, they are not threatened by the hazard and can therefore
be excluded from further analysis. An EaR on the contrary, represents a building or an other arbi-
trary infrastructure element that is characterized by several parameters that have to be determined.
Among these are precise location parameters within the system, information about the functional
use (residential, commercial, industrial), occupancy (inventory of contents, number of people living
or working inside) and construction type (building material, number of stories, construction year).
Figure 2.5: Risk analysis performed on micro-, meso- and macro-scales
In this respect, the location parameters serve primarily to forecast the pathways of the hazard, i.e.
to convert the impact of a hazard of a given intensity x to the system to a hazard load y affecting
the particular EaR situated in a certain area within the system. As the development of the hazard
within the system is only assessable probabilistically, a so called pathway function [192] that converts
the hazard intensity x to a hazard load y is introduced by means of a conditional PDF fHL|HI :
Hazard intensity x
fHL|HI−→ Hazard load y (2.6)
According to the law of total probability, that can be reviewed in Appendix B, this pathway function
is taken into account to calculate the PDF of the hazard load for the considered EaR:
fHL(y) =
∫
fHL|HI(y, x)fHI(x)dx (2.7)
The remaining EaR parameters other than location in contrast, are designed to predict the reaction
of the EaR in case of disaster occurrence as well as the immediate and longterm aftermaths that go
in line with it. A detailed discussion about the EaR parameters is provided in Grossi et al. [97].
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If larger systems such as whole cities, regions or even entire countries are considered, it will hardly
be possible to perform the risk analysis on a micro level, i.e. to investigate each EaR individually
for its reaction towards disaster load or at least not at a reasonable cost. Therefore, in order to
facilitate the analysis, it is possible to group EaRs with similar characteristics into EaR classes,
depending on the hazard under consideration. Then, the further analysis can concentrate on one
typical representative out of each EaR class, assuming that all other EaR of the same category
will show similar behavior. Depending on the size of the EaR classes this approach then results
in a micro-, meso- or macro-level risk analysis. Surely, the advantageousness of this decrease in
complexity going along with reduced investigation cost comes at the price of a reduced accuracy, as
visualized in Figure 2.5.
In order to finally decide on which scale to perform the risk analysis, one might try to maximize the
following equation
Efficiency =
Accuracy
Complexity
(2.8)
for a given investigation budget, as suggested by [150].
Damage Assessment After all the EaR (classes) have been identified and clearly delineated,
the structural behavior of each EaR (class) has to be predicted contingent upon hazard load. The
damage module of an EaR is strongly dependent on the structural response of the EaR and captures
the physical harm only. It is expressible by a large variety of measures, e.g. water height, crack
width, story drift, which are used to derive damage states. It needs to be clearly emphasized however,
that damage is not measured in monetary value.
The relation between hazard load and the resulting damage is called structural vulnerability
and may be interpreted as a measure of building performance. As the damage z for a given hazard
load y can only be estimated probabilistically, structural vulnerability is best described on basis of
a conditional PDF fDA|HL, which has also been suggested by Faizian et al. [78]:
Hazard load HL
fDA|HL−→ Damage DA (2.9)
Thus, the structural vulnerability is an EaR (class) specific characteristic that indicates the degree
of physical susceptibility towards the impact of the hazard. Having determined the structural vul-
nerability, the law of total probability is employable once again to calculate the PDF of the damage
fDA of the considered EaR (class):
fDA(z) =
∫
fDA|HL(z, y)fHL(y)dy (2.10)
Now, by taking formula (2.7) into account, the probability of damage can directly be related to the
hazard intensity:
fDA(z) =
∫∫
fDA|HL(z, y)fHL|HI(y, x)fHI(x)dxdy (2.11)
Subsequent to the prediction of the structural behavior of all EaR (classes), the consequences
for the system that might go in line with a given level of damage of the exposed elements have
to be analyzed. For this investigation the above sketched characteristic parameters of each EaR
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(class) need to be taken into account. It is distinguished between direct consequences that occur
simultaneously to the time the disaster takes place and indirect consequences, which occur with
a time shift as a result of the direct consequences.
Figure 2.6: Categorization of disaster consequences
Whereas direct consequences are in a straight line linked to the coping capacity of the system,
i.e. the ability to withstand the natural forces and to provide immediate help, indirect consequences
are linked to the resilience, i.e. the capacity of the system to remain functional and recover from
the disaster. In addition, each consequence class is further subdivided into tangible or economic
consequences that are directly measurable in monetary terms and intangible consequences, which
are not directly appraisable, e.g. injuries and fatalities, pollution of the environment, loss of cultural
social and historical (CSH) values etc.. A comprehensive study about consequence assessment in
application to earthquake risk is given in [78]. Figure 2.6 summarizes the above discussion and
provides an overview of the consequence classification.
Loss Assessment After all possible consequences for each EaR (class) and thus for the system
as a whole have been determined, loss appraises and eventually accumulates all direct and indirect
consequences at the time the disaster takes place, as visualized in Figure 2.7. In this respect, the
indirect consequences that occur later in time have to be discounted on basis of a properly defined
discount rate that is specific for each consequence class. The loss LO is then characterized by means
of the net present value (NPV), which represents the sum of discounted expected future consequences
and is calculated as:
Loss =
N∑
t=0
E [Consequenceit]
(1 + ri)t
(2.12)
where E denotes the expected value operator and ri represents a properly defined discount factor
specific for each consequence class i to include time preferences.
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Figure 2.7: Loss assessment
In this context, system vulnerability is an EaR (class) specific characteristic, that links damage
to loss and indicates the total potential the hazard has on the EaR (class) and in a second step on
the system as a whole. Again, as the loss resulting from a given damage state can only be predicted
in probabilistic terms, system vulnerability is best described by a conditional PDF fLO|DA:
Damage DA
fLO|DA−→ Loss LO (2.13)
Thus, for a given damage state, system vulnerability contains information about the susceptibility
of the EaR (class) and its contents towards that damage as well as the resulting disruption of
functionality within the system. In the prediction of system vulnerability interdependencies between
EaR (classes) need to be properly accounted for. It is crucially dependent on the latter how severe the
consequences to the system will be once a certain EaR (class) damage has occurred. Consequently,
system vulnerability allows for an interpretation in terms of system performance.
Having this formulation for the system vulnerability at hand, the PDF for the loss is easily obtained
by applying the law of total probability:
fLO(v) =
∫
fLO|DA(v, z)fDA(z)dz (2.14)
In analogy to the damage also the probability of loss can directly be related to the hazard intensity
by substituting expression (2.11) for the PDF of the damage:
fLO(v) =
∫∫∫
fLO|DA(v, z)fDA|HL(z, y)fHL|HI(y, x)fHI(x)dxdydz (2.15)
The risk analysis phase terminates with the quantification of risk for the considered EaRs (classes)
as well as for the system as a whole. In quantifying the risk, all previously collected information
about the single risk components is comprised. It is distinguished between two different types of
risk that are introduced subsequently.
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Structural Risk Firstly, the risk an EaR is exposed to may be interpreted in terms of physical
harm imposed by the hazard and is calculated by taking the product of the annual probability of
occurrence of the damage multiplied by the damage that goes in line with it. According to this
understanding, risk equals the expected damage per year and is expressed by the following equation:
RD = Damage · Probability [Damage measure / year]
=
∫
z · fDA(z)dz
(2.16)
It is being referred to as structural risk. Evidently, the structural risk is of primary importance for
civil engineers in order to have a number on hand that subsumes the behavior and the response of
a structure or structural element under potential hazard load. In line with the above discussion,
structural risk is also directly relatable to the hazard source by substituting the PDF of damage
fDA in equation (2.16) with the identity given in (2.11):
RD =
∫∫∫
z · fDA|HL(z, y)fHL|HI(y, x)fHI(x)dxdydz (2.17)
From this alternative formulation of the structural risk, which is absolutely equivalent to definition
(2.16), the composition of the risk is clarified. It becomes obvious which of the risk defining com-
ponents has the largest impact on its absolute value. Before the second risk calculation scheme
is discussed, it is important to highlight at this point that the damage measure and therefore the
structural risk is characteristic for each EaR (class). As the whole system is usually composed of a
great heterogeneity of EaR (classes), it is rather unconventional to accumulate the structural risks
across EaR (classes) to obtain a structural risk on aggregate level. This is due to the fact that one
physical damage measure such as crack width cannot be used equivalently for two different building
typologies such as concrete and masonry. This is in sharp contrast to the total risk introduced below,
which is based on the loss concept and thus comparable across EaR classes.
Total Risk The second way to express the risk for an EaR (class) is to take the product of the
annual probability of occurrence of the loss and the loss that goes in line with it. This calculation
scheme sets the risk equal to the expected annual loss and is characterized by the following equation:
RL = Loss · Probability [Loss measure / year]
=
∫
v · fLO(v)dv
(2.18)
It is being referred to as total risk. As demonstrated for the structural risk, the total risk can also
be directly related to the hazard source, by replacing the PDF of loss fLO with the identity provided
in equation (2.15):
RL =
∫∫∫∫
v · fLO|DA(v, z)fDA|HL(z, y)fHL|HI(y, x)fHI(x)dxdydzdv (2.19)
As outlined above, this formula shows the composition of the total risk in a more exhaustive fashion
and is absolutely identical to (2.18).
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The total risk may comprise all consequences, both tangible and intangible, if a reasonable way
has been found to convert the primary intangible consequences to monetary value. Alternatively,
this transformation of intangible outcomes may be omitted and the total risk split with respect to
the specific consequence classes. Then, a total risk for each consequence class is obtained and the
relative contribution of each consequence class to total harm is quoted separately in units of the
respective loss measure (e.g. money, loss of life etc.).
The total risk is a more extensive measure than the structural risk. Not only the instant damage,
but the full consequences over time resulting from that damage are evaluated and included in the
calculation. As the various consequences have been appraised by means of an adequate loss measure
in the context of total risk, it is possible to compare and accumulate the total risk across EaRs
(classes). As a result, a total risk for the system on aggregate level is assessable:
RL(System) =
N∑
i=1
RL(EaRi) (2.20)
In this expression for the total risk to the system it is implicitly assumed that interrelated losses
that occur due to interactions between the single EaRs (classes) within the system are accounted
for, by assigning them cautiously to the expected losses of the single EaR (classes).
2.3.2.2 Risk Evaluation
Subsequent to the termination of the risk analysis procedure, the risk evaluation phase is initiated.
The purpose of risk evaluation is to make the risk under investigation comparable to other competing
risks to the system, by using adequate risk measures. Several commonly applied risk measures are
depicted in Figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8: Risk evaluation
In this context, so called exceedance probability curves have found wide acceptance as a common
tool to illustrate risk graphically. In an exceedance probability curve the probability that a certain
level of loss is surpassed within a specific time period is plotted against different loss levels, as shown
in Figure 2.9. In line with the above discussion, it is possible to construct an exceedance probability
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curve EP either by means of the PDF of the loss fLO or the corresponding cumulative distribution
function FLO and has the following mathematical representation:
EP (v) := 1− FLO(v) = 1−
∫
fLO(v)dv (2.21)
Hereby, the loss to the system can be specified in terms of monetary loss, of fatalities or of other
suitable impact measures. An insightful overview and more in depth discussion of common risk
measures and tools to compare risks is provided in [210].
Figure 2.9: Exceedance probability curve
Having analyzed the risk on basis of adequate risk measures, it may be graded into priority classes
that highlight, which risks are relatively most threatening to the system and where mitigation
measures need to be implemented most urgently. The grading of risks hereby depends on the risk
perception of the analyst. Accordingly, the output of the risk evaluation is a prioritized list of risks
for further action.
2.3.3 Risk Treatment
After the risk to the predefined system has been analyzed and graded into a risk class, the last
procedure of the risk management framework, the risk treatment phase, begins to operate. This
procedure is assigned to the task to create a rational basis for deciding about how to handle the risk
in the presence of other competing risks. Based on several analytical tools from decision mathematics,
finance, economics and public choice theory, a decision whether to accept, to transfer, to reject or to
reduce a given risk is derived. In the latter case, risk mitigation initiatives are implemented. Figure
2.10 visualizes the process of risk treatment schematically.
If the risk is to be mitigated, decision makers are able to choose among several alternatives to
implement a risk reduction measure. All possible risk reduction strategies have in common that they
reduce either the exposure or the vulnerability of the system. Depending on the specific strategy
that is chosen, it may either reduce structural vulnerability by increasing the resistance of structures
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through retrofitting and other improvements or system vulnerability by enhancing the response of
the system to the occurring damages and developing strategies to recover from the disaster as quickly
as possible. The construction of a dyke to protect properties close to the water might be taken as an
example to reduce exposure with respect to flood risk. In the following, the strategies are subdivided
according to the time the risk reduction project becomes effective.
Figure 2.10: The risk treatment phase
Firstly, so called pre-disaster interventions, such as prevention and preparedness, are available.
Prevention includes technical measures like structural strengthening that are to be performed with
an accurate time horizon before the disaster takes place. Typical examples are dykes against floods
or dampers against dynamic actions. Preparedness in contrast, contains all social activities, e.g.
evacuation plans and emergency training, that are necessary to limit harm shortly before the disaster
takes place.
Secondly, post-disaster strategies may be pursued to reduce the risk. Among these, response cov-
ers all activities that are performed immediately after the occurrence of the disaster, such as the
organization of help and shelter for the injured and harmed as well as the coordination of emer-
gency forces. Recovery on the contrary, subsumes all activities that need to be undertaken until
the pre-disaster status of the system is restored again. Examples for recovery activities might be
emergency plans that guarantee the quick reconstruction of damaged sides, the provision of financial
aid to the harmed and the quick revitalization of affected economic sectors. Straightforwardly, also
a combination of the classified activities is applicable to mitigate the risk.
The process of risk treatment is further discussed in Section 2.6, where public risk reduction projects
are studied in depth. Figure 2.11 summarizes the above discussion by reviewing the entire risk man-
agement framework schematically. A comprehensive compilation of all introduced risk management
terms is provided in Appendix A.
2.4 Integration of Risk Definitions
Following the introduction of the general risk management framework it is discussed in this section,
how the risk definitions of Section 2.2 interrelate. Even if the referenced authors might have had
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Figure 2.11: The complete risk management framework
different understandings in mind, an interpretation of the risk definitions within the above described
methodology is presented. This is done by taking the previously established basal terms and defini-
tions as a baseline for argumentation. In the following, the review of risk Def. (1)-(5) is separated
in two segments with respect to the affinity of formulation.
Firstly, risk Def. (1) and (2) are considered together as they both do not include a measure of hazard
outcome in their risk formula. Therefore, it might be concluded that these two definitions do not
seek to express risk in terms of an expected value but are rather trying to provide a formulation for
the full outcome distribution. The two Def. (1) and (2) have the hazard and the vulnerability term
in common, while Def. (1) contains an additional exposure multiplier.
Referring to the above derived expressions for the PDF of the loss (2.15) and the damage (2.11)
respectively, Def. (1) can be retraced basically in two distinct ways:
fDA(z) =
∫∫
fDA|HL(z, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
structural vulnerability
fHL|HI(y, x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
exposure
fHI(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
hazard
dxdy (2.22)
fLO(v) =
∫∫∫
fLO|DA(v, z)fDA|HL(z, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
total vulnerability
fHL|HI(y, x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
exposure
fHI(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
hazard
dxdydz (2.23)
The reason why there are these two possibilities to interpret risk Def. (1) from the perspective of
the provided risk management framework is because it is not obvious from the definition whether
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structural or system vulnerability is being referred to. If structural vulnerability is taken into
account, the definition can be included in the framework by means of formula (2.22) and represents
the damage distribution for the considered element. If on the contrary the vulnerability term is
intended to reflect also system vulnerability, expression (2.23) is appropriate to embed Def. (1) in
the framework. In this case Def. (1) represents the loss distribution for the considered element.
In both (2.22) and (2.23) the hazard pathway function has been declared to reflect the exposure.
This can be justified from the point of view that an arbitrary system element becomes exposed (and
thus an EaR) to the hazard as soon as the hazard load on the element exceeds a certain threshold
level, so that damage is caused. Therefore, Def. (1) is better suited for the analysis of entire systems,
that are composed both of endangered objects (EaR) and non endangered objects (EaNR) that are
distributed unevenly within the system. Consequently, the exposure term has to be included in the
definition in order to firstly analyze the way the hazard is evoluting within the system, and based
on this to identify exposed elements for which further analysis is being performed.
In Def.(2) on the other hand, the exposure term is omitted, making the following two inclusions
possible:
fDA(z) =
∫
fDA|HL=HI(z, x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
structural vulnerability
fHI(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
hazard
dx (2.24)
fLO(v) =
∫∫
fLO|DA(v, z)fDA|HL=HI(z, x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
total vulnerability
fHI(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
hazard
dxdz (2.25)
In line with the above discussion, the vulnerability term can be interpreted in two distinct ways,
resulting in two possible representations (2.24) and (2.25). As neither formula contains an exposure
term, Def. (2) is specifically tailored for an application of the risk analysis for one single structural
element which is then identical to the whole system. In this case, exposure to the impact of the
hazard is a prerequisite for initiating the investigation, as outlined in Paragraph 2.3.1. As the system
is restricted to one element, there is no hazard pathway and the hazard intensity and hazard load
components coincide. Therefore, the outcome distribution is sufficiently described by the product
of hazard and vulnerability.
Secondly, risk Def. (3)-(5) are considered jointly as they all contain a measure for the hazard
outcome, i.e. consequences, loss and damage, while they have the probability multiplier in common.
Obviously, when risk is calculated in this way, an expected value for the respective outcome is
obtained. As the three definitions differ in their understanding of hazard outcome, the probability
multiplier has to be treated case specifically and therefore differs throughout the definitions. It
represents the probability that the respective outcome occurs and can be obtained by taking Def.
(1) and (2) into account. Consequently, the probability multiplier comprises all information about
hazard intensity, exposure and vulnerability, as illustrated above.
With reference to the outcome specification, the use of the term consequence in Def. (3) is most
general and makes a detailed listing of the diverse harms to the system necessary. The depth of
analysis cannot be judged upon on basis of the formula. It may either finish with the determination
of physical harm to the considered system or include the total spectrum of adverse outcomes over
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time. In the first case Def. (3) would coincide with expected damage or structural risk, whereas
in the second case it would be identical to expected loss or total risk. Def. (3) is most suitable in
political decision processes. In this area, it is essential to know precisely which parts of the system
are especially endangered by the hazard and to which extent. With this information, specifically
tailored risk treatment strategies can be developed.
The use of loss in Def. (4) and damage in Def. (5) as an outcome measure however, entails an
evaluation of the consequences on basis of a suitable impact measure, and differs in the depth of
analysis. If loss is taken into account, it is implicit in the definition that all possible consequences,
both direct and indirect, need to be considered and evaluated, dependent on their occurrence in
time. Here, Def. (4) is equivalent to the total risk defined in (2.18):
RL =
∫∫∫∫
v︸︷︷︸
Loss
· fLO|DA(v, z)fDA|HL(z, y)fHL|HI(y, x)fHI(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability of Loss
dxdydzdv (2.26)
The use of loss as an outcome measure is advantageous in an economic context, where it is important
for instance to relate disaster risk to measures like national income. Furthermore, the effects of risk
reduction projects in terms of reduced loss can directly be incorporated in a cost benefit analysis
(CBA). Also in insurance industry the calculation of premiums for disaster insurance rely on the
loss concept.
Finally, if as in Def. (5) damage is taken into account to express the outcome, the calculation results
in the structural risk defined in (2.16):
RD =
∫∫∫
z︸︷︷︸
Damage
· fDA|HL(z, y)fHL|HI(y, x)fHI(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability of Damage
dxdydz (2.27)
In this case, the physical harm of the system elements is in the focus of attention. The expression
of risk in terms of damage is of primary importance in civil engineering to express the structural
behavior under hazard load. Based on this, the engineer is able to decide for instance whether it is
necessary to retrofit a building at a particular risk prone location to improve its performance and
guarantee an adequate safety level to its occupants.
2.5 Public Risk Reduction Projects
Risks that have a potentially high impact on the system in relation to other risks are graded in a
high priority class in the risk evaluation phase and need to be treated subsequently. One important
strategy of risk treatment is to mitigate the risks by implementing risk reduction measures. While
each endangered subject of the system, such as households and firms, can take private precaution
to reduce their personal risk for instance by retrofitting their property to withstand wind and
earthquake loading or transferring a part of the risk by purchasing some form of insurance, it is a
matter of their risk perceptions and level of information whether they will do so in the end. Here,
in particular private homeowners are among the least active stakeholders in the risk management
process. Many homeowners do not take action even if the risk is abundantly clear and loss reducing
measures are widely available. The reason for this is that they feel that a disaster will not affect
them [97].
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Therefore, it is often in the hand of the public authority, i.e. the federal, state and local governments,
to take the lead in managing disaster risk on large scales [145]. There are a variety of measures at
disposition for the government to engage in risk reduction, both legislative and administrative, to
enhance the level of protection of people and property and guarantee an adequate safety level that
applies to all [196]. Building codes that include criteria for wind or earthquake resistance and
legislation for land use might serve as examples of public risk reduction. Also, incentive programs
instituted to reduce losses from disaster events might be followed. California’s Proposition 127 [20]
enacted in 1990 is a good illustration of the later category. It guarantees to private homeowners
that those who perform seismic retrofits to their property will not face increased property tax
until ownership changes. Further examples for public risk reduction projects might be seen in
the construction of dykes or rain storage reservoirs to limit flood risk, the retrofitting and regular
surveillance of public buildings and infrastructure elements, such as bridges, tunnels, pipelines and
many more.
In all these public activities that might be undertaken to reduce disaster risk, the government has
mainly two incentives to allocate resources to risk reduction:
1. As the government in its role as the insurer of the last resort [164] often takes on the respon-
sibility of providing funds to cover losses from catastrophic disasters, it has a direct economic
incentive to mitigate the risk from these events. If preventative measures have been imple-
mented with adequate time horizon before a disaster takes place, it directly pays for the
government in case of disaster occurrence.
2. The government aims at serving the public interest. Risk reduction investments might provide
the public authority with the opportunity to increase the welfare of its citizens and of society
as a whole.
As public resources are limited, the decision to devote resources to disaster risk reduction must
be continually appraised in light of other competing needs. Allocating resources in disaster risk
reduction means taking resources away elsewhere, such as health care, education and social services
that also have the potential to enhance social welfare [195]. There is an increasing cost to a fixed
increment of risk reduction. Absolute safety cannot be obtained and even less at a reasonable cost.
Therefore, it is necessary to strike a balance between the cost of risk reduction and its benefits,
making trade-offs in the decision process unavoidable.
CBA now constitutes a valuable economic tool to systematically access and evaluate the cost and
benefits that are associated with a risk reduction project in order to assist the public authority in
making informed and rational decisions. The application of CBA to public risk reduction projects
however, brings along certain difficulties. As a great part of the benefits in terms of reduced disaster
consequences of the various categories are of intangible nature, such as prevented fatalities or reduced
environmental and CSH losses, a reasonable way has to be found to convert these preserved values
to monetary value in order to relate them meaningfully to the project cost. Here, the willingness
to pay (WTP) concept is an important economic tool to appraise intangible values, as illustrated in
particular in Chapters 4 and 5 in its special application to safety. Furthermore, as many different
individuals are affected by the project and to different extents, there is often no consensus about the
project decision and a conflict of interest results. Here, welfare economic serves as the theoretical
basis to identify policy changes which are beneficial for society as a whole, as outlined in Chapter 3.
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Outline - Considered Risk Reduction Projects
Before it is proceeded with characterizing social risk reduction projects economically, it is first
necessary to specify the type of risk reduction projects that are considered in this thesis within the
risk management framework. As public risk reduction projects are in the focus of attention that are
evaluated by means of a social CBA, it is obvious that comparatively large projects are the subject
of study. Such an analysis only makes sense, if a rather large number of individuals is potentially
affected and the impacts of the intervention are measurable on aggregate level. Therefore, the
system under consideration is assumed to be an entire country, a region, a city or at least a suburb,
including a substantial number of structural elements and people exposed to the risk and where the
final decision about project appraisal is in the hand of the public authority.
Furthermore, the performance of a social CBA requires some time to collect all the data and is
therefore of particular importance within preventative disaster management. Disaster reduction
activities of this category are performed with considerable time horizon before the disaster takes
place where its occurrence is a pure statistical issue.
Strategies of the categories preparedness in contrast, might not leave enough time to carry out cost
benefit considerations as the disaster is already about to strike the system. A quick decision about
how to evacuate people and protect property in the short term is needed. The same holds for
response activities. As the disaster has already taken place, an immediate decision about how to
allocate emergency forces and provide shelter to the victims of the disaster is necessary to prevent
the disaster aftermaths from becoming even more devastating. Also for the evaluation of disaster
risk reduction strategies of the category recovery there is the urgency to regain the functionality
of the system as quickly as possible. Only in this way, the occurrence of further indirect disaster
consequences such as business interruption is avoidable, making a time consuming investigation
unfeasible.
At this point it has to be noted however, that the distinction between the different risk reduction
strategies with respect to their implementation relative to the time of disaster occurrence is often
not as sharp as it may seem. Also preparedness, response and recovery activities require attentive
planning with adequate time horizon before a possible disaster. Consequently, their implementation
is shortly before, immediately after and shortly after the disaster respectively, while their planning is
to be considered as preventative. Nevertheless, it is focused on structural risk reduction measures in
the following that either reduce the exposure of the system’s elements or their structural vulnerability.
2.6 Public Risk Reduction Projects - The Economic View
From an engineering point of view there are many possibilities to engage in disaster risk reduction,
with examples provided above. All the different measures that might be undertaken differ greatly in
their technical implementation and require an analysis of diverse physical processes. Nevertheless,
they have in common that they all reduce either the exposure or the vulnerability of single EaRs
and thus of the system as a whole, resulting in a reduction of damage and in a second step of loss
in case a disaster occurs.
From an economic point of view in contrast, the technical details of the risk reduction measures are
of minor importance. Here, the risk reduction project decomposes in a series of cost and benefits
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occurring at different points in time. As an initial expenditure is necessary to implement the measure
and the benefits in terms of reduced disaster consequences flow back uncertainly over the effective
period, the public risk reduction intervention meets the basic characteristics of a financial investment
[148]. Furthermore, these investments in preventative disaster risk reduction are largely characterized
by the following three properties:
1. Uncertainty: The cost and even more the benefits are associated with a tremendous amount
of uncertainty. There is uncertainty about the occurrence of a natural disaster as well as its
intensity, about the evolution of its impact within the system, about the damages that might go
in line with a certain hazard load as well as the loss that results from the damaged elements over
time. Also uncertain is the loss reducing potential of the considered risk reduction initiative.
2. Irreversibility: Once the decision has been made to implement the project, the invested
financial means cannot be recovered in case of adverse project development. Consequently, at
least a part of the investment cost is lost or "sunk".
3. Flexibility: There is the possibility to postpone the investment to some later point in time.
This may be advantageous in order to improve the information basis, finally making cost
and benefit estimations more reliable. Certainly, the postponement of the investment entails
the possibility that a disaster occurs in the meantime that could have been confined by an
implementation of the measure in time.
The importance of these three investment characteristics will become clear in Chapter 6, where
a real option approach is developed to account for the flexibility involved in the project decision
under uncertainty. As a result of the above discussion, the social risk reduction project constitutes
an investment that is economically characterized by the cost and benefit occurrences over time.
Therefore, these two driving forces shall be illustrated more in detail subsequently.
2.6.1 Cost of Risk Reduction
The cost of the risk reduction project depends on the specific measure under investigation. To take
into account all cost that accrue over the service life of the measure, the cost assessment is based
on a life cycle cost approach. Accordingly, the total cost CT can be split into investment cost CI ,
operations cost CO, maintenance & repair cost CMR, replacement cost CR and a residual value CRV
[189]:
CT = CI + CO + CMR + CR + CRV (2.28)
The investment cost represents the initial expenditure that is necessary to implement the risk re-
duction project. As it is due at the very beginning of the measure’s service life, it may be estimated
quite reliably under cautions planning. The operations, maintenance & repair cost is a regularly
reoccurring expenditure that is required to maintain its functionality over the design life and to
prevent the risk reduction measure from deteriorating. Whereas the operations cost can usually be
determined quite reliably on an annual basis, the maintenance & repair cost are subject to uncertain-
ties in the time of occurrence as well as in their absolute amounts. The replacement cost covers the
expenditure that is needed to replace single elements of the structure or the structure itself in case of
failure or at the end of their service lives. Normally, the replacement cost is due at rather advanced
ages of the measure’s service life and there is a considerable amount of uncertainty involved in its
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estimation. The residual value is the net worth of the measure at the end of the study period n and
constitutes the only negative cost component. It is especially important when evaluating project
alternatives that have different life expectancies. Table 2.3 provides and exemplary overview of the
different cost components and their possible occurrences over the study period n.
Cost component t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 ... t = n− 1 t = n
Investment CI0 CI1 0 ... 0 0
Operation 0 CO1 CO2 ... COn−1 0
Maintenance & Repair 0 CMR1 CMR2 ... CMRn−1 0
Replacement 0 0 0 ... CRn−1 CRn
Residual Value 0 0 0 ... 0 CRV
Annuity 0 AC AC ... AC AC
Table 2.3: The cost of a risk reduction investment
In order to avoid double counting, the estimation of the different cost components has to be carried
out cautiously in accordance with the characteristics of the special risk reduction measure under
investigation. Here, it has to be distinguished between strengthening measures such as retrofit that
are applied to existing structures and measures that are newly constructed and serve entirely for
protection, such as flood defenses. Whereas the investment cost needs to be fully accounted for
throughout all measures, in the estimation of the other cost components a distinction has to be
made. In case of strengthening measures only the additional operations, maintenance & repair and
replacement cost in comparison to status quo1 have to be considered, while for measures that are
newly implemented, the full cost need to be taken into account. If this cost difference in comparison
to status quo should be negative, it enters the calculation on the benefit side. The same holds for the
estimation of the residual value. In the estimation of the various cost components expected values
are to be taken as a baseline for calculation [216].
The reliable assessment of the various cost components is a complex engineering issue that has to
be carried out case specifically with focus on a particular risk reduction measure. As this thesis
aims at providing a general framework for judging on public risk reduction projects, it is assumed
throughout this thesis that the cost of the risk reduction project are given and at hand. For a more
in depth discussion on life cycle costing it is referred to [85]. What remains to be done from an
economic point of view to is to meaningfully relate the cost to the benefits with respect to their
occurrence in time. In this respect, one possibility is to discount the diverse cost components back
to the decision point t = 0 by means of a properly defined discount rate r to obtain the NPV of the
total cost:
NPVCT =
n∑
t=0
CIt + C
O
t + C
MR
t + C
R
t
(1 + r)t
+
CRV
(1 + r)n
(2.29)
The NPV corresponds to the value of the total cost at the time the decision is made. The second
strategy that might be followed is to transform the stream of cost over time into a constant yearly
cost by means of the annuity:
1Refers to the condition of an EaR or the whole system in the initial situation, before a risk reduction measure
has been implemented.
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AC =
r
1− (1 + r)−n ·NPVCT (2.30)
The transformation of the total cost in a constant annuity cost is sometimes convenient in the
application of social CBA to disaster risk reduction projects, because the benefits are obtained in
terms of reduced annual disaster consequences. Therefore, a comparison by means of the annuity
cost becomes directly possible. Alternatively, the annual benefits may be converted to their present
value and compared to the NPV of the cost.
2.6.2 Benefits of Risk Reduction
Whereas the cost estimation of risk reduction interventions already poses a considerable amount
of difficulties, the assessment of their benefits is an even more challenging task. In the benefit
estimation, the above introduced risk analysis procedure plays a central role. Being more precise,
the procedure is employed to firstly estimate the particular disaster risk in status quo situation and
in a second step under the new conditions that are expected to hold after project implementation.
Then, by performing a risk review iteration, the annual disaster risks before and after the risk
reduction project are compared to net out the measure’s annual benefit potential. It is assumed
in the following that the benefits are formulated in terms of reduced expected annual disaster loss,
quoted separately for each consequence category.
Benefit component t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 ... t = n
Reduced economic loss 0 Becon1 [$] Becon2 [$] ... Beconn [$]
Reduced human loss 0 Bhum1 [m] Bhum2 [m] ... Bhumn [m]
Reduced environm. loss 0 Benv1 [$] Benv2 [$] ... Benvn [$]
Reduced CSH losses 0 BCSH1 [$] BCSH2 [$] ... BCSHn [$]
Table 2.4: The benefits of a risk reduction investment
In order to relate these reduced losses meaningfully to the cost of the project, they need to be
translated into monetary value. In this sense, the evaluation of reduced CSH as well as reduced
environmental losses is beyond the scope of this thesis and they are assumed to have been priced by
the application of some other method available in literature [38, 40, 204, 252]. What remains to be
priced are the reduced annual economic and human losses. Whereas the reduction in economic losses
is already given in monetary terms, the reduced human losses are formulated in terms of prevented
fatalities and injuries per year. The derivation of a social value for the prevented fatalities is best
done by means of the WTP concept, which constitutes one of the main focuses of this thesis and is
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.
As a result, the data input for the social CBA from the benefit side is summarized in Table 2.4,
where it is assumed that the measure becomes effective from period one onwards and saves m lives
annually.
Probabilistic Benefit Assessment
After the benefits of a public risk reduction measure have been outlined, it is now analyzed, how
the measure impacts the loss distribution and thus total disaster risk mathematically. Depending
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on the specific preventative measure that is chosen to reduce the risk, it either causes a reduction in
exposure of the system’s elements or reduces their structural vulnerability. In the present context it
is rational to assume that the measure leads to a higher or at least the same level of protection for
all considered hazard intensities. Statistically, this implies that either the hazard pathway function
fHL|HI or the structural vulnerability function fDA|HL need to be substituted by new functions
gHL|HI or gDA|HL respectively, that are first order stochastically dominated by the old functions
that characterize status quo condition.2 Thus, if exposure has been reduced by the measure, the
following condition holds for the hazard pathway functions before and after the intervention:∫ a
0
fHL|HI(y, x)dy ≤
∫ a
0
gHL|HI(y, x)dy for all a and each given x (2.31)
This equation implies that the probability that the actual hazard load falls below an arbitrary level a
is higher after the implementation of the measure than in status quo condition for each fixed hazard
intensity x. Stated more simply, the probability that lower hazard loads will occur is higher after
the implementation of the measure than before for each fixed hazard intensity.
If structural vulnerability has been reduced in contrast, the status quo and new structural vulnera-
bility functions are related in a similar way:∫ a
0
fDA|HL(z, y)dz ≤
∫ a
0
gDA|HL(z, y)dz for all a and each given y (2.32)
Analogously, this equation implies that the probability that the level of damage falls below an
arbitrary level a is higher after the implementation of the risk reduction project than before for each
fixed hazard load y. Consequently, the resistance of the structure has been improved.
Now, as the PDF of damage depends both on the conditional PDFs characterizing exposure and
structural vulnerability (as indicated by equation (2.11)), a reduction of either exposure or structural
vulnerability also causes a shift in the damage PDF from fDA to gDA. Therefore, the new damage
PDF gDA is first order stochastically dominated by the damage PDF fDA representing the status
quo as well: ∫ a
0
fDA(z)dz ≤
∫ a
0
gDA(z)dz for all a (2.33)
This means that no matter whether exposure or structural vulnerability has been reduced, the
damage PDF after the intervention will deliver higher probabilities that the actual level of damage
falls below an arbitrary level a. This implies that lower damage states are more likely to occur.
Before the final step from damage to the loss is undertaken, it has to be outlined, that the system
vulnerability fLO|DA is not directly affected by the preventative risk reduction activities under
consideration. Thus, its functional form is maintained and still valid under the new conditions.
Nevertheless, as the PDF of loss, which is provided in (2.15), is both dependent on the system
vulnerability and on the damage PDF, also a shift in the loss distribution from fLO to gLO is
imposed by the risk reduction intervention:
fLO(v) =
∫
fLO|DA(v, z)fDA(z)dz
fDA→gDA−→ gLO(v) =
∫
fLO|DA(v, z)gDA(z)dz (2.34)
2The basics about stochastic dominance are provided in Appendix B.2.
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Now, from the first order stochastic dominance relation between new and old damage PDF given in
(2.33) it follows, that also the new loss PDF gLO is first order stochastically dominated by the loss
PDF fLO that has been valid before the risk reduction intervention:∫ a
0
fLO(v)dv ≤
∫ a
0
gLO(v)dv for all a (2.35)
Again, this relation implies that the new probability that the actual level of loss will fall below an
arbitrary level a will be higher after the intervention than before. Thus, lower levels of loss are more
likely to occur.
Figure 2.12: Annual benefit of a disaster risk reduction measure
According to the discussion in Section 2.3.2.2, disaster risk is often visualized by means of exceedance
probability curves as they are easy to interpret. With the results derived above, it becomes possible
to visualize the effect of a disaster risk reduction intervention on the exceedance probability curve,
as is common practice in literature [97]. This is done by referring to equation (2.21) which captured
the relation between the loss PDF and the corresponding exceedance probability curve. If ϕL and
ψL represent the loss exceedance probability functions before and after the intervention respectively,
the following condition holds:
ϕL(a) = 1−
∫ a
0
fLO(v)dv and ψL(a) = 1−
∫ a
0
gLO(v)dv (2.36)
From this equation in combination with (2.35) and the fact that probability density integrals are
always bounded between 0 and 1 it can be concluded that ϕL(a) ≥ ψL(a) holds for all possible losses
a. This result is displayed graphically in Figure 2.12 and is in line with the above discussion about
stochastic dominance.
The two types of losses that are of particular importance in this thesis are the economic loss and
the loss of life. To distinguish between these two loss types mathematically, the so far general loss
distributions fLO and gLO before and after the risk reduction intervention need to be split in order
to indicate the economic and human loss potential conditional on a certain damage state. In this
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respect, the functions feconLO and g
econ
LO as well as f
hum
LO and g
hum
LO are introduced to describe the PDF
of the economic and human losses before and after the intervention, respectively. As the functions
feconLO and f
hum
LO are related to the same damage PDF fDA, this split in economic and human losses
straightforwardly also implies a split of the system vulnerabilities in feconLO|DA and f
hum
LO|DA, that predict
economic and human losses for a given damage state. Obviously, the same holds for the functions
of the g family that describe the situation after risk reduction.
With this notation in hand, the benefits of the risk reduction intervention are ready to be formalized.
It is clear that the benefits of the risk reduction intervention represent the prevented losses in the
change from status quo to final state. If LOinitial denotes the total loss before the intervention and
LOfinal the loss after the intervention, these two variables are random variables following the loss
distributions fLO and gLO, respectively. Therefore, the total benefit of the risk reduction intervention
given by
BT = LOinitial − LOfinal (2.37)
must also be a random variable following a certain benefit distribution. Without knowing which
forms the functions fLO and gLO will concretely take however, the benefit distribution cannot be
further specified analytically. What can be done instead is to determine the expected value of
the benefits, due to the linearity property of the expected value operator. Distinguishing between
human and economic benefits, the expected annual benefits of the disaster risk reduction project
are determined to be
E(Bhum) = E(LOhuminitial)− E(LOhumfinal) =
∫
v · fhumLO (v)dv −
∫
v · ghumLO (v)dv
E(Becon) = E(LOeconinitial)− E(LOeconfinal) =
∫
v · feconLO (v)dv −
∫
v · geconLO (v)dv
(2.38)
which represents exactly the delta in total risk in comparing the situations before and after the
intervention. As the loss PDFs of the g family are first order stochastically dominated by the
loss PDFs of the f family, it follows that the expected benefits must be positive, as illustrated in
Appendix B.2. Accordingly, the expected benefits represent the prevented human and economic
losses per year. If it is assumed that the risk reduction measure is equally effective over the effective
period, these benefits reoccur statistically every year as illustrated in Table 2.4.
To complete the probabilistic description of disaster risk reduction benefits, the variance of the two
benefit categories is given by
V ar(Bhum) = V ar(LOhuminitial) + V ar(LO
hum
final)− 2 · Cov(LOhuminitial, LOhumfinal)
V ar(Becon) = V ar(LOeconinitial) + V ar(LO
econ
final)− 2 · Cov(LOeconinitial, LOeconfinal)
(2.39)
and contains valuable information about the variability of the annual benefit stream. This is an
important measure to be included in economic investment decisions as discussed in the sequel.
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2.6.3 Disaster Risk and Risk of Misinvestment
In this paragraph, a short review about the different understandings of risk in the engineering and
financial context is presented. In civil engineering the total disaster risk is defined by the probability
of loss times loss itself, as outlined in (2.18) above. The calculation of disaster risk by means of
(2.18) reduces the whole bunch of information that is contained in the loss distribution to its mean
value. This is justifiable in the disaster risk management context because disaster risk is a pure
downside risk, meaning that there is just the possibility to lose [165]. Therefore, the expected value
may serve as an approximation with how much annual loss on average has to be calculated with.
Nevertheless, it does not indicate whether the main contribution of the risk comes from frequent
and comparatively small events that only cause moderate loss or if it is mainly driven by rare events
that are devastating and go in line with tremendous amounts of loss throughout all consequence
categories. Therefore, it seems advisable to include measures of dispersion around the mean by
means of second moments and measures of skewness through the incorporation of third moments in
the analysis of the loss distribution. By means of these statistical tools it is seen more clearly how
the probability mass under the loss PDF is distributed across different loss levels.
Furthermore, the loss potential of extreme events can be assessed by the Value at Risk (VaR) or
Expected Shortfall (ES), which are specifically designed risk measures that operate on the tails of
the loss distribution FLO. Hereby, the VaR represents the level of loss that will potentially not be
exceeded with a given probability α over a specific time horizon
V aRα(LO) = F−1LO(α) (2.40)
whereas the ES measures the expected value of loss given that the Value at Risk has been exceeded:
ESα(LO) = E[LO|LO ≥ V aRα(LO)] (2.41)
These two measures, originating from financial risk management literature, may consequently be
employed to characterize disaster risk more precisely. Further details about these two measures are
provided in [116, 157, 219].
Financial risks in contrast, where the risk of misinvestment implicit in social risk reduction in-
vestments can be integrated in, belong to the more general class of speculative risks. Here, the
probability to lose is accompanied by the chance to win. In this context, the initial estimation if
the project or investment under investigation will be profitable is based on the expected values of
the returns. These are then confronted with the investment cost. If the expected difference of the
two is positive, the project is expected to be profitable and is therefore attractive to the investor
at first sight. Nevertheless, because the returns on the investment are uncertain, there is always
the risk of misinvestment, which describes the possibility that returns occur that fall short of the
expected value below the investment cost. Consequently, the financial risk is to be seen more like the
possibility that the expected value will be missed, which actually constituted the basis of planning.
Therefore, financial risks are often characterized by statistic parameters that describe also the scat-
tering around the mean, among these variance σ2, standard deviation σ or volatility σ [206]. Higher
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scatterings around the mean imply a higher risk of misinvestment. But this is only one side of the
coin. Higher scatterings are also accompanied by higher chances of deviating from the mean in the
other direction, i.e. the chances to receive higher than expected returns also increase. Therefore,
the final decision about the investment associated with a certain risk of misinvestment depends on
the risk attitude of the investor. Is she risk neutral, will she decide on basis of expected returns
only. Is she risk averse or risk seeking in contrast, will she subjectively prefer investments with
lower or higher volatility respectively, given that they have equal expected returns. To conclude, the
dominating influences on the investment decision are the expected returns, the scattering around
the mean as well as the risk attitude of the decision maker.
2.6.4 Structural Failure and Risk of Misinvestment
To finally close this section, a nice analogy between structural engineering and finance is presented.
An important concept within structural reliability analysis in civil engineering constitutes structural
failure analysis. In this field of research, the event of structural failure is assessed by investigating
the interactions between the two driving forces load S and resistance R. The load and resistance
are subject to substantial uncertainties and are thus described probabilistically. Structural failure is
then defined as the event where the load exceeds the resistance. Accordingly, the failure probability
may be characterized by introducing a random variable M , which is often being referred to as safety
margin [77]:
M = R− S (2.42)
The probability of failure eventually corresponds to the event where M becomes negative.
Figure 2.13: The risk of misinvestment
In the evaluation of public risk reduction projects by means of a social CBA there is the risk that
the investment will lead to a misinvestment. The total cost CT and even more the total benefits BT
are subject to substantial uncertainties and are assessed probabilistically. A misinvestment is then
defined as the event where the cost exceed the benefits. Accordingly, the misinvestment probability
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may be characterized by introducing a random variable NB, which is often being referred to as net
benefits:
NB = BT − CT (2.43)
The probability of misinvestment eventually corresponds to the event where NB becomes negative.
This analogy is depicted in Figure 2.13 where the well-known load-reliability graph is transformed
into the financial context.
2.7 Discussion
In this chapter, an innovative probabilistic risk management framework has been introduced that
enables a systematical assessment, evaluation and treatment of natural disaster risk. The consec-
utive steps to be performed have been discussed in detail and a mathematical description of the
important, in literature often ambiguously defined terms has been provided. Furthermore, possible
interpretations for various risk definitions that are often encountered in risk related publications
have been presented.
In a second step, the necessity for the public authority to engage in risk mitigation has been empha-
sized and the problem of evaluating public risk reduction projects economically has been discussed.
By focusing on preventative disaster risk reduction activities, the general approach to estimate the
cost and benefits of a risk reduction investment has been introduced and a probabilistic benefit
assessment has been carried out. To describe the benefits with sufficient statistical accuracy, the
loss distributions before and after the implementation of the risk reduction project turned out to be
of particular value. Concentrating on mean values only, the annual benefits equal the delta in total
risk. Eventually, by comparing the different understandings of risk in an engineering and economic
context it has become clear, that the risk encountered in disaster management constitutes a pure
downside risk, while the risk inherent in financial project appraisal belongs to the class of speculative
risks. In both cases however, the necessity to include statistical measures beyond the mean value
has been highlighted.
The theory assembled throughout this chapter enables the sound identification and assessment of
the cost and benefits of public risk reduction projects. It has been assumed that the cost of the
project as well as the benefits in terms of reduced environmental and CSH losses have already been
appraised and are on hand. As the benefits in terms of reduced economic loss are directly measured
in monetary terms, the major remaining challenge at this point is to economically evaluate the
prevented fatalities in order to include them in a CBA. This is subject of the three upcoming
chapters. In Chapter 3 the welfare economic theory to perform this appraisal is provided and based
on this, Chapters 4 and 5 concentrate on the economic evaluation of increased human safety by
discussing the WTP concept both on individual and aggregate level.
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Chapter 3
Cost Benefit Analysis as Applied Welfare
Economics
Societies must make choices on how to use their scarce resources such as labor, capital, land and so
on. At any point in time the total amount of these resources has to be considered as fixed, making
trade-offs in the decision processes on how to allocate these resources inevitable. Consuming more
of one thing usually goes in line with the necessity to consume less of another thing. In addition, as
society is composed of numerous heterogeneous individuals, changes in allocation often result in a
conflict of interest. A social risk reduction investment is such a change. It uses resources now and
causes an increase in the social safety level over the effective period of the measure. This in turn
results in the prevention of economic and human losses over the design period, which will eventually
increase the capital and labor endowments of society long term. Therefore, it is necessary to rely on
certain criteria that help to decide under which conditions the economic situation is better in the
final state after the implementation of the measure than in the initial state before. Welfare economics
now is that branch of economics that aims at characterizing social welfare levels in different economic
states [31]. Consequently, it delivers the theoretical foundation for managing risk in public interest
and is at the heart of public policy and at the core of cost benefit analysis (CBA) [35]. CBA is often
interpreted as applied welfare economics [130] as it aims at quantifying individual and social welfare
changes and thus transforms the welfare analysis in the monetary scale. By briefly discussing the
essentials of welfare economics and CBA, this chapter will provide the essentials for social decision
making and constitutes the theoretical basis of this work.
3.1 A Broader View of Welfare Economics
Economics is a discipline of social sciences that studies the consumption, production and distribution
of goods and services within an economy. By examining the behavior of economic agents that
interact within the economy on markets, theories are derived that aim at explaining how the forces
of supply and demand allocate scarce resources. Whereas microeconomics studies the behavior
of single individuals, firms and the government typically on markets where particular goods are
traded, macroeconomics on the other hand examines effects such as economic growth, inflation,
unemployment on aggregate level of the entire economy. Therefore, in the field of macroeconomics
aggregated indicators such as GDP, unemployment rates, life expectancy are of special importance
to investigate how the whole economy is working and developing over time. In this sense, a great
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part of macroeconomics has so called microfoundations, implying that microeconomic models of
consumer and firm behavior are employed and aggregated on social level to study the relationships
between these macroeconomic indicators.
Positive economics is to be interpreted as that branch of economic theory that deals with under-
standing and predicting economic behavior. The theorems of positive economics are logically derived
from axioms or assumptions about consumer and producer behavior, technology and availability of
scarce resources. The theoretical parts of positive economics, insofar as they possess empirical impli-
cations, provide hypothesis that can be tested statistically. Furthermore, there might be controversy
whether or not the assumptions behind a positive model are sufficiently realistic, but moral or ethical
assumptions are completely outside the scope of positive economics. Therefore, it is only concerned
with "what is" [139]. Normative economics, on the other hand, incorporates value judgments and
is concerned with what "ought to be". It tries to evaluate the desirability of certain aspects of the
economy and is designed to support public decision making to achieve particular desirable goals.
Welfare economics is normative economics. It focuses on using resources optimally to achieve the
maximum wellbeing for the individuals of society as well as for society as a whole. However, there is
a great deal of controversy of what is to be considered as optimal. As with positive economics, the
propositions of welfare economics are also logical derivations from a set of axioms and assumptions,
but they differ from those of positive economics in the sense that they are ethical assumptions and
value judgments with which people may legitimately disagree. Welfare is not an observable entity
such as market prices or profits [138]. Two assumptions that are fundamental to welfare economic
are:
• The welfare status of society must be judged solely by the members of society, which recognizes
the traditional emphasis on the importance of the individual in the western society and
• The notion that society is only better off if any member of society is made better off without
making anyone worth off.
From these two principles it becomes obvious that welfare economics constitutes a science that
operates between micro- and macroeconomics. Based on investigations of individual behavior and
preferences, statements about total social welfare on aggregate level are derived. Furthermore, it is
important to outline at this point that welfare economics itself is not about decision making. The
essential objective in contrast may be seen in enabling the political decision maker representing her
constituency to make informed decisions. The effects of the public project are therefore analyzed and
quantified to provide an understanding of the extent and magnitude of the economic consequences,
the final decision whether to implement the project or not however constitutes the politician’s task.
This is due to the fact that political factors such as political orientation, international relations or
related economic considerations such as trade deficit management may play a crucial role influencing
the project decision [139].
3.2 Preferences and Utility Functions
A crucial step in welfare economics constitutes the measurement of wellbeing of individuals that
comprise society. In order to judge if a particular social state is preferred to another it must be
assessed how the individuals would decide with respect to the proposed change. Consequently,
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each individual contributes to the final social judgment with her personal decision, in line with the
individualistic principle. In this sense, the preference construct is of particular importance in welfare
economics. Preferences are taken into account to explain people’s choices in the presence of several
alternatives. In a second step then, under certain requirements, utility functions are constructed to
represent preferences in a mathematical way. Therefore, a utility function rationalizes the preference
relation.
3.2.1 Preferences and Rational Consumer Axioms
Preferences are a theoretical construct that help to explain consumer behavior. As they are not
directly observable, their assessment is all but an easy task and crucial for the outcome of an economic
analysis. In this respect, several methods have been developed that are classified in behavioral and
non-behavioral approaches [136]. Behavioral approaches are discussed in detail in Chapter 4 and
non-behavioral approaches constitute the focus of attention in Chapter 5 in the context of safety.
Starting point for the preference analysis are so called consumption bundles. A consumption bundle
defines a certain combination of goods and services the individual chooses to consume and their
respective amounts. If X denotes the total consumption space that subsumes all goods and services
that are available for consumption, a consumption bundle is best described by a vector x ∈ X of
the following form [104]:
x = (x1, . . . , xn) (3.1)
Hereby, the vector components xi, i = 1, ..., n describe the amount that is consumed of good or
service i. Now, if the considered individual in her role as a consumer has the free choice to select
between two different consumption bundles x and x′, she will intuitively choose the one that brings
her subjectively more satisfaction or will be indifferent between the two. A decision for consumption
bundle x leads to the conclusion that she prefers x over x′ and thus, x ≥ x′ holds. Therefore, the
preference relation is a binary relation on X that reflects the consumer’s subjective evaluation of
different consumption bundles. In order to include preferences in economic analysis it is common to
impose some assumptions about their consistency that facilitate their treatment. In this sense, it is
presumed that the individual behaves as a "rational consumer", implying that her preferences are
in line with the following four axioms [256]:
1. Reflexivity: Every consumption bundle is at least as good as itself, implying x ≥ x.
2. Transitivity: If consumption bundle x is preferred to x′ and x′ is preferred to x′′, then also
x is preferred to x′′.
3. Completeness: For any two possible consumption bundles x and x′ out of consumption
space X the consumer must be able to say if she prefers one to another x ≥ x′ or x′ ≥ x or is
indifferent between the two x ≥ x′ and x′ ≥ x.
4. Continuity: The preference relation must be continuous over consumption space X.
The assumption that these axioms hold and the consumers are rational in their preference expressions
enables the graphical and mathematical representation of preferences through continuous utility
functions, as discussed next.
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3.2.2 Utility Functions
A rational consumer’s preferences satisfying the four stated axioms may conveniently be represented
by a utility function U . Utility is closely related to the satisfaction, happiness or wellbeing the
consumer derives from consuming a certain bundle of goods, whereas non economic aspects of
wellbeing are either ignored or assumed to remain unchanged [35]. A utility function constitutes
a tool used by economists to analyze and understand individual market behavior. In this respect,
whenever a consumer prefers a commodity bundle x to a commodity bundle x′, it is inferred that
a consumer’s utility is greater in the former case than in the latter, so that the following condition
holds:
U(x) ≥ U(x′)⇔ commodity bundle x is preferred to commodity bundle x′ (3.2)
Thus, if a consumer behaves in accordance with the rationality assumptions, it can be said that she
behaves as if she was equipped with a well-defined utility function. Whether she will do so at the
end is ultimately an empirical question [129].
As the requirements for the utility function are rather weak, there are generally many utility functions
that match a given preference ordering. Nonetheless, it is sufficient to select one arbitrary utility
representation out of all possibilities as they lead to similar conclusions and serve equally well.
Within utility theory two conceptually distinct ways to describe utility have emerged over the years,
splitting welfare economic theory in two branches:
Cardinal Utility: Classical welfare economists like Marshall, Walras, Sidgwick and Edgeworth
were partisans of the cardinal branch of utility theory, being convinced that utility was a measurable
quantity and fully interpersonally comparable, provided that enough information about preferences
had been collected. In the cardinal sense, utility itself has a significance and utility differences are
meaningfully comparable. Thus, it may be stated not only that an individual prefers one good to
another, but also how much she prefers it over the other. Cardinal utility functions are equivalent up
to positive linear transformations, as they preserve the second derivative of the function. Moreover,
they are generally assumed to be increasing in each argument and fulfill the diminishing marginal
utility condition, indicating that an individual derives less and less additional utility from increments
in commodity consumption at higher absolute levels of consumption. Nowadays, cardinal utility
functions are of particular importance in life cycle consumption models and in the analysis of risk
attitudes.
Ordinal Utility: As a reaction to the constructive critics of many economists, such as Robbins
[223], that argued that there is no objectively justifiable way to measure utility on a cardinal scale
and even more to support interpersonal comparisons of utility, the development of the new welfare
economics approach was initiated. Mostly influenced by the works of Pareto [199], Hicks [111]
and Kaldor [140], it could be shown that ordinal utility is sufficient to derive the fundamental
economical results that have been obtained under cardinality. For this reason, there is nowadays
general agreement among economists that the analysis of consumer behavior should be based on
ordinal utility. In ordinal utility theory it is assumed that a consumer is only able to rank different
bundles of consumption goods and to integrate them into a preference ordering. It can only be said
that one particular consumption bundle is preferred to another but not how much it is preferred.
Thus, the absolute level of utility has no meaning and utility differences are of no significance.
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Therefore, the utility functions are equivalent up to any positive monotone transformation, as they
maintain the preference ordering. In order to work with ordinal utility functions, they must be
at least two dimensional. The central value of information that is contained in an ordinal utility
function is how much of one good is exchangeable for a certain amount of another good so that the
absolute level of utility remains constant. This exchange rate is referred to as the marginal rate of
substitution (MRS) and is at the core of indifference curves analysis.
3.3 Welfare Economic Principles
Based on the individualistic principle of social welfare, welfare economics is concerned with two
major objectives. The first aim is to allocate society’s scarce resources efficiently in order to supply
the maximum achievable wealth and prosperity for society as a whole. The second goal lies in the fair
distribution of the efficient allocations among the members of society. Both of these sub disciplines
rely on the utility concept and are discussed in the following.
3.3.1 Efficiency
In contemporary welfare economics questions of economic efficiency are generally assessed on basis
of the Pareto criterion. This criterion is an efficiency norm that describes the conditions necessary
to achieve optimality in resource allocation.
The Pareto principle:
A social state is defined as Pareto optimal when no action can be undertaken that makes one
individual of society better off without making at least one other person worse off. In this connection,
the terms better off and worse off refer to the individual utility functions. It is said that a person is
better off (worse off) from a change in resource allocation when the utility level is higher (lower) after
than before the change. Accordingly, a reallocation of resources constitutes a Pareto improvement if
at least one individual of society is made better off in terms of a utility gain and all other members
of society maintain at least their preliminary level of utility. A Pareto optimal social state is a
situation where no further Pareto improvement is possible. Although the Pareto concept clearly is
a value judgment, it is a weak one in the sense that most people would accept it [129]. In most
real world situations however, the Pareto criterion reaches its limits rather fast as public projects
usually involve both winners and losers. In addition, a Pareto optimal state might be very unfair
from a distributional point of view. If for instance one individual possesses all society’s wealth, any
intervention that makes this individual worse off and all others better off cannot be judged upon by
the Pareto criterion.
In a free market economy where consumers and producers interact with the intention to maximize
utility and profits respectively, a set of marginal conditions have to be fulfilled to ensure that Pareto
optimality holds. In this respect, it is important to emphasize the marginality property of these
optimality rules, meaning that they refer to the last unit consumed or produced, respectively. The
condition that no one can be made better off without making somebody else worse of must hold
between consumers (exchange efficiency), in production (production efficiency) and between con-
sumers and producers (allocative efficiency). The rules which guarantee these efficiency conditions
are as follows [119]:
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1. Exchange efficiency: The MRS between any two goods x and y must be equal across all
consumers of the two goods.
2. Production efficiency: The marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS)1 between any
two factors of production, say labor L and capital K, must be equal across all producers in
the production of x and y.
3. Allocative efficiency: The marginal rate of transformation (MRT)2 for producers must be
the same as the MRS between the goods for consumers.
If any of these three conditions is violated, a Pareto improvement will be possible. A detailed
discussion on this topic is provided in [139] and the optimality conditions are readopted in the
discussion of Chapter 4 and 5.
The strength of the Pareto criterion lies in the fact that it does not require the utilities of different
individuals to be compared or weighted and that it requires only ordinal utility. Its weakness lies
in the fact that it yields an incomplete ordering, i.e. there are many Pareto optimal allocations
that satisfy these three marginal conditions. In addition, different Pareto optimal solutions are
not comparable solely by relying on the Pareto criterion and the Pareto criterion per se does not
rank every Pareto optimal allocation superior to any non optimal allocation [31]. What is therefore
needed are further criteria that allow to identify a path towards a Pareto optimal state and more
demandingly, to select one out of the set of all Pareto optimal solutions that is most desirable for
society. Such concepts are given by compensation tests and the formulation of a social welfare
function.
Compensation Tests and Potential Pareto Improvements:
In almost all practical situations both winners and losers are involved, so that the Pareto principle
is of limited value for the evaluation of welfare changes. Addressing this limitation, compensation
tests have been developed that are specifically designed for the evaluation of welfare changes due to
public projects. The most common compensation test originates from a work of Kaldor [140] and
Hicks [111] and is often being referred to as Kaldor-Hicks compensation test or potential Pareto
improvement. This test requires for a social change to be approved that the gainers are able to
compensate the losers and still have some net benefit left over.
In this respect, it has to be emphasized that the test considers only hypothetical compensation,
whether compensation is actually carried out in the end is regarded to be an important but separate
decision [129]. In practice, it may be too costly to ensure that there are actually no losers, because
the administrative expenses for compensation are often greater than the gain in net benefits [35]. In
addition, if the redistribution was actually carried out however, the entire exercise would be a direct
application of the Pareto principle itself [139]. The purpose of considering hypothetical redistribution
is to try to separate efficiency and distributional aspects of a policy change. Consequently, the
Kaldor-Hicks compensation test focuses only on the efficiency aspect of a welfare change and provides
1The MRTS measures the rate at which one factor can be substituted for another at constant levels of output.
2The MRT measures the rate at which good x can be transformed in good y in the production process. It is given
by the slope of the production possibility frontier, which represents all efficient output combinations for any two goods
x and y.
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the theoretical justification for CBA. The main tool to carry out these compensation tests in practice
is the willingness to pay (WTP) concept that is discussed in Section 3.5.
By means of the Kaldor-Hicks compensation test, a Pareto optimal allocation is always consistently
ranked superior to any non Pareto optimal allocation. However, problems arise when the criterion
is applied to judge on any other type of change, as demonstrated for instance by Scitovsky [231].
Therefore, the compensation principle cannot be employed to obtain a complete order of social states
and many social states still remain non comparable. A comprehensive and more in depth discussion
on this issue is provided in [168]. To draw a conclusion, for the construction of a complete social
welfare ordering, it is necessary to make stronger normative assumptions through the specification
of a social welfare function [31].
3.3.2 Distribution
Whenever a utility conflict between at least two different individuals concerning a change in resource
allocation is observed, more than the Pareto principle is required to decide between different alter-
natives. Such a complete ranking of the numerous economical efficient allocations of goods is called
a social welfare ordering. It is comparable to the individual preference orderings that are formulated
in terms of utility functions to rank different bundles of consumption goods. If the social welfare
ordering is assumed to be continuous, it may be represented by a social welfare function (SWF)
that takes the utility functions of the individuals as its arguments, such that a higher value of the
function is preferred to a lower one:
W = W (U1, . . . , Um) = W (U1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , Um(x1, . . . , xn)) (3.3)
A SWF of this type is known as Bergsonian welfare function [27]. Unfortunately, a priori there is
not much more to say about the concrete form the SWF will take. The form of the SWF depends
on the subject behind the function. It may represent the views of the parliament or that of the
social decision maker. In literature however, it is generally assumed that the SWF satisfies certain
reasonable requirements [129]:
1. The SWF should depend only on the utility levels of the individuals and thus, fulfill "wel-
farism".
2. In order to satisfy the Pareto criterion it should be monotonically increasing in its arguments,
meaning that an increase in any individual’s utility function ceteris paribus3 leads to a higher
level of social welfare. This condition implies that the indifference curves of a SWF in utility
space are negatively sloped. If one individual is worse off, another individual must be better
off to maintain a given level of social welfare. The intensity of this trade-off is given by the
slope of the social welfare indifference curve and depends on the degree of inequality. In this
sense, it is generally assumed that social welfare indifference curves are convex to the origin,
just like the utility indifference curves of the consumers.
3. The SWF should satisfy the principle of anonymity, indicating that it is insensitive to who
actually receives a high or low level of utility. Therefore, any permutation of the individual
utility arguments within the SWF must lead to the same result.
3All other things being equal.
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Under the premise that a social welfare function possessing all these desirable properties has been
constructed, the maximum social welfare point is identified where the grand utility possibility fron-
tier, that represents the set of all Pareto efficient combinations in utility space, is just tangent to
the highest social welfare indifference curve. A comprehensive discussion on the properties of social
welfare functions is provided in [232].
Beside the strong normative assumptions that are required in the construction of a SWF, the for-
mulation of a SWF only makes sense if utility is cardinal and comparable across individuals. This
result has been proven mathematically by Arrow [12] and is widely known as Arrow’s impossibility
theorem. If utility functions are ordinal and not interpersonal comparable, the only possible consis-
tent social welfare ordering is a dictatorship, i.e. the SWF must coincide with the utility function
of some individual. For these reasons questions about distribution often play only a minor role in
practical welfare economic analysis. They are often being declared as a political issue that can be
accomplished for instance through a progressive tax transfer system and are frequently considered
to be beyond the scope of economics [105]. Instead, it is propagated to focus on efficiency consider-
ations only. This view is also adopted for the purpose of this thesis. For an in depth discussion on
the construction of SWFs and the inclusion of distributional issues in welfare analyses it is referred
to [34, 35, 139, 203, 233]. An interesting essay on the interrelations between efficiency and equality
goals is provided in [191].
3.3.3 Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics
In Paragraph 3.3.1 the concept of Pareto optimality has been introduced and characterized by a set
of marginal conditions that must be fulfilled in order to guarantee an efficient resource allocation.
Rather than following some optimization strategy to reinforce the validity of the conditions "man-
ually", most professional economics put their faith in the "invisible hand"4 of the markets. The
first welfare economic theorem derived by Arrow and Debreu [13] delivers the justification for this
attitude:
First fundamental theorem of welfare economics: A perfectly competitive market equilib-
rium is Pareto optimal.
A perfectly competitive market is characterized by the following four conditions [180]:
1. With freely available and perfect information about a market transaction, both consumers
and firms show utility and profit maximizing behavior respectively, choosing the outcome that
yields the greatest possible net benefits to themselves.
2. Firms and consumers are price takers, i.e. they are too small in relation to the entire market
to influence the market prices. Therefore, price fixing, leadership and monopolistic practices
constraining output levels are ruled out by assumption.
3. There are no market barriers that prevent firms from entering into or from exiting a market.
Resources are completely mobile, and firms are able to enter freely if a market is profitable or
leave if losses are expected.
4Famous formulation of Adam Smith, introduced in his work on "The Wealth of Nations IV" [242], who has been
a pioneer of political economy and is often being cited as the godfather of modern economics.
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4. All factors of production are privately owned.
Given that these four conditions are met, the market mechanism generates a set of outputs and prices
through the interaction of supply and demand. A perfectly competitive market is in equilibrium
where demand equals supply and represents the point where demand and supply curves intersect.
The demand curve displays the amount the consumers are willing to pay for each unit of output.
The WTP may be interpreted as the subjective benefit they derive from the consumption of an
additional unit of output. The supply curve in contrast shows the producers’ or resource owners’
marginal cost for each unit of output. It is equal to the value of resources that have to be forgone in
order to produce the extra unit of output in perfect competition. Therefore, in equilibrium the WTP
is equal to the marginal cost and defines market price and quantity. Moreover, supply and demand
are perfectly accordable, indicating that there is no excess supply and no excess demand so that the
market clears. As a consequence, an equilibrium corresponds to a Pareto optimal solution and any
other price-output combination is inefficient. Any move towards the equilibrium price-output level
constitutes a Pareto improvement.
In line with the above discussion, there is an infinite number of Pareto optimal allocations which
may be for most instances very unfair. The outcome actually depends only on the initial distribution
of endowments. If this distribution is altered, a new Pareto optimum is obtained. This essence is
subject of the second welfare economic theorem:
Second fundamental theorem of welfare economics: Each possible Pareto optimum can be
achieved as a competitive equilibrium after a redistribution of initial endowments if preferences and
technology are convex.
In other words, all that is required to reach a particular more desirable outcome is a redistribution of
initial endowments after which the market can be left alone to do its work. This suggests that the two
objectives of efficiency and distribution may be followed separately and need not involve a trade-off.
A formal mathematical proof of the two welfare economic theorems is provided in [11, 79, 255].
3.4 Market Failures
Certain limitations have to be taken into account when relying on the market mechanism to obtain
the social value of goods. There are several real world conditions that might impose market failure,
preventing the market from producing efficient prices. They distort the working of the price mech-
anism and cause the market to deviate from its ideal social efficiency level. These imperfections
generate a divergence between observed prices and production cost in both factor and product mar-
kets, causing an inefficient use of resources. Therefore, in case of market failure, observed prices do
not reflect the real scarcity values of society’s resources and corrective measures need to be applied.
This provides the government with a justification to intervene in the market process to correct the
imperfections as well as to redistribute resources by transfer payments and progressive taxation.
There are a couple of reasons why markets may not operate efficiently, which can be integrated
predominantly in the following classes [225]: imperfect information, imperfect competition, exter-
nalities and public goods. For a comprehensive discussion on market failure mechanisms and their
treatment it is referred to [54, 79]. The last mentioned reason for market failure, public goods, shall
further be exemplified as they are of particular relevance in the subsequent discussion.
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Public Goods
A public good as opposed to a private good is generally characterized by two properties [152]:
1. Non-Rivalry: A public good is non-rivaled, meaning that one individual’s consumption does
not reduce the availability of the good for others. Thus, they are simultaneously consumable
by everyone.
2. Non-Excludability: A public good is non-excludable, indicating that no one can effectively
be excluded from consuming that good.
These two properties collectively imply that actually all individuals of society benefit from the
provision of a public good, which is available to everyone to equal amounts. Therefore, in practice
the pricing of public goods is often being carried out on basis of representative consumer models, that
allow to analyze welfare effects on the average individual of society [31]. This is further discussed
in Chapter 4. Especially the non-excludability property of public goods makes it difficult to provide
such goods on the market. People do not have the incentives to reveal their true WTP for the good
because they can possibly consume it at no cost. This is commonly known as the free rider problem.
If suppliers in turn cannot succeed to collect all the benefits of a public good they have produced,
there won’t be enough incentives for them to produce it. This leads to the fact that private markets
generally underproduce public goods [32], i.e. the supply of public goods is below its socially optimal
level. As a consequence, it remains the government’s task to correct this imperfection and to provide
the public good in efficient amounts, by making use of its power to reinforce a payment via taxation
[96].
Examples of public goods that are often being referred to are military, clean air, environmental
goods and many more. Also, many examples exist where the definition boundaries between public
and private goods are blurred. Safety constitutes an example of the latter category: there is a basic
infrastructure that is supplied to all, while each individual may take additional private precaution
to elevate her personal safety level. For the efficient provision of public goods certain tools are at
disposition for the government such as the definition of user fees, property rights and taxation [35].
As no direct prices for public goods are observable, their valuation is often being carried out by
extracting a WTP measure out of the consumer’s behavior on the markets or by survey techniques
[171]. This is further illustrated in Chapter 4.
3.5 Cost Benefit Analysis as Applied Welfare Economics
In the previous sections it has been demonstrated, that welfare economics is about judging on
changes to evaluate if one economic situation is preferable to another. The individualistic postulate
of welfare economics dictates that individual preferences represented by utility functions are to be
taken as the baseline to judge on changes. In order for the change to be approved on social level, it
must fulfill the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency test and be in accordance with certain distributional value
judgments. As the whole welfare economic discussion is based on ordinal utility functions that are in
itself neither measurable nor interpersonal comparable, they cannot be taken into account to judge
if the welfare gain of one individual is higher than the welfare loss of another individual due to the
implementation of a public project. This is exactly the point where CBA comes into play. CBA
is about measuring changes in monetary terms and thus serves as an instrument to translate the
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reasoning behind the Kaldor-Hicks criterion into practice. In the CBA context the WTP becomes
the primary means of measuring utility changes and the measuring rod that permits aggregation
of preferences on social level [200]. For potential losses, the willingness to accept (WTA) measure
might also be used, as further illustrated in Chapter 4.
In the present thesis, changes in social welfare result from the implementation of a public risk
reduction project. To carry out the project, resources are diverted away from other sources and
cause opportunity cost. On the other hand, benefits occur that individuals derive from increases in
consumption of the project’s output, which is mainly given in terms of increased safety henceforth.
In other words, these two effects result in a welfare loss on markets where resources are diverted
away and a welfare gain on markets where increased output is produced. The central question that
is tackled by CBA is under which conditions the overall effect of the project is beneficial to society.
To find an answer to this question it is crucial to identify and record all changes that occur due to the
implementation of the public project. Immediate adjustments in the quantities of the provisioned
goods and services as well as secondary modifications in individual consumer behavior that might
occur due to changes in the relative prices of the goods are to be priced and included in the economic
analysis. But as the supply with consumption goods does not constitute the ultimate purpose of
economic activity and rather serves to satisfy the needs of the consumer, the final evaluation of
changes is carried out by measuring changes in individual utility by means of the WTP concept.
Therefore, individual utility levels are not only the basis of welfare economics but in the center of
CBA [3, 104].
Social CBA Financial CBA
Viewpoint Society as a whole Individual, household or firm
Objective Increase in welfare Increase in income or profit
Benefit Any kind of increase in wellbeing Monetary revenue
or utility including monetary revenue
Benefit Measure WTP, WTA Monetary revenue
Cost Any kind of decrease in wellbeing Monetary cost
or utility including monetary cost
Cost Measure Opportunity cost Monetary cost
Value Net change in welfare Net change in revenue
Measure Dollars Dollars
Table 3.1: Differences between social- and financial CBA [Binning [28]]
As a consequence of the preceding discussion it follows that social CBA is to be conceptually dis-
tinguished from private or financial CBA that is carried out by a private investor. The economist
engaged in social CBA is not asking a different kind of question from that being asked by the private
investor. Rather the same kind of question is evaluated for a larger group of people. Instead of ana-
lyzing if the project will be profitable to the single investor, the economist asks whether society as a
whole will become better off by undertaking the project. For the more precise concept of revenue to
the investor, the economist substitutes the less precise concept of WTP to measure the individual
and in a second step the social benefit [170]. For the cost to the private firm the economist sub-
stitutes the concept of opportunity cost, i.e. the social value forgone when resources are diverted
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away from alternative economic activities into the specific project. The general project decision rule
that holds for both CBA disciplines is that the benefits must outweigh the cost for the project to
be approved. The conceptual differences between social and financial CBA are summarized in Table
3.1.
3.5.1 The Concept of Willingness to Pay (WTP)
CBA aims at recording and pricing changes in individual welfare levels that are imposed by a public
project and in a second step at aggregating them on social level. Utility functions serve as the
basis to price changes in individual welfare. It has been emphasized previously, that the ordinal
utility concept has been adopted for analyzing consumer behavior, implying that absolute utility
levels as well as utility changes have no meaning themselves and are not interpersonally comparable.
Therefore, it is not admissible to characterize welfare changes by changes in individual utility. What
has to be done instead is to convert individual utility changes to monetary equivalents, that then
in turn enable the evaluation of changes in wellbeing across individuals. This is exactly where the
WTP concept begins to operate, making the utility concept functional to evaluate policy changes.
The basic value of information that is contained in an ordinal utility function is how much of one
good an individual is willing to trade off against a certain amount of an other good so that she
remains equally well off. This analysis of trade-offs is generally known as indifference analysis and
illustrated graphically by means of indifference curves. Accordingly, a gain in an individual’s utility
can be measured implicitly by the maximum amount of money or income that she is willing to give
up in order to obtain a certain change, so that the initial level of utility is exactly maintained. This
amount of income in turn defines the WTP.
To demonstrate this more illustratively, consider an individual in an initial state of wellbeing given
by utility level U0 that she achieves with a money income y0 and a safety level s0, so that
U0 = (y0, s0) (3.4)
holds. Suppose further that there is an increase in the safety level from s0 to s1 due to a public risk
reduction project. This change would increase the individual’s wellbeing to:
U1 = (y0, s1) (3.5)
What needs to be known is how much the wellbeing of the individual has increased by this safety
improvement, i.e. U1 − U0. Since utility is not measurable it is sought for an indirect measure,
namely the maximum amount of income the individual would be willing to pay for that change. The
individual is now hypothesized to be considering two combinations of income and safety that both
yield the same level of wellbeing U0. One by which her income is reduced and safety increased, and
a second where her income is not reduced and safety not increased:
U0 = (y0 −WTP, s1) = U0(y0, s0) (3.6)
Therefore, the individual implicitly adjusts the WTP to the point at which these two combinations
yield equal wellbeing. Therefore, the WTP is defined as the monetary equivalent or value of the
change in wellbeing U1 − U0 resulting from the safety change.
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In a last step, in order to arrive at a social willingness to pay (SWTP), the individual WTPs have
to be aggregated over all members of society:
SWTP =
∑
WTPi (3.7)
This formula often appears augmented by distribution weights that are assigned to the individual
WTPs to elevate the relative position of economically comparatively weak individuals, in order
to incorporate distributional considerations in the CBA. As this entails placing a rather strong
normative value judgment in analogy to the definition of a social welfare function, the determination
of these weights is not considered in the following and it is referred to [35, 139] for an in depth
treatment of this issue. The WTP concept in general though, is extended and discussed in detail in
Chapter 4.
In particular, the WTP concept plays an important role in the evaluation of non market goods, that
are by definition not traded on markets and therefore have no direct prices. Once the preferences
of an individual with respect to a non market good relative to a market good have been assessed, it
becomes possible to infer the above illustrated trade-off and assign an implicit WTP, representing
the individual’s valuation of the non market good.
3.5.2 Steps to be Performed within a Social CBA
In line with the above discussion, a comprehensive CBA for social project evaluation requires the
execution of the following steps [35, 162]:
1. The status quo state of society has to be assessed. This entails an analysis of the current level
of social welfare, i.e. individual preferences, incomes, current prices, safety level and market
imperfections have to be recorded.
2. The potential effects of the public project have to be estimated. In this respect, it is important
that all the effects on all individuals are assessed, both private and social, direct and indirect,
tangible and intangible.
3. All recorded effects are to be priced. Here, for marginal effects on traded goods in many cases
market prices may serve of a proxy, noting the illustrated limitations though. For large effects
on traded goods as well as for non traded goods in contrast, a derivation of the WTP on basis
of utility functions is crucial to assess the true social price.
4. The social discount rate needs to be specified to discount the stream of cost and benefits,
accounting for the fact that cost and benefits accrue at different points in time.
5. Distributional effects are to be recorded and incorporated by weighting individual WTPs with
distribution weights or by means of inequality measures on aggregate level.
6. The impact of uncertainty has to be evaluated and included in the final project recommenda-
tion.
In this work, in particular steps 1 and 2 are being covered by the above introduced risk manage-
ment framework. By means of the latter, the current level of disaster risk may systematically be
assessed and the effectiveness of potential risk reduction projects over the effective period estimated.
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With special emphasis on the pricing of public safety, Chapters 4 and 5 are concerned with the
implementation of step 3. Furthermore, Chapter 5 also contains a discussion on how to specify the
social discount rate. As already stated previously, step 5 is not being accounted for in the present
thesis. Chapter 6 deals with the evaluation of uncertainty inherent in the project’s cost and benefit
estimations and therefore covers step 6. Eventually, Chapter 7 provides a practical application of
all illustrated steps.
3.5.3 CBA Decision Rules
As soon as all consecutive steps of the social CBA have been executed, a final decision whether to
implement or to reject the project under evaluation must be made. If the total cost CT and the
total benefits BT of the project have been identified and priced at the different points in time they
are expected to occur, there are several tools available to demonstrate cost efficiency. These are in
particular:
1. Net Present Value (NPV)
2. Benefit to Cost Ratio (BT /CT )
3. Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
Each of these project evaluation criteria has its advantages and drawbacks that can be reviewed in
detail in [162, 200]. Instead of providing a detailed discussion on these decision rules, only the Net
Present Value rule is readopted, as it is most intuitive and predominantly applied in practice [238].
Net Present Value: The net present value criterion (NPV) measures the difference between the
discounted flow of benefits and the discounted flow of cost and is therefore adequate for both private
and social perspective. The rules that need to be accepted for using the NPV criterion are the
following [123, 124, 249]:
1. Only projects with positive NPV are to be accepted.
2. Under a fixed budget constraint the subset of available projects is to be chosen so that the
NPV is maximized.
3. Without fixed budget constraint the project with the highest NPV is to be chosen.
4. Only investment strategies with approximately the same length of life are to be compared.
NPV =
n∑
t=0
Bt − Ct
(1 + r)t
(3.8)
In this equation Bt and Ct represent the monetized cost and benefits occurring at period t, respec-
tively and r denotes the discount rate indicating time preferences. In this sense, the NPV represents
the amount of money or magnitude that may be earned by a project at decision point t = 0.
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3.6 Discussion
This chapter reviewed the fundamental aspects of welfare economics, which serve as a baseline to
guide public policy decisions. The two central goals of welfare economics have been outlined to be the
efficient allocation of resources and their fair distribution among the members of society. Whereas
efficient allocations are characterized by means of Pareto optimality, the normative judgment of an
allocation to be fair is implicitly included in the formulation of a social welfare function.
In order to verify if a public project drives an economy towards a more efficient allocation of re-
sources, the Kaldor-Hicks compensation test constitutes a valuable tool for practical purposes and
provides the theoretical basis for CBA. Social CBA transforms the theoretical underpinning of wel-
fare economics into practice, by converting individual welfare changes to monetary value through the
WTP concept. By means of a clear structure to systematically identify and analyze social welfare
changes that accrue due to the implementation of a public project and a set of decision rules, CBA
provides clear guidelines to assist public policy decisions.
A public disaster risk reduction investment is to be seen as a public project that has an impact
on social welfare. While on the one hand it causes cost in terms of material and labor that are
needed to implement the project and diverted away from other uses in the economy, on the other
hand it brings benefits to the members of society in terms of reduced disaster losses. Referring
to Chapter 2, the benefits occur over a wide range of categories which have been subdivided into
reduced economic, human, cultural social historical (CSH) and environmental losses. For a great
fraction of the avoided losses no direct market prices exist, which could be taken into account as an
indicator for their scarcity values. Among these are potentially saved lives.
Instead of placing a value on human life directly, which would obviously contradict with our ethical
understanding that human life is innumerable and priceless, the conventional way in economics is to
convert these "statistical lives" saved to reductions in the risk of death, which are in turn enjoyed
by any member of society. Put in this perspective, the necessity to value life in order to guarantee
an efficient resource allocation becomes more acceptable in public view. Furthermore, safety may
be interpreted in terms of an economic good that brings utility to individuals and any changes in
safety that result from reductions in mortality risk are consistently appraisable by means of the
WTP concept. This in turn enables a coherent incorporation of safety related aspects into CBA.
The derivation of a SWTP to price reduced human disaster losses constitutes the focus of study
in the two upcoming chapters. After a conversion of the public risk reduction project decision
problem to a pure safety problem, the next chapter concentrates on deriving a SWTP for safety in
a bottom up fashion: based on individual preferences for safety, the WTP for safety is assessed for
each economic agent individually and in a second step aggregated on social level. In Chapter 5 in
contrast, a top down approach for directly obtaining a WTP on social level is presented, which is
based on the Life Quality Index (LQI).
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Chapter 4
Pricing Safety - Bottom Up Approaches
A profound decision on the profitability of a public risk reduction investment depends crucially
on two aspects: the reliable estimation of the measure’s cost and benefits and the assessment of
their social scarcity values. After the risk management framework has been introduced addressing
the first aspect, it is now focused on the derivation of a social price for benefits that occur in
terms of prevented fatalities, i.e. the social willingness to pay (SWTP) for safety. In line with the
individualistic postulate of welfare economics, a bottom up approach is followed to estimate the
SWTP: based on each economic agent’s preferences, firstly a willingness to pay (WTP) is derived
on an individual level and then, in a second step aggregated over all individuals that comprise
society to obtain a SWTP for safety. To do this consistently, at the outset a literature review on
existing WTP estimation approaches is being performed and exemplary values are listed. Then, a
theoretical model is developed, that discloses the influence of safety in a market economy. Here,
safety is being modeled as a public good that enters the utility functions of the consumers and
production functions of the producers as a separate argument, but is outside their control. No direct
market for safety exists. Only the government has the ability and power to impose changes in the
publicly provided safety level that uniformly affect all economic agents. These in turn reply to safety
changes by modifying their behavior. The resulting welfare changes are then priced by means of the
WTP concept, taking into account all possible effects. Afterwards, by introducing a representative
consumer model it is departed from the pure individualistic safety pricing strategies and general
equilibrium safety pricing rules are developed. These in turn serve as a basis for the analysis of the
Life Quality Index (LQI) in Chapter 5.
4.1 Willingness to Pay for Safety and Value of Statistical Life
One of the most contentious issues arising in the field of cost benefit analysis (CBA) of public projects
that impact human safety has been the valuation of reductions in mortality risk. The conceptual
basis for most valuation approaches constitutes the WTP for safety and the closely related value of
statistical life (VSL). Despite almost four decades of both theoretical and empirical research in this
field, still no consensus concerning the validity of the results it produces in actual applications has
been achieved [41]. In this introductory section, the historical development of the WTP approach
as well as commonly applied strategies to assess the WTP for safety in public policy are briefly
reviewed and exemplary VSL values obtained from different studies are provided.
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The essentials for valuing increases in safety1 by means of the WTP concept were introduced in 1968
by Schelling [229] and in 1971 by Mishan [169]. Both of these two early works in this field highlighted
the conceptual weaknesses of the human capital method2 to valuing lives, which corresponds to the
present value of an individual’s expected future income [221, 264]. The two authors pointed out
that consistency with the theoretical foundations of CBA and welfare economics requires to value
benefits in the form of prevented fatalities in terms of small changes in the risk of death for any
particular individual on basis of the individual’s WTP. Mishan states in this respect:
"It is the only economically justifiable concept...And this assertion does not rest on any
novel ethical premise. It follows as a matter of consistency in the application of the
Pareto principle in cost-benefit calculations."
Schelling similarly highlights the importance of the individual concept in the evaluation of an in-
creased chance of survival:
"A common way to place a value on life is to determine the dollar amount that an
individual would be willing to pay to reduce the probability of his death."
As a consequence of those two early influential works, most real world applications are based on the
view of this statistical concept [180].
Hence, it is commonly accepted that the price for safety is to be determined by the WTP for
reductions in mortality risk. As already discussed in Chapter 3, the WTP is defined as the maximum
amount of income an individual is willing to give up in order to obtain a certain good or service and
is considered as a measure of how much the individual values that good. In a conventional economic
context it is assessed by investigating prices of goods and services that are traded on the markets. In
the particular case of safety however, such market transactions cannot be directly observed because
the reduction of mortality risk is not directly purchased. Therefore, in an economic sense, safety or
mortality risk reductions constitute a non market good.
Once obtained, the estimations on the WTP for a particular small change in mortality risk ∆µ
can be normalized to some common level of risk reduction. The standard way has become to
employ the VSL as a normalization of the WTP concept. Rather than the value for any particular
individual’s life, the VSL represents the amount that the entire society is willing to pay to reducing
each member’s risk by a marginal amount [61]: if for instance a group of 1,000,000 individuals is
willing to pay $10 each to reduce their individual risk of death by 2 · 10−6, the SWTP sums up to
$10 million. Statistically, two lives are saved in this society so that the VSL is calculated to be $5
million. Consequently, the VSL standardizes the WTP concept to the reduction in mortality risk
that corresponds to exactly one prevented fatality in society. Mathematically, the WTP and the
VSL are related in the following way
V SL =
∑N
i=1WTPi
N ·∆µ (4.1)
where WTPi represents individual i′s WTP for a reduction in mortality risk of ∆µ and N denotes
total population size.
1The expressions ’increase in safety’ and ’reduction in mortality risk’ are used synonymously henceforth.
2The human capital approach is further discussed in Chapter 5.
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Despite the statistical nature of the VSL concept, valuing safety and life remains a controversial
and problematic issue. Much of the discussion concerning the role of the economist in this matter
stems from the reluctance to trade off dollars for lives. The necessity to value life in public decision
making becomes more acceptable in public view when it is put in a slightly different perspective.
What is done in project evaluation is not to value the worth of any particular identifiable individual
whose life is at stake ex post but rather the value of preventing a statistical death ex ante, i.e.
the avoidance or reduction of a small probability of death [222]. It is investigated how resources
should be devoted to programs which reduce the probability of death from a specific cause for a
specific group of people. In order to do this comprehensively, economists are forced to place a value
on an expected life saved, so that the mysterious personal nature of life valuation is removed and
resources may be allocated most efficiently throughout projects [91]. Viscusi [257] summarizes the
controversial issue of valuing life in the following manner:
"Ignoring the issue of valuation of life and limb may circumvent the problem of offending
people’s sensitivities by making the trade-offs explicit. But at the same time it may
be very costly in that it sacrifices lives that could have been improved or saved by a
more systematic allocation process. An important issue for society as a whole, and one
that many people are unwilling to face, is whether lives will be sacrificed in an effort to
maintain the illusion that we will not trade off lives for dollars."
As a consequence, the crucial step in the safety pricing procedure is to assess how people are willing
to trade off changes in their consumption and labor provision pattern against changes in the publicly
provided safety level according to their preferences.
In general, two classes of economic approaches for measuring the WTP for the non market good safety
are available in literature. Firstly, certain real world situations make it possible to reveal people’s
WTP for mortality risk directly. Approaches of this category rely on observations of actual behavior
on the markets and are therefore termed revealed preference approaches. The second category makes
use of survey techniques and choice experiments to create a hypothetical situation designed to have
people disclose their WTP for safety. They are known as stated preference approaches.
4.1.1 Revealed Preference Approaches
The revealed preference method has been applied extensively to estimate the VSL [61]. The central
assumption underlying the approach is that people reveal their preferences through their market
behavior. The information on the WTP is acquired by identifying situations in which people actually
make trade-off decisions between income or wealth and mortality risk, either implicitly or explicitly.
Labor Market Studies
The major part of revealed preference approaches has been conducted on the labor market by means
of wage-risk studies. Here, wage premiums associated with greater mortality risk on the work place
are estimated. These premiums are deduced by regressing the wage on the risk of death. Regression
analysis is applied to factor out influences other than risk of death that are reflected in the observed
wage differentials. The extracted wage premium then indicates that there is a trade-off between
income and mortality risk. The amount of additional wages people are paid per unit of additional
mortality risk serves as an indicator for the monetary value of the risk increment to those individuals
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who voluntarily accept the risk in exchange for a given wage increment. This goes in both directions.
If the wage premium is positive and people are exposed to a higher risk on the job, it corresponds
to the peoples’ willingness to accept (WTA). If the wage premium is negative on the contrary, it
represents peoples’ WTP for increased safety. In both cases, the wage premium can be taken into
account to compute a VSL in the above sketched fashion. Thaler and Rosen [247] were the first to
apply hedonic pricing on the labor market in 1975.
Authors Year VSL Country
(US$ 2007)
Labor market studies
Weiss et al. [265] 1986 8,936,585 Europe
Moore and Viscusi [173] 1988 7,577,561 U.S.
Moore and Viscusi [174] 1988 11,288,780 U.S.
Moore and Viscusi [175] 1989 12,062,439 U.S.
Knieser and Leeth [143] 1991 927,805 U.S.
Cousineau et al. [56] 1992 5,040,650 Canada
Martinello and Meng [161] 1992 7,317,074 Canada
Elliot and Sandy [73] 1996 1,756,098 UK
Meng and Smith [166] 1999 6,016,260 Canada
Arabsheibani and Marin [10] 2000 17,232,878 UK
Table 4.1: VSL estimates from labor market studies
Exemplary VSL estimates from several labor market studies have been collected and are summarized
in Table 4.1. All estimates have been converted to US$ 20073. The table contains ten distinct
labor market studies all published in peer reviewed journals, which should warrant their analytical
credibility. Even if the studies originate from different sources and have been obtained by labor
market observations in different countries, they have all been conducted in industrialized countries
with comparable income. Nevertheless it is astonishing, how far the range of the values, i.e. from
US$ 927,805 to US$ 17,232,878 goes. The mean value of the ten sample studies is US$ 7,815,613,
with a median of US$ 7,447,317 and a large standard deviation of US$ 4,892,657. It is anticipated at
this point, that labor market studies usually lead to significantly higher VSL values than the other
approaches and show the greatest variance across all studies. A possible explanation for this might
be, that the trade-offs involved in wage-risk studies refer to before tax wage premiums, while studies
of the other categories base their calculation on after tax income.
The wage-risk method to price safety on the labor market relies on several assumptions to guarantee
a correct reflection of a person’s subjective WTP in the market conditions [91]:
1. The labor market under investigation operates freely and is in equilibrium.
2. Workers possess correct information about the risk that is inherent in different kinds of jobs.
3If necessary, prices have been converted from local currency to US$ using the purchasing power parity of the given
year and then an inflation adjustment based on the consumer price index has been carried out to obtain US$ 2007,
as suggested by [47].
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A violation of the first assumption will render biased WTP estimates as the wages do not reflect
true scarcity values. The second assumption that workers are able to correctly calculate the actual
risk level of potential jobs is necessary for observed (i.e. market) wage-risk premiums to mirror
individuals’ marginal values of safety. The assumption that perceptions of risk and actual risk
coincide in real world applications however, is at best very suspect [91].
Consumer Market Studies
Consumer market studies constitute the second category of revealed preference approaches and are
by far not as prominent as wage risk studies in safety literature. Here, trade-offs people make
with respect to income or wealth and mortality risk are evaluated in their everyday consumption
decisions. On basis of sophisticated econometric approaches, such as hedonic regression and conjoint
analysis, market prices for safety attributes implicit in certain composite goods that are sold on real
product markets are derived. For example, data on the market price of smoke detectors and their
effects in reducing the probability of dying in a fire might serve to extract people’s WTP for safety,
as performed by [58]. Another illustration for consumer market studies to derive a VSL is the
investigation of different safety features in cars and the corresponding reduction in mortality risk,
see for instance [18]. In the special application to derive a WTP for enhanced disaster safety, the
method has been applied in the analysis of real estate prices with similar characteristics but with
different property exposures to disaster risk [87].
Authors Year VSL Country
(US$ 2007)
Consumer market studies
Garbacz [89] 1989 4,082,618 U.S.
Atkinson and Halvorsen [18] 1990 5,839,024 U.S.
Carlin and Sandy [44] 1991 996,098 U.S.
Garbacz [90] 1991 5,675,457 U.S.
Blomquist and Miller [30] 1992 4,541,463 U.S.
Dreyfus and Viscusi [70] 1995 5,238,049 U.S.
Table 4.2: VSL estimates from consumer market studies
Table 4.2 provides an overview about a collection of VSL estimates from consumer market studies
that have been extracted from literature. Here, all studies have been conducted in the U.S.. The
mean value of the sample is US$ 4,395,451, the median amounts to US$ 4,889,756, which corresponds
to only around 60% of the labor market result and is thus significantly lower. The standard deviation
is US$ 1,794,830, so that the distribution of values is more compressed.
In the application of consumer market studies to derive a WTP for safety several limitations have
to be outlined. Also here, in order to obtain reliable VSL estimates that reflect people’s WTP
correctly, the safety related markets under investigation must be in equilibrium and perfect consumer
information must be guaranteed. This means for instance, that consumers of smoke detectors must
perfectly understand the probability of dying in a fire as well as the amount of risk reduction or safety
increase associated with installing a smoke detector. This assumption about complete knowledge
60 CHAPTER 4. PRICING SAFETY - BOTTOM UP APPROACHES
also entails that consumers mentally calculate whether the cost of buying the smoke alarm is worth
the minute risk reduction that is provided. Therefore, the valuation of increased safety due to the
implementation of the smoke detector must in turn also equal the money paid for an increase in
traffic safety through the purchase of an airbag in a car, if compared per unit of increased safety.
In real world situations however, people typically underestimate the probability of higher probability
death events such as cancer and smoking and overestimate the chances of lower death causes such
as earthquake, lightening and so on [83]. Consequently, the assumption of perfect information is
unlikely to hold in safety related markets. In addition to this limitation there are also significant
difficulties in reliably extracting the price for one attribute out of a composite good, because it is
hardly possible to find two comparable goods that differ only in the attribute to be valued. Also
critical is the assumption that the consumer may consume exactly the amount of safety she wants,
even if in reality this is only possible in combination with consuming the composite good.
Despite the stated limitations of revealed preference approaches, their primary advantage is that
they are based on actual behavior that is observed in real world situations. The presumption is that
people’s own choices are the best reflection of their WTP values [47].
4.1.2 Stated Preference Approaches
Stated preference approaches use survey techniques in which people are confronted with a hypothet-
ical situation that involves a trade-off between income or expenditures and a change in the risk of
death. The main example for the stated preferences approach is contingent valuation, which was
firstly applied by Davis [59] in 1964. In a direct contingent valuation approach, individuals are
asked to state in specifically designed interviews or questionnaires, how much they would be willing
to pay to change their mortality risk by a specific, generally small amount. In special application to
disaster risk a typical question could be: how much would you willing to pay to reduce your risk of
dying in an earthquake from 2 · 10−7 to 1 · 10−7?
A second variant of this approach is to disclose people’s preferences towards safety by selling various
goods with different risk exposures on artificial test markets and extracting the amount that is
voluntarily spent for goods with enhanced safety level out of a fixed virtual budget. In the NOAA4
Panel [16] guidelines are presented for performing contingent valuation consistently. An extensive
listing of performed contingent valuation studies can be found in [45, 171] for the U.S. and in [95, 182]
for Europe.
Several VSL estimates originating from stated preferences have been collected and are summarized
in Table 4.3. All studies have been carried out in western countries with comparable incomes. The
mean value of the selected studies is US$ 4,948,065, the median amounts to US$ 5,141,463 and the
standard deviation is the lowest of all studies, namely US$ 1,282,778. It becomes obvious, that
the selected stated preference approaches lead to results which are quite comparable to those of
consumer market studies and significantly lower than the labor market values.
Certain limitations have to be taken into account when relying on contingent valuation to reveal
peoples preferences towards safety. Biases occur because it can hardly be assured that respondents
will provide honest answers to the questions they are asked and often reply as socially desired.
4US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
4.1. WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR SAFETY AND VALUE OF STATISTICAL LIFE 61
Authors Year VSL Country
(US$ 2007)
Contingent valuation
Jones-Lee et al. [135] 1985 6,516,098 U.K.
Gerking et al. [92] 1988 5,160,976 U.S.
Viscusi et al. [260] 1991 4,640,000 U.S.
Johannesson et al. [125] 1996 5,847,805 Sweden
Corso et al. [55] 2001 4,165,854 U.S.
Ludwig and Cook [153] 2001 6,427,317 U.S.
Persson et al. [207] 2001 3,145,366 Sweden
Alberini et al. [5] 2004 2,764,228 Canada/US
Chestnut et al. [48] 2004 5,691,057 Canada
DeShazo and Cameron [60] 2004 5,121,951 U.S.
Table 4.3: VSL estimates from stated preference approaches
Furthermore, the responds depend strongly on the way the questions are formulated and on phrasing.
Hypothetical bias occurs because no real money is involved. Respondents know that they are not
actually required to expend anything for their choices and therefore, the reaction is different in
hypothetical markets than in real markets. However, certain strategies may be followed to mitigate
the effects of hypothetical biases [1, 178]. Finally, respondents may have difficulties in understanding
the small impact of changes in mortality risk properly. Contingent valuation studies strongly depend
on the design of the study and even more on the way individuals understand and perceive the
characteristics of the hazard under consideration [240, 241].
The major advantage of stated preferences approaches is that they allow to tailor questionnaire
and sample to exactly elicit the information that is needed. They are applicable to the general
population, while labor market studies are restricted to workers and consumer market studies to
consumers of the particular safety related good. In addition, the availability of the responses and
the characteristics of the respondent allow for an identification of the major determinants of the
WTP [61].
In summary, both of the approaches discussed can be taken into account to directly obtain a WTP
for safety or to process the collected preference information towards safety in the formulation of a
utility function. Either of the approaches suffer from conceptual weaknesses. Neither approach is
inherently superior and, indeed, they are almost certainly best viewed as essentially complementary
rather than competing estimation procedures [134].
4.1.3 WTP and VSL for Public Policy
The previous section impressively highlighted how far the WTP and VSL estimations can range and
vary across different application approaches and contexts. As the real preferences are unknown, it is
not clear which of the approaches delivers the most accurate estimates. On an individual level the
following factors certainly impact and might explain the observed variance in the WTP estimations
to a certain extent: age of the respondent, background risk, altruistic concerns, income/wealth,
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education, risk preferences, context of risk, the question whether the study has relied on the WTP
or the WTA to derive the VSL and many more [126].
With increasing sample size however, these variations should be less emphasized. Other possible
explanations might be that market distortions have been present in the markets where labor or
consumer market studies have been conducted or that perceived risk differed significantly from the
actual risk involved.
The large variation in the VSL estimates raises the question which value to employ for public policy
decisions or risk reduction project appraisal that have an effect on a potentially large number of
people. One assumption that could be made is that the WTP for a unit of change in mortality
risk is the same regardless of the type of risk. Another assumption could be that the average WTP
for a population is always identical regardless of the characteristics of the population at risk. One
or both of these hypothesis is implicit whenever a VSL value is applied in any context that differs
from the context in which it was originally estimated. It becomes a concern when the population
whose mortality risk is affected by a policy is considerably different from the population from which
the VSL estimates have been obtained. It is also a concern if the type of risk is different from the
context of the original WTP study.
Recognizing that evaluating the risk reduction benefits of a project by simply counting the number
of lives saved and multiplying them by a single VSL is potentially inadequate for valuing changes
in mortality risks in all circumstances, analysts have been investigating the dimensions of mortality
risk that may be relevant to monetary valuation in project appraisal for projects that impact human
safety. The central question is how the WTP for mortality risk reduction may vary in different
application fields. Economic theory suggests that WTP may vary, but it does not answer the
question of how precisely it varies. Thus, it remains largely an empirical question. Empirical work
has been carried out, but the results are not yet sufficiently robust to provide a fully adequate basis
for a new valuation approach for public project appraisal. Some alternatives have been proposed,
and their basis may soon be sufficient for policy applications when additional research is undertaken
to further explore these issues [47].
A desirable goal for public policy analysis would be the ability to extrapolate WTP estimates from
one context and one population to another population and context and use standard VSL values.
Such a procedure will become admissible only if numerous WTP studies have been performed on
a variety of risk reductions contexts and on a variety of populations, allowing the estimation of
an overarching WTP function that links WTP values with the characteristics of the risk and of
the affected population. As it is usually quite costly and time consuming to conduct a SWTP
analysis any time before a public decision is made, in practice policy analysis often relies on meta
analyses. Meta analysis is a methodology comprising a vast array of statistical techniques, developed
to systematically analyze differences between outcomes of WTP studies, ultimately leading to a
synthesis of results [29]. In this sense the law of large numbers suggests, that the obtained results
factor out systematical inconsistencies of single studies and converge to the true social mean WTP.
Table 4.4 provides an overview of recent meta studies that have been identified in literature. Also
here, the results are not uniform and significant deviations are observable. The mean value over
all studies is calculated to be US$ 5,809,360, while the mean value weighted by the number of
observations included in each study is US$ 5,425,471. The standard deviation amounts to US$
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Authors Year VSL Country Number of
(US$ 2007) studies included
Meta Analyses
Viscusi [258] 1992 7,950,000 Multiple 36
Miller [167] 2000 5,080,000 Multiple 68
Dionne and Lanoie [61] 2002 4,878,049 Multiple 86
Mrozek and Taylor [177] 2002 3,008,130 US 91
Viscusi and Aldy [259] 2003 8,374,000 Multiple 64
Kochi et al. [144] 2006 5,565,979 Multiple 78
Table 4.4: VSL estimates from meta analyses
2,023,124. It follows that even if there are not as many outliers in meta studies in comparison to
single studies, the question which value to employ for policy decisions remains unanswered.
The US EPA’s5 Guidelines advise analysts to use a uniform VSL estimate of US$ 4.8 million in 1990
dollars for policy analysis. Based on the consumer price index to adjust for inflation this converts
to approximately US$ 7.61 million in 2007 dollars [269]. This value is derived from a meta analysis
of 26 estimates assembled for EPA’s first retrospective analysis of the Clean Air Act [75], being all
but two from the Viscusi 1992 [258] review. Each estimate is from a different study, with 21 of
the estimates from hedonic wage studies and the remaining five derived from contingent valuation
studies. The estimates range from US$ 0.9 million to US$ 20.9 million in 2002 dollars and the studies
were published between 1976 and 1991. The estimates are fitted to a Weibull distribution that is
often used in probabilistic assessments of uncertainty in EPA benefit calculations [69].
To conclude, for the derivation of a social price for safety to be employed in the evaluation of public
disaster risk reduction projects that have an impact on a potentially large number of individuals,
it might not be appropriate to rely on VSLs that have been determined in differing contexts and
populations. It is generally not admissible to apply a value that has been obtained by artificially
isolating one particular market and assessing the WTPs of a subset of individuals for a particular
type of risk only. Rather it is necessary for public policy analysis to explore the influence of safety
in the whole economy, taking into account its effects on both consumer and producer behavior on a
great diversity of markets simultaneously. The theoretical model for this approach is developed in
the remainder of this chapter, where safety pricing rules in a general equilibrium setting are derived.
This methodology then in turn serves as the microeconomic foundation of the LQI that is introduced
in Chapter 5.
4.2 Modeling Safety in a Market Economy
After the general problem of deriving a social price for safety has been introduced and the diverse
practices to estimate the WTP and VSL as well as their price ranges have been documented, this
section is designed to analyze the influence of safety in a market economy. Based on the economic
theory to be developed in the sequel, safety pricing rules in general equilibrium are derived that are
5US EPA = United States Environmental Protection Agency.
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appropriate for the analysis of public risk reduction projects potentially affecting a large number of
individuals. In order to do this comprehensively, the entire problem of deciding upon a public risk
reduction project is firstly converted to a pure safety problem that concentrates on safety related
aspects only.
4.2.1 The Pure Safety Problem
To facilitate the subsequent discussion the problem of evaluating public risk reduction projects
is transformed into a second problem, that allows to focus on safety related aspects of project
appraisal only. It is assumed at this point that the benefits of all consequence categories, except
for the saved lives, have already been priced by the application of some other procedure and are on
hand. Subtracting the monetized benefits of all other consequence categories from the total cost of
the investment yields
NCHS = CT −Becon[$]−Benv[$]−BCSH [$] (4.2)
which is being referred to as the net cost into human safety (NCHS) . Accordingly, the NCHS
describes the residual of the project’s total cost that is attributed to enhance human safety. By
means of the latter, the question about project efficiency is convertable to a pure safety problem,
focusing only on cost and benefits that are related to human safety. Efficiency in safety is granted
accordingly, if the benefits that society derives from the enhanced human safety standards, measured
by the SWTP, are higher than the NCHS, leading to the following efficiency criterion for the pure
safety problem:
SWTP ≥ NCHS (4.3)
By construction of the pure safety problem it is easily verified that the fulfillment of this condition
implies not only efficiency in safety but also total project efficiency. In the remainder of this chapter
and of Chapter 5 it is therefore focused only on the pure safety problem of a public risk reduction
project. All changes in individual welfare levels that are being evaluated in the following are directly
or indirectly induced by changes in the publicly provided safety level. Other changes that result
from the implementation of the project, such as price changes on markets where material and labor
are used by the project, need not be considered in the pure safety problem.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the NCHS are on hand, so that issues related to project financing
are not being accounted for. This is justifiable by pointing out that questions related to project
financing make it necessary to specify the risk reduction project under consideration and can hardly
be treated generally. An update of building codes for example carries over the cost directly to the
citizens, whereas a construction of a flood protection is largely financed by the government out of its
fixed budget or by raising taxes. Safer public infrastructure elements in contrast might be financed
through user fees. An elaborate discussion of issues related to project financing is included in [32].
For this reason it is exclusively focused on pricing the benefits of changes in the publicly provided
safety level by means of the WTP concept.
4.2.2 A Simple Economy’s Workflow
This section briefly explores the behavior of consumers and producers within a simplified economy
model and serves as a basis for an understanding of how safety impacts the economy. As visualized in
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Figure 4.1 the simplified economy consists of two classes of economic agents, namely the consumers
and the producers that interact on two distinct types of markets, the product markets and the factor
markets.
Figure 4.1: A simplified economy model
The fundamental goal of the consumers is to maximize their utility. They derive utility from con-
suming goods and services that are obtained on the product markets. But their capacities to buy
these goods and services are limited by the amount of income they gain. The income is earned by
selling parts of their endowment in terms of labor and capital on the factor markets. The provision
of labor has a negative impact on consumer utility, i.e. it brings disutility to her as labor is a bad.
This is because most work is dull, troublesome and sometimes dangerous [213].
The producers buy labor and capital on the factor markets for the production processes of goods
and services. Producers follow the aim of profit maximization. They supply their products on the
product markets and receive a revenue from the consumers’ purchases. If the expenditures for labor
wages and rents on capital that the producers have to expend for demanding the factors of production
from the consumers is subtracted from this revenue, the profits are obtained. The relation between
the outputs producers are able to produce from a certain amount of input factors is captured by the
production function, which therefore limits their profit maximizing ambitions by indicating what is
technically feasible.
Thus, there are essentially two flows observable in this simplified economy. The first one constitutes
the stream of goods and services, whereas the second one is the money flow. They work in opposite
directions. Furthermore, it is clear that the consumers derive their utility from the flow of goods
and services, whereas their consumption ability is limited by the money flow. The opposite holds for
producers. Their objective to maximize profits is defined over the money flow, while their ability to
produce is limited by their production function that is defined over the flow of goods and services.
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The link between consumers and producers is given by consumer income. In a private ownership
economy firms are ultimately owned by consumers. Thus, the firms’ profits are transmitted to the
consumers via shares and can therefore be included as part of consumer income. This essential step
ensures the fulfillment of Walras’ Law6 and hence provides for the existence of a general equilibrium
[243]: under perfect competition, where all economic agents are price takers7, the forces of supply
and demand will result in a set of prices so that all markets clear. This set of prices is being
referred to as general equilibrium and balances supply and demand on each market, so that the
utility maximizing strategies of the consumers are perfectly accordable with the profit maximization
strategies of the producers. Thus, at the general equilibrium solution social welfare is maximized.
From this brief introduction in an economy’s work flow it follows that there are basically two types
of markets at disposition where safety could principally be priced. The product market and the
factor market. Obviously, a direct market for safety does not exist. In the absence of clearly defined
markets, the value of safety can be derived from information acquired through surrogate markets:
there are goods sold on the product markets that have a direct impact on safety and whose prices
therefore contain a value of safety implicitly. Also, a price for safety is included in wages that are
paid on labor markets for jobs with different risk exposures, as already discussed above.
4.2.3 Characterizing Safety as a Public Good
Safety has a considerable influence on our daily decisions and our daily decisions influence the safety
level we are exposed to. Many actions like buying a smoke detector, selecting a particular job,
tightening regulations on air quality or building codes may be viewed as activities that determine
our personal safety. Most of these important decisions are made by individuals on their own behalf.
However, society and in particular the government as the authority to represent the public interest
undertakes a variety of decisions on behalf of all of us [236]. These include allocations of public
resources into traffic safety, flood control, natural disaster mitigation programs, public health and
the like and designate the circumstances we are living in and provide the framework under which we
make our decisions. As a consequence, the safety level that is enjoyed by each individual of society
is the result of a twofold process: there is a basic infrastructure that applies to all and there is some
superstructure that allows for individual variability [51].
Within the latter category the market perspective is of particular importance. In the market per-
spective the value of safety is a residual that results from a series of other decisions. Each individual
evaluates the value of safety herself, determines her WTP for protective, safety increasing products
or services (such as smoke detectors, seat belts etc.) and tries to find that service at that price
and in the desired amount to increase her own personal safety. In short, she has control over the
situation as far as her financial capabilities admit [91]. The market in turn provides these products
or services as long as it is profitable to do so. The final equilibrium price is then a reflection of all
this wealth of information on individual preferences and contains a price for safety implicitly. The
initially introduced labor and consumer market studies to determine a VSL are approaches to price
safety increments of this category.
6The Walras’ Law [261] states that if each individual satisfies her budget constraint, so that the value of goods
sold equals the value of goods bought, then the total value of all sales by all individuals equals the total value of all
purchases by all individuals. This holds at any given prices.
7i.e. neither single consumers nor producers are influential enough to affect prices.
4.2. MODELING SAFETY IN A MARKET ECONOMY 67
The basic safety level in contrast, is externally provided to the individual and the evaluation whether
the prevailing safety level is subjectively worthwhile is outside her control. It is imposed to her and
determines the circumstances under which she makes her decisions. Here, it is the government’s task
to provide a basic safety level to protect people and property regardless of their personal financial
background. Any change in the publicly provided safety level, which is induced for instance by the
construction of safer roads, the provision of flood defenses or an improvement of building codes,
indiscriminately makes life safer for all of us and thus possesses to some extent the non-rivalry and
non-excludability property of public goods, introduced in Section 3.4. Jones Lee goes even a step
further in stating: "the vast majority of safety improvements are non-marketed public goods" [133].
The publicly provided safety that is affected by the public risk reduction project under investigation
is therefore considered as a public good henceforth, in line with [91, 121, 133]. It is clear however,
that the project induced safety change will not affect all individuals in exactly the same way and
to equal amounts. Some will benefit from the project to larger extents, while others in turn might
be affected only marginally because their financial background already allowed for sufficient private
precaution prior to the intervention. Nevertheless, the introduction of a uniform safety variable s
to represent the public good safety that is equal for all individuals of society is justifiable at least in
good approximation.
The recognition that the basic safety level constitutes a public good provided by the government,
potentially affecting all individuals raises the question how much society as a whole should spend
on safety provision. There is a solution that provides an answer to this question in a simple and
straightforward way, guaranteeing the Pareto optimal provision of public goods, which is known
as the Samuelson condition. Essentially, it states that the public good should be provided in such
amounts that the aggregate WTP is equal to the marginal cost of providing the good. But as in the
present context of project appraisal it is not focused on the provision of an overall optimal safety
level to society but rather on the question if the single safety change induced by the project is socially
efficient, the Samuelson condition is not further elaborated in this work. For a detailed discussion
on the latter it is referred to [130].
Measuring Safety
The first step in the mathematical derivation of a SWTP for public safety is to specify a unit in
which safety is measured [35]. This is done in the sequel by means of the society’s crude mortality
rate
µ :=
M
N
(4.4)
which equals the number of deaths M per year in relation to total population size N . In Figure 4.2
the development of crude mortality rates over time is depicted for selected countries. For developed
economies it is observable that the crude mortality rate clusters at around 0.01, whereas in developing
countries the rates are significantly higher due to differences in the population structure as well as
lower safety standards. Accordingly, safety s can be defined as the annual survival probability:
s := 1− µ (4.5)
If multiplied by one year, the annual survival probability allows for an interpretation in terms of
annual survival time, measured in years, that is on average enjoyed by each individual of society. It
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Figure 4.2: Crude mortality rates for selected countries [data source: WDI [262]]
is clear that the so defined safety level is a result of the twofold safety structure and reflects both
private and public precaution. If a public risk reduction project now saves m lives annually, the
change in crude mortality in the move from status quo condition µ0 to post project condition µ1
amounts to
∆µ = µ1 − µ0 = M −m
N
− M
N
= −m
N
(4.6)
which by definition yields a safety improvement of:
∆s =
m
N
(4.7)
As a consequence, the prevented fatalities due to the implementation of the public risk reduction
project convert in a reduction in mortality risk, which in turn leads to an increase in safety, that
is statistically enjoyed by any member of society. Accordingly, the benefits take the form of lives
extended rather than lives saved [41]. Therefore, the ethically questionable issue of pricing human
life is transformed to the problem of evaluating reductions in mortality risk or changes in the public
good safety. For later convenience the concept of ∆µ-units is introduced at this point:
∆µ− unit := 1
N
(4.8)
It is easily verified, that a reduction in mortality risk or an increase in safety equal to one ∆µ-unit
corresponds to saving exactly one statistical life in society. Accordingly, equation (4.1) indicates
that the SWTP for one ∆µ-unit coincides with the VSL.
Size of safety changes
Before it is started with the derivation of WTP estimations for safety changes that are induced
by the public risk reduction project it is necessary to outline the size of safety changes that are
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under consideration. As illustrated above, overall crude mortality in industrialized countries roughly
amounts to 0.01. Only three deaths in 10,000 however are not owing to natural causes. If deaths
due to voluntary risk activities such as sports, smoking and traffic accidents as well as unavoidable
accidents such as house accidents are subtracted from this number, a reduction in crude mortality of
around 2 ·10−4 or less constitutes the focus of study. It may be a little higher as certain risks typical
for industrialized countries, like air pollution, are not separated out in usual statistical records [217].
To draw conclusion, only marginal changes in the publicly provided safety level are attainable by
the implementation of a public risk reduction project and therefore only marginal safety changes are
to be accounted for in the pure safety problem.
4.2.4 Consumer Side - Utility Maximization
This section explores the consumer’s utility maximization strategy in the presence of the public
good safety in mathematical detail. The consumer is assumed to consume n different private goods
xi, where i = 1, ..., n. These are purchased on the product markets in non-negative quantities at
exogenously given fixed positive prices pi. Moreover, the consumer supplies k different kinds of labor
lj , where j = 1, ..., k and obtains an exogenously given fixed wage rate wj for each particular labor
unit supplied on the labor market. Furthermore, the publicly provided safety level s is exogenously
given and changes can only be imposed by governmental safety projects. The consumer’s preferences
are captured by an ordinal utility function
U = U(x, l, s) (4.9)
where x is the n-dimensional vector of consumption goods, l is the vector of labor supply of order
k and safety s enters the utility function as a separate argument which is outside the consumer’s
influence. If not stated otherwise, the vector notation is maintained in the following. The utility
function U is assumed to be continuous, twice continuously differentiable and well-behaved in the
sense of Section 3.2.2. Thus, the utility function possesses the following properties with respect to
the first partial derivatives:
∂U(x, l, s)
∂x
> 0,
∂U(x, l, s)
∂l
< 0,
∂U(x, l, s)
∂s
> 0 (4.10)
In this sense, it is hypothesized that the consumer always prefers a higher level of consumption
and of safety to a lower one respectively, so that the utility function is increasing in each of these
two arguments. As labor constitutes a bad that brings disutility to the consumer, she always
prefers less work to more, other things equal, so that the utility function is negatively sloped in
the labor argument.8 Furthermore, the utility function is assumed to exhibit diminishing marginal
rates of substitution between safety and consumption: if an individual’s safety level is on a quite
low standard, she would be willing to trade off more units of consumption to obtain an additional
unit of safety than if the individual’s safety level was already on a comparatively advanced level.
Empirical evidence seems to confirm this hypothesis [4], which leads to convex indifference curves
in safety consumption space.
8As discussed below sometimes it is more convenient to work with the complement of labor time, i.e. leisure time,
in the consumer utility function as leisure constitutes a good that is consumed.
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Utility maximization problem: If the economy consists of C distinct consumers, the problem
of utility maximization for consumer c (c = 1, ..., C) is formulated as follows:
max
xc,lc
U c(xc, lc, s)
s.t. yc + wlc = pxc ∀c = 1, ..., C
(4.11)
Here, the variable yc = kc+pic−τ c represents the consumer’s non labor income, that is treated as fixed
in the following as the focus is on the short term perspective. This income yc is composed of capital
income kc and profit income pic, received by the consumer from holding firm shares. Furthermore,
the income yc may be interpreted as after tax τ c income as the influence of the government is not
explicitly accounted for in the model. Since safety is modeled as a public good, it is consumed in
equal amounts by all consumers implying that sc = s for all c.
The direct utility function of consumer c is therefore augmented by the argument s, while her
budget constraint remains unchanged. This is justifiable by the assumption, that any cost for the
provision of the public good are covered by tax payments that have already been collected, so that
the government finances the project out of its fixed budget. Normally, it would be necessary to add
an additional time constraint to the consumer’s utility maximization problem, requiring that work
time plus leisure time sum up to total time available to the consumer. This constraint is suppressed
at this point however, in order to keep things simple.
As the utility maximization problem stated in (4.11) constitutes a constrained optimization problem
it may conveniently be solved by Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrange function for the above stated
constrained maximization problem is written as:
Λc = U c(xc, lc, s)− λc(pxc − wlc − yc) (4.12)
Then, the first order conditions for an interior solution to the utility maximization problem (4.11)
are easily calculated:
∂Λc
∂xc
=
∂U(xc, lc, s)
∂xc
− λp = 0 (4.13)
∂Λc
∂lc
=
∂U(xc, lc, s)
∂lc
+ λw = 0 (4.14)
∂Λc
∂λc
= yc + wlc − pxc = 0 (4.15)
Dividing equation (4.14) by equation (4.13) and rearranging terms leads to
∂U(xc,lc,s)
∂lc
∂Uc(xc,lc,s))
∂xc
= −w
p
(4.16)
showing that each consumer maximizes her utility at the point where the marginal rate of substitu-
tion (MRS) of labor for consumption equals the negative of their ratio of prices. As all consumers in
the economy face the same set of prices it follows straightforwardly, that when all consumers follow
the strategy of utility maximization, the MRS must be equal across all consumers in the economy
[237]. Thus, the Pareto optimality condition in an exchange economy is fulfilled, as outlined in
Chapter 3.
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Now, if the first order conditions for utility maximization (4.13),(4.14) and (4.15) are solved for the
three unknown variables xc, lc and λc as functions of prices p, wages w, non labor income yc and
safety level s, the Marshallian9 demand functions for goods, the Marshallian supply functions for
labor and the marginal utility of income function are obtained:
xc = xc(p, w, yc, s) (4.17)
lc = lc(p, w, yc, s) (4.18)
λc = λc(p, w, yc, s) (4.19)
The demand functions for consumption goods and the supply functions of labor indicate how much
the consumer demands on the product markets and how much labor she supplies on the labor
market in order to maximize her utility under the given exogenous variables p,w,yc and safety level
s. Thus, it becomes obvious that in particular the publicly provided safety level has an influence on
all consumer decisions in the ambition to maximize her utility.
The demand and supply functions can easily be used to derive the Marshallian demand and supply
curves for consumption and labor, respectively. The Marshallian demand and supply curves are
directly observable on the markets and display the amount of goods consumed and labor supplied
at varying prices p and wages w, keeping all other exogenous arguments of the demand and supply
functions constant. They represent a useful tool in policy analysis in particular to investigate the
impact of price changes. Along the Marshallian demand and supply curves income is kept constant,
whereas the utility level is allowed to vary. According to the law of demand, consumers consume
more at lower prices and the demand curve is downward sloping. The contrary holds for the labor
supply curve.
It has to be emphasized at this point that there is a difference between a change in demand/supply
and a change in quantity demanded/supplied. A change in quantity demanded/supplied is caused
only by a price change and constitutes a movement along the demand/supply curve. A change in
demand/supply in contrast, occurs when more or less is demanded/supplied at any price of the good
and is mainly caused by a change in the exogenous variables excluding the own price or alternatively,
a change in preferences, i.e. the utility function. Therefore, as safety s constitutes a public good
that enters the demand/supply functions as an exogenous variable, a change in safety will result in
demand/supply curve shifts on several markets at once.
Although safety is not explicitly included in the budget constraint, it affects the demand for goods
and labor supply through the marginal utilities for such goods, which in turn causes the consumer
to adjust her economic behavior. The direction of change is ambiguous in general and depends on
the way the marginal utilities change when the safety level is elevated. If ∂
2U
∂xi∂s
> 0 is fulfilled, the
consumer will expand her consumption of good xi to maximize her utility. This in turn causes her
demand curve for xi to shift outwards. An example for such a situation in context of disaster risk
might be the increased demand for houses close to the sea, where safety has been increased by the
construction of a nearby flood protection. If ∂
2U
∂xi∂s
< 0 holds in contrast, the consumer will consume
less of the good and the demand curve will shift in the opposite direction. The reduced demand for
water isolation devices in the above example might serve as an illustration. Finally, if ∂
2U
∂xi∂s
= 0 is
9Named after the famous economist Alfred Marshall [160]
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given, safety has no influence and the consumer will not modify her consumption pattern for good
i. The direction of shift in response to a safety change is easily verified by means of the optimality
conditions of the utility maximization problem (4.11). For labor supply it is argued analogously,
keeping in mind that labor is a bad though.
The marginal utility of income λc on the other hand indicates, how much additional utility the
consumer derives from a marginal increase in income under the given circumstances. Thus, it is to
be interpreted as the shadow price of income [128]. As shown below, the marginal utility of income
function represents a useful tool to convert marginal changes in utility to monetary value and vice
versa. Reinserting the demand and supply functions (4.17) and (4.18) in the utility function U c
yields the indirect utility function V c:
V c(p, w, yc, s) := max
xc,lc
{U c(xc, lc, s) : yc + wlc = pxc}
:= U c(xc(p, w, yc, s), lc(p, w, yc, s), s)
(4.20)
The indirect utility function V c displays the maximum utility level that is attainable for the consumer
as a function of the exogenously given variables p, w, yc and safety level s. It is a convenient tool
to analyze how the consumer’s optimal utility level will change when the exogenous variables are
modified for instance due to the implementation of a public project. Without going deeper in the
mathematical properties of the indirect utility function it is important to emphasize, that it is
increasing in wages, income and safety level, while it is decreasing in commodity prices.
4.2.5 Producer Side - Profit Maximization
On the complementary side of the market, the producer’s or firm’s primary objective is to maximize
profits. If it is assumed that there are f = 1, ..., F producers on the market and labor L and capital
K are required in the production of the consumption goods x, at wages w and rents r respectively,
and F represents the production function, each firm’s constrained profit maximization problem can
be stated as follows:
max
xf ,Lf ,Kf
pif = pxf − wLf − rKf
s.t. xf = F f (Lf ,Kf , s) ∀f = 1, ..., F
(4.21)
The profit pi of the firm f is given by the revenues obtained on the product markets subtracted by
the variable cost of labor and the fixed cost of capital expended on the factor markets to carry out
the production. The firm’s profit maximizing ambition is limited by the production function F f ,
that indicates how much goods x can maximally be produced out of a certain amount of labor L
and capital K at a given and fixed publicly provided safety level s. Clearly, the production function
F f is a vector of production functions, that contains n different sub production functions F fi as
its arguments to produce each of the n distinct commodities xi. For notational simplicity it is
furthermore assumed, that each producer f produces all n commodities that are consumed by the
consumer. The safety level enters the production function because it has an impact both on the
quality of the hired labor force and on the production process itself that has to be carried out in
compliance with safety regulations.
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Furthermore, it has to be noted that the capital K represents all capital goods including factories,
machinery, tools, equipment and various buildings which are used in the production process and are
therefore not variable in the short term optimization. The labor component on the other hand, is the
accumulated labor time of all employees that is needed in the production process and is adjustable
also short term. To solve the constrained profit maximization problem the production function F f
is substituted in the profit function pif :
max
Lf ,Kf
pif = pF f (Lf ,Kf , s)− wLf − rKf (4.22)
The first order conditions for this transformed unconstrained profit maximization problem are easily
obtained:
∂pif
∂Lf
= p∂F
f (Lf ,Kf ,s)
∂Lf
− w = 0 (4.23)
∂pif
∂Kf
= p∂F
f (Lf ,Kf ,s)
∂Kf
− r = 0 (4.24)
From the first order conditions (4.23) and (4.24) it is easily seen, that the firm maximizes its profits
at the point, where the marginal product of labor (MPL) ∂F
f (Lf ,Kf ,s)
∂Lf
and the marginal product
of capital (MPK) ∂F
f (Lf ,Kf ,s)
∂Kf
equal the real wage and the real interest rate, respectively. Dividing
equation (4.23) by (4.24) and rearranging terms shows that the producer maximizes profits at this
combination of labor and capital, where the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) between
the two factors of production equals their ratio of prices:
∂F f (Lf ,Kf ,s)
∂Lf
∂F f (Lf ,Kf ,s)
∂Kf
=
w
r
(4.25)
As the prices for labor and capital are exogenously given it follows, that the MRTS must be equal
across all producers in the economy, yielding the Pareto optimality condition in production as
outlined in Chapter 3. Solving these first order conditions for Lf and Kf respectively, yields the
two factor demand functions
Lf = Lf (p, w, r, s)
Kf = Kf (p, w, r, s)
(4.26)
which capture the amount of labor and capital the producer demands on the factor markets to
maximize her profits under given prices p, wages w, rents r and safety level s. If these factor demand
functions are substituted in the production function F f , the supply function for consumption goods
is obtained:
xf = xf (p, w, r, s) = F f (Lf (p, w, r, s),Kf (p, w, r, s), s) (4.27)
The producer’s supply function discloses the amount of commodities the producer offers on the
product market in order to maximize her profits as a function of exogenously given prices p, wages
w, rents r and safety level s. Thus, also on the producer side in particular the publicly provided
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safety level has an impact on all producer decisions. In analogy to the discussion on the consumer
side, the factor demand functions and the product supply function can be taken into account to
construct the factor demand and product supply curves, that display the firm’s optimal quantities
demanded and supplied in dependency of their prices. Also here a change in the exogenous variables
other than the own price causes the curves to shift. In particular, this holds for the publicly provided
safety level s. Again, the direction of the shift is implicit in the demand and supply functions and
may be analyzed by means of the first order conditions to the profit maximization problem.
Substituting the labor and capital demand functions into the objective function gives the profit
function
Πf = pF f (Lf (p, w, r, s),Kf (p, w, r, s), s)− wLf (p, w, r, s)− rKf (p, w, r, s) (4.28)
which constitutes a value function, indicating the firm’s maximum attainable profits under the given
exogenous variables. Thus, in analogy to the consumer’s indirect utility function, the firm’s profit
function displays the producer’s optimal outcome under the circumstances the firm operates. The
profit function is increasing in commodity prices p and safety level s and decreasing in factor prices
w and r.
4.2.6 Single Market Equilibria and General Equilibrium
It was demonstrated in the previous sections how consumers and producers behave ideally in a
market economy to maximize their welfare. Each of the two economic agents acted under exogenously
given prices that were outside their influence in a competitive market setting. Now, in the market
perspective it is the job of the price mechanism to coordinate the forces of supply and demand so
that the independent and decentralized utility maximizing strategies of the consumers and profit
maximizing ambitions of the producers become accordable [243]. It is important to outline that even
if the market price for a good is independent on the single agents’ actions, the final market price is
the result of the aggregate behavior of all economic agents collectively [256].
The aggregate supply and demand on a market level for a given price is obtained by summing up
the quantities supplied and demanded over all consumers and producers respectively, taking the
supply and demand curves into account. In order to facilitate the presentation, in the following the
influence of capital on the product supplies and factor (labor) demands is suppressed and assumed
to be constant over the considered period. This is common practice in economics, especially if it
is focused on the short term perspective where firms are unable to modify their capital structures
[129].
Equilibrium on Product Markets Under this assumption, firstly the aggregate supply curve is
constructed by focusing on an arbitrary product market i, where commodity xi is traded. Adding
up the above derived Marshallian supply curves over all firms operating in the economy yields
Si(pi) =
F∑
f=1
xfi (pi, p
−, w, s) (4.29)
where Si(pi) denotes aggregate supply on product market i at product price pi and p− represents
the price vector of all remaining products excluding i. For the aggregate demand on product market
i it is proceeded analogously, by summing the demand curves over all consumers in the economy
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Di(pi) =
C∑
c=1
xci (pi, p
−, w, yc, s) (4.30)
where Di(pi) represents aggregate demand on product market i at price pi. This notation in hand,
the excess demand function on market i is determined by the following equation:
EDi(pi) = Di(pi)− Si(pi) (4.31)
The ith product market now is in equilibrium at a price p∗i and quantity x
∗
i where the aggregate
supply and demand curves intersect and supply equals demand, as shown in Figure 4.3. Here, the
excess demand function (4.31) is equal to zero and the market clears. At equilibrium price and quan-
tity the utility maximization strategies of the consumers and the profit maximization strategies of
the producers become perfectly accordable and the consumers’ marginal WTP equals the producers’
marginal cost for the product. Therefore, the allocative efficiency condition of Pareto optimality
is met and social welfare is maximized. This is the essence of the first welfare economic theorem,
presented in Section 3.3.3. Markets converge to equilibrium prices over time unless particular ex-
ogenous events occur in the economy [205] and the interaction of supply and demand determines
price and quantity of the good that will clear the market [176].
Figure 4.3: Product market equilibrium
The total benefits that all consumers collectively derive from the provision of product xi on the
market is given by the area below the aggregated demand curve and above the price line. This area
corresponds to the aggregate consumer surplus and represents the amount the consumers are willing
to pay less the price they actually pay. The producer surplus in contrast, equals the region below the
price line and above the aggregated supply curve. It represents the amount that producers actually
earn from selling the product at the market price less their marginal cost of production. It is to be
interpreted as the total benefits the producers derive from supplying product xi on the market. The
overall social benefit from market i is given by the sum of consumer and producer surplus.
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It has to be emphasized at this point, that the equilibrium price and quantity on product market i
have been obtained for a given publicly provided safety level s, that determined the circumstances
under which consumers and producers made their decisions of demanding and supplying the good.
It has been outlined in the description of supply and demand curves, that a change in the public
safety level s due to the implementation of a risk reduction project causes the individual supply
and demand curves to shift, as both producers and consumers respond by a modification of their
economic behavior.
Hence, as the equilibrium constitutes the intersection between aggregate supply and demand curves,
it will no longer be stable after a safety improvement and will move to a new equilibrium price
and quantity. The move from status quo to the new equilibrium goes in line with changes in both
consumer and producer surpluses, which are solely attributed to the safety increase. Converting
these changes in monetary units yields a price for safety, ceteris paribus. Such an approach to derive
a price for safety is called partial equilibrium analysis. In the relevant context of disaster safety, such
partial analyses are being carried out for instance in the attempt to value safety on basis of changing
real estate prices that are differently exposed to disaster risk and thus provide the theoretical basis
for consumer market studies in the VSL assessment.
Many public projects however, can reasonably be expected to impact a large number of markets both
directly where the policy is applied, and indirectly through spillover and feedback effects on those
and other markets [76]. Therefore, the safety prices obtained from partial equilibrium analysis might
not be adequate and strongly biased when relying on the ceteris paribus assumption. A strength
of general equilibrium models in contrast, is their ability to account consistently for the linkages
between all sectors of the economy, as illustrated further below.
Equilibrium on Labor Markets In principle, the above described methodology to define price
and quantity that equilibrates supply and demand holds also on the labor markets. One important
difference however is that the role of consumers and producers is reversed in the sense that consumers
are suppliers of labor, whereas producers demand labor on the markets. Accordingly, by focusing
on an arbitrary labor market j, the aggregated labor supply curve is given by
Sj(wj) =
C∑
c=1
lcj(p, wj , w
−, s) (4.32)
i.e. the consumers’ labor supply curves are summed over all consumers. As before, wj denotes the
wage rate on the considered labor market j, whereas w− constitutes the k− 1 dimensional vector of
wages on all other labor markets except for j. For the aggregated labor demand curve it is obtained
Dj(wj) =
F∑
f=1
Lfj (p, wj , w
−, s) (4.33)
i.e. it represents the sum of all firms’ labor demands. The excess demand function on labor market
j is represented by:
EDj(wj) = Dj(wj)− Sj(wj) (4.34)
The labor market is in equilibrium where the excess demand function (4.34) is equal to zero. As
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the above derived results and properties concerning equilibrium price and quantity hold also for the
labor market, no further explanation is needed.
Figure 4.4: Labor market equilibrium
In Figure 4.4 the labor market equilibrium is visualized graphically. The crucial difference to the
product market here is that aggregate consumer surplus on labor market j is given by the area above
the aggregate labor supply curve and below the wage rate, whereas the aggregate producer surplus
is represented by the area below the aggregated labor demand curve and above the wage rate. Total
social welfare that results from labor market j is the sum of consumer and producer welfare.
Also with respect to the equilibrium on labor market j it has to be emphasized that the optimal
wage w∗j and quantity L
∗
j are dependent on the publicly provided safety level s in general. In line
with the above discussion, the equilibrium will shift in response to a publicly imposed safety change
so that a new equilibrium solution is reached. Therefore, also here a partial equilibrium approach
for pricing safety may be performed, by relying on the ceteris paribus clause. This constitutes the
theoretical basis of labor market studies in VSL assessments. The above stated limitations must be
kept in mind though.
General Equilibrium In a modern economy single markets are often closely interrelated, making
it necessary to analyze welfare changes beyond the other things being equal assumption and look
at multiple markets simultaneously. Interrelations between markets are essential to forecasting and
understanding economic activity. This holds because there are distinctive interactions across markets
and therefore it is important that the equilibrium concept includes simultaneous determinations of
equilibrium prices across markets [243]. This is of particular importance in the analysis of public
goods as they are not traded on particular markets and can generally be expected to have an
impact on diverse markets simultaneously. The general equilibrium consideration is able to present
a solution strategy for the economy as a whole, taking into account all market interdependencies.
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Formally, a general equilibrium in the short term is defined as a set of allocations for the consumers
{xc, lc}Cc=1, a set of allocations for the producers
{
xf , Lf
}F
f=1
and a set of prices (p, w), such that all
consumers and firms maximize their utility and profits, respectively and all markets in the economy
are simultaneously in equilibrium [2, 146]. In line with the above notation, the general equilibrium
in the considered economy can be characterized by the following n+ k equations:
EDi(pi) =
C∑
c=1
xci (pi, p
−, w, yc, s)−
F∑
f=1
xfi (pi, p
−, w, s) = 0, ∀i = 1, ..., n (4.35)
EDj(wj) =
F∑
f=1
Lfj (p, wj , w
−, s)−
C∑
c=1
lcj(p, wj , w
−, yc, s) = 0, ∀j = 1, ..., k (4.36)
Thus, at the general equilibrium allocations and prices, each single market in the economy clears
and has an excess demand equal to zero. At the general equilibrium it is impossible to improve the
situation of one economic agent without worsening that of another and therefore social welfare is
maximized in the whole economy. This is the essence of the first welfare economic theorem that was
stated in Chapter 3. In order to analyze the properties of the general equilibrium the Walras’ Law
[261] is of particular importance:
n∑
i=1
pi(Di(pi)− Si(pi)) +
k∑
j=1
wj(Dj(wj)− Sj(wj)) = 0 (4.37)
The Walras’ Law states that at each given set of prices, which need not necessarily be equilibrium
prices, the price weighted sum of excess demands over all markets of the economy is equal to zero.
This relation holds whether the economy is in equilibrium or not [243]. Therefore, the Walras’ Law
implies that in a general equilibrium model there are n+ k prices to determine, but there are only
n+ k − 1 linear independent equations at disposition that characterize these prices [256]. If supply
equals demand on n+ k− 1 markets of the model economy and each individual’s budget constraint
holds with equality as a result of utility maximization, it follows from (4.37) that the (n + k) − th
market must be in equilibrium as well [244]. Therefore, only n+ k − 1 independent prices exist.
As a consequence, the equilibrium price vector (p, w) is not unique and the general equilibrium
model cannot be taken into account to determine absolute prices. Some particular price must be
kept constant, so that the corresponding good serves as a so called numeraire good. In this vein,
the system is being normalized with respect to the numeraire: prices of all other goods on all other
markets are expressed relative to this numeraire price, which is commonly set equal to one [256].
This approach may be clarified by recalling that all demand and supply curves on the market are
homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income
xc(p, w, yc, s) = xc(tp, tw, tyc, s)
lc(p, w, yc, s) = lc(tp, tw, tyc, s)
xf (p, w, s) = xf (tp, tw, s)
Lf (p, w, s) = Lf (tp, tw, s) ∀t > 0
(4.38)
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i.e. multiplying all prices and income by some arbitrary positive factor t > 0 will not result in any
adjustment in the behavior and serves equally well. Therefore, only relative prices count and all
prices and income can legitimately be multiplied by the reciprocal of the numeraire price, which
implies setting the latter equal to one.
On the other hand it is not necessarily true that an equilibrium price vector (p, w) exists. Certain
assumptions about the firm’s production technology in combination with certain requirements con-
cerning the consumption set and consumer preferences, that can be reviewed in [14, 243], in contrast,
ensure the existence of a general equilibrium. Alternatively, there might be multiple equilibria in the
sense that more than one price vector results in a general equilibrium, given the initial distribution
of endowments [130]. But the discussion of these rather complex issues is outside the scope of this
thesis and it is henceforth assumed that there is one unique equilibrium price vector.
As in the case of single market equilibria, also the general equilibrium in the above described model
has been determined for one particular safety level only and will respond to safety changes that are
imposed by a public risk reduction project in moving to another general equilibrium. Therefore,
the status quo general equilibrium serves as the starting condition for investigating the impacts of
changes in the publicly provided safety level on the whole economy by means of the WTP concept
henceforth. To justify this approach, it needs to be verified that there are generally two ways to
depart from a general equilibrium without suffering a decrease in efficiency.
One way is to change the initial distribution of endowments so that after utility and profit maxi-
mization a new general equilibrium is obtained. This new equilibrium goes in line with a different
distribution of welfare across individuals. Nevertheless, from a social point of view the status quo
and the new equilibrium are equally efficient, they only differ in distribution. The Kaldor-Hicks
compensation test and its practical realization in terms of the WTP concept is only applicable to
identify increases in efficiency, while it is of limited use in the comparison of two Pareto optima. A
selection for one of these two equilibria needs to be made by means of a social welfare function, as
discussed in Chapter 3.
The second reason that leads to the formation of a new general equilibrium in the considered closed
economy model is given by technological progress or an increase in the available resources [105]. In
these cases, a new equilibrium solution is obtained that is comparable to the status quo equilibrium
by means of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. This is due to the fact that either of the two cases mentioned
lead to an increase in the economy’s efficiency. Therefore, the status quo equilibrium becomes
inefficient under the new conditions and the welfare change in the move from status quo to the new
equilibrium can be evaluated meaningfully by means of the WTP concept. It is crucial to note that
welfare changes due to these reasons are the only ones for which estimated first order income effects
must be included in the welfare change measure. Such effects are not generated by solely price
changes taking place within the competitive economy, unless there are distortions present. Here, the
benefits to consumers from a fall in price are canceled out by the cost to producers, and vice versa
in the case of a price increase [105]. These considerations are further elaborated in Section 4.4.
Now, from the definition of safety in terms of annual survival probability it is easily verified, that an
increase in the public safety level resulting from the implementation of a risk reduction project leads
to a situation, where any individual of society has statistically more time at disposition. Accordingly,
the total time endowment of society is enhanced, which in turn can be interpreted as an increase in
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economic resources [33, 109]. Consequently, public safety improvements are to be integrated in the
second category of general equilibrium changes and the evaluation of safety increases by means of
the WTP concept, departing from the general equilibrium under status quo safety level, finds good
theoretical support.
4.3 Evaluating Safety Induced Welfare Changes
This section analyzes, how marginal changes in the publicly provided safety level affect both single
consumer and producer welfare. In a second step, these changes are transformed into the money
scale and aggregated on social level to finally arrive at a social price for safety that is employed in
the social CBA. How the government finances the intervention is not explicitly considered here, but
it is possible to interpret yc as after tax income as discussed above.
4.3.1 Consumer Welfare Change Measures
A change in the publicly provided safety level has an impact on potentially all consumers of the
considered economy. In order to analyze how the improved safety conditions affect consumer welfare
concretely, it is assumed that the public project causes a change in the publicly provided safety level
from s0 to s1, where superscript 0 represents the safety standard in status quo condition and 1 refers
to the safety level after project implementation. Thus, the safety change
∆s = s1 − s0 (4.39)
is the subject of study that affects all consumers in society uniformly. For simplicity it is hypothesized
at this point, that the considered safety change leaves all prices p, wage rates w and consumer income
yc unaffected. Now, by means of the indirect utility concept
V c(p, w, yc, s) = U c(xc(p, w, yc, s), lc(p, w, yc, s), s) (4.40)
that yields the optimal utility level of the consumer as a function of prices p, wages w, non-labor
income yc and safety level s, the change in utility that results from the safety increase is:
∆V c = V c(p, w, yc, s1)− V c(p, w, yc, s0) (4.41)
Since the utility of the consumer is defined on an ordinal scale only, the utility change to the consumer
in absolute terms is of no significance as any monotone transformation of the utility function serves
equally well to describe consumer behavior. What is needed in contrast, is a measure that is invariant
under these transformations and captures the utility change in monetary units. Although a great
variety of different measures have been proposed in literature [104, 163, 185] attention is focused on
the Hicksian measures compensating variation (CV) and equivalent variation (EV) henceforth, that
have been introduced by Hicks in a series of articles [112, 113, 114].
Originally, the two measures have been developed to evaluate welfare changes that result from price
changes. In this thesis the two measures are primarily applied to evaluate quantity changes in
the public good safety. In the context of quantity changes the welfare measures are often being
referred to as compensating and equivalent surplus and can be interpreted as an extension of the
measures for price changes [103]. But as the distinction seems increasingly artificial [152, 172] the
term compensating and equivalent variation is maintained in the following.
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In thinking about compensating and equivalent surplus as opposed to variations, it is always useful
to remember what is public and what is private. In case of market goods, prices are public and the
demand for goods varies across individuals. For the considered non market good safety, the safety
level is publicly provided and shared by all, while the marginal values vary among individuals. These
considerations help to differentiate between compensating variations and surpluses [46].
The Compensating Variation (CV)
The CV is equal to the maximium amount of money that can be taken away from the individual
after an improvement in the publicly provided safety level so that she is exactly as well off as before
the change. Formally, the CV is implicitly defined by means of the following equation:
V c(p, w, yc − CV c, s1) = V c(p, w, yc, s0) (4.42)
Thus, the maximal achievable utility level of the individual under enhanced safety conditions and a
by means of CV reduced non labor income is equal to the maximal achievable utility level before the
change. As a consequence, the consumer will remain on the same indifference curve by paying the
compensation payment CV and enjoying the enhanced safety level s1. In other words, CV represents
exactly the WTP for the safety improvement, introduced in Section 3.5.1.
Figure 4.5: The compensating variation
This is easily retraced by means of Figure 4.5 that depicts the consumer’s preferences in a single
private good - public good safety space. As stated above, the increase in safety is assumed to be
free of charge so that the consumer’s budget line is horizontal. The status quo situation of the
consumer is given by point A on an indifference curve corresponding to utility level U0. After the
improvement in the safety level due to the public project, the consumer is able to attain a point B
of higher satisfaction allocated on a higher indifference curve corresponding to utility level U1. Now,
reducing the consumer’s income by an amount equal to CV under the new safety conditions will
bring her back to the initial indifference curve consuming the bundle C, so that she is equally well
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off as before the change. Similar argumentation reveals, that a reduction in the publicly provided
safety level requires a monetary payment CV’ received by the consumer to enable the attainment of
the initial utility level U0. In case of a reduction in the safety level the CV therefore represents the
WTA.
Figure 4.6: The equivalent variation
The Equivalent Variation (EV)
The EV represents the minimum amount of money that must be given to the consumer before an
improvement in the publicly provided safety level to make her exactly as well off as she would have
been after the change. Formally, the EV is implicitly defined by means of the following equation:
V c(p, w, yc + EV c, s0) = V c(p, w, yc, s1) (4.43)
Thus, the maximal achievable utility level of the consumer at status quo safety level s0 and a
by means of EV augmented income yc is equal to the maximal achievable utility level under new
safety conditions s1. As a consequence, the consumer reaches the same higher indifference curve by
receiving the EV and enjoying status quo safety level as she could have attained with the safety
enhancing public project and status quo non labor income. In other words, the EV is exactly the
WTA to forgo the project.
This is easily verified on basis of Figure 4.6. As before, the status quo condition is given by point A
on an indifference corresponding to utility level U0. After the implementation of the public project
the consumer could reach point B on indifference curve corresponding to utility level U1. Increasing
the consumer’s income by EV under the status quo safety conditions would enable her to reach point
C with utility level U1 also without the project, making her as well off as she would have been after
the change. Similarly, in case of a safety decrease, the EV corresponds to the WTP of the consumer
to prevent the project from being realized. Table 4.5 summarizes the relation between CV, EV and
WTP and WTA for positive and adverse safety changes.
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Welfare change measure Safety increase Safety decrease
(Utility increase) (Utility decrease)
Compensating variation WTP WTA
Equivalent variation WTA WTP
Table 4.5: Welfare change measures
The WTP/WTA Discrepancy
Traditionally, economists have been quite indifferent about which welfare measure to employ in
economic valuation: WTP and WTA have both been considered to be acceptable. By large, the
literature has focused on WTP. It has been confirmed by numerous empirical studies however, that
the WTA tends to be significantly higher than the WTP in many applications [102, 272]. This
discrepancy is shown in Table 4.6 for diverse kinds of goods.
Both measures rely on the assumption of substitutability in preferences, but each adopts different
reference points. The WTP reference point is the absence of the safety improvement, while the
WTA reference point is the presence of the improvement. Therefore, WTP and WTA need not be
exactly equal for an equal size improvement of the publicly provided safety level. Obviously, the
WTP is constrained by consumer income, whereas there is no upper limit on what the individual
would require to forgo the improvement (WTA). In addition, it has been observed that people place
higher values on things they own than on things they do not, a phenomenon commonly known as
the endowment effect [246].
These differences still would not matter if property rights were always clearly defined [200]. WTP
in the context of a potential improvement is clearly linked to the right for status quo. It presumes
that the individual has no right to the safety improvement but does have a right to the original level
of s and must pay for the enhancement. Similarly, if the situation is one of losing the status quo,
then WTA for that loss is the appropriate measure. It presumes that the individual has a right to
the new, higher level of safety and must be compensated if the new level is not attained.
Type of good WTA/WTP ratio Standard error
Public or non market 10.4 2.5
Health and safety 10.1 2.3
Private 2.9 0.3
Lotteries 2.1 0.2
Timing 1.9 0.2
All goods 7.2 0.9
Table 4.6: WTA/WTP for different kinds of goods [Horowitz and McConnell [118]]
Based on this interpretation of the two measures, some economists have argued that the choice
between them is basically an ethical one [46]. As policy decisions in the context of public risk
reduction project appraisal deal with improvements rather than degradation in the publicly provided
safety level, there is strong favor for the assumption that the WTP constitutes the appropriate
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measure for employment. For marginal safety changes however, the discussion about which measure
to choose becomes dispensable from a theoretical point of view, as the two measures coincide. For
practical purposes instead, it might be relevant also for marginal changes.
4.3.2 Impact of Marginal Safety Changes on Consumer Welfare
So far the welfare change measures have only been defined implicitly by means of the indirect utility
function V c. In this paragraph explicit formulations for the consumer’s WTP for safety are derived.
Under the assumption that the risk reduction project has only marginal effects on the total publicly
provided safety level and potentially other exogenous variables, the partial and total derivatives of
the indirect utility function may be taken into account to estimate the resulting change in consumer
welfare.
Ceteris Paribus Safety Changes
It is investigated firstly, how a small ceteris paribus change in the publicly provided safety level s
affects consumer utility (per unit of safety). This is done by constructing the partial derivative of
the indirect utility function V c with respect to safety:
∂V c(p, w, yc, s)
∂s
=
∂U c(xc(p, w, yc, s), lc(p, w, yc, s), s)
∂s
(4.44)
=
∂U c
∂xc
∂xc
∂s
+
∂U c
∂lc
∂lc
∂s
+
∂U c
∂s
(4.45)
= λcp
∂xc
∂s
− λcw∂l
c
∂s
+
∂U c
∂s
(4.46)
In this chain of equations, expression (4.46) has been obtained from equation (4.45) by making use
of the first order optimality conditions ∂U
c
∂xc = λ
cp and ∂U
c
∂lc = −λcw of the utility maximization
problem stated in (4.13) and (4.14). As discussed above, the first two terms in equation (4.46) imply
that the optimal levels of consumption and labor supply may be affected by a change in the safety
level s through their marginal utilities as
∂2U c
∂xc∂s
6= 0 and ∂
2U c
∂lc∂s
6= 0 (4.47)
generally holds. But under the ceteris paribus assumption of constant prices p and w and income
yc, these indirect effects cancel out as can be demonstrated by means of the income constraint [96].
Under the optimal consumer behavior the following equation must hold for the income restriction:
yc − pxc(p, w, yc, s) + wlc(p, w, yc, s) = 0 (4.48)
Differentiating the income constraint (4.48) with respect to safety and multiplying all terms by the
marginal utility of income to convert them in utility changes leads to:
λcp
∂xc
∂s
− λcw∂l
c
∂s
= 0 (4.49)
Now, reinserting condition (4.49) in equation (4.46) yields:
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∂V c
∂s
=
∂U c
∂s
(4.50)
Thus, the influence of a ceteris paribus safety change on optimal utility is equal to the marginal
utility of safety and all second order effects on consumption and labor supply are negligible. This
result is of great importance in microeconomic theory in general and is commonly known as envelope
theorem, which is formally derived in Appendix C. For the constrained utility maximization problem
it states that the partial derivatives of the indirect utility function with respect to the exogenous
parameters equal the respective derivation of the Lagrange function Λc evaluated at the optimum:
∂V c
∂z
=
∂Λc
∂z
, z ∈ {p, w, yc, s} (4.51)
As safety does not enter the budget constraint by construction, for the above considered ceteris
paribus safety change (4.51) vanishes to (4.50). The envelope theorem is of great importance for
further argumentation.
To sum up, the total change in optimal utility for a marginal safety change ds is given by:
∂V c
∂s
ds =
∂U c
∂s
ds (4.52)
Now, by dividing equation (4.52) by the marginal utility of income ∂V
c
∂yc , the change in utility is
converted to monetary value, leading to consumer c’s marginal WTP for safety:
WTP c =
∂V c
∂s
∂V c
∂yc
ds =
∂V c
∂s
λc
ds (4.53)
The identity ∂V
c
∂yc = λ
c may be verified by means of the envelope theorem result (4.51). It is easily
seen that a subtraction of WTP c from the consumer’s income neutralizes the utility increase of the
safety improvement, so that the consumer is as well off with the safety change and a lower income
than without the change and initial income. For any fraction of the NCHS that the consumer has to
expend for the project that is below the consumer’s WTP, an increase utility would result and the
project would be worthwhile for the individual. Accordingly, it can be validated, that an addition
of WTP c to consumer income makes her as well off without the safety improvement as she could
have been with the change and initial income.
Consequently, for a marginal ceteris paribus safety change the WTP c given in formula (4.53) is
identical to the above introduced measures CV c and EV c and these two measures coincide. This
is due to the fact that the marginal utility of income remains constant throughout the change.
Therefore, equation (4.53) is to be interpreted as the consumer’s pricing rule for small ceteris paribus
safety changes. Furthermore, it has to be emphasized that the WTP formula is invariant under
monotone transformations of the ordinal utility function because the change in V c is offset by the
change in the marginal utility of income resulting from the transformation [105].
Complex Safety Changes
If the ceteris paribus assumption of the safety change is relaxed and thus, prices p, wages w and
income yc are allowed to vary in response to the safety change ds, the realm of measuring individual
safety changes in a general equilibrium setting is reached. At individual level however, the changes
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in prices, wages and income must be considered as exogenously given, as outlined above. They
are treated endogenously when cost benefit rules in general equilibrium based on the representative
consumer model are derived in Section 4.4. Now, the individual WTP measure for such a complex
safety induced welfare change must fulfill the following implicit condition
V c(p1, w1, yc1 −WTP c, s1) = V c(p0, w0, yc0, s0) (4.54)
where superscripts 0 refer to the status quo state before the implementation of the project and
superscripts 1 denote the post project situation. For reasons of simplicity the characterization of the
WTP by means of equation (4.54) has relied on the CV measure. In order to arrive at an explicit
form for the WTP measure, the indirect utility function V c needs to be totally differentiated to
firstly obtain a functional form for the consumer’s utility change
dV c =
n∑
i=1
∂V c
∂pi
dpi +
k∑
j=1
∂V c
∂wj
dwj +
∂V c
∂yc
dyc +
∂V c
∂s
ds (4.55)
= −λc
n∑
i=1
xcidpi + λ
c
k∑
j=1
lcjdwj + λ
cdyc +
∂V c
∂s
ds (4.56)
= −λc(xcdp− lcdw − dyc) + ∂V
c
∂s
ds (4.57)
where equation (4.56) has been derived from equation (4.55) by applying the envelope theorem and
equation (4.57) corresponds to (4.56) in vector notation. Equation (4.57) captures the change in
consumer utility due to the safety induced changes in the exogenous variables. Dividing equation
(4.57) by the marginal utility of income λc converts the utility change in monetary units and thus,
yields the generalized WTP formula of the consumer for complex safety induced changes:
WTP c = −xcdp+ lcdw + dyc +
∂V c
∂s
∂V c
∂yc
ds (4.58)
Equation (4.58) may be interpreted as the individual consumer’s cost benefit pricing rule for a
marginal safety change in a general equilibrium analysis. The direct benefits to the consumer are
given by ∂V
c
∂s /
∂V c
∂yc ds, and the project has some spillover effects on a variety of markets, where it
causes adjustments in consumer and producer behavior. Therefore, the previously given equilibrium
prices p and wages w are no longer stable and adjust to new values, as discussed above. These
price changes in turn have an effect on the individual consumer surpluses on the affected markets,
which are captured by the first two terms of equation (4.58). The third term represents the change
in the consumer’s non labor income that results from the safety change. As was true for the small
ceteris paribus safety change also here the WTP c measure is interpretable either in terms of CV or
EV, since the two measures coincide. This holds, because the marginal utility of income remains
constant along a marginal change in the exogenous variables.
If prices and wages should vary in non marginal amounts in response to the marginal safety change
however, the problem of path dependency is faced: when relying on the Marshallian demand curves
to analyze consumer surplus changes on the affected markets, the sequential order in which the
prices are changed generally has an impact on the WTP measure and can cause inconsistencies.
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These inconsistencies occur whenever the cross price derivatives of the demand functions are not
symmetric. In this case, the welfare change measures must be based on Hicksian compensated
demand curves to ensure a reliable result. The relation between Marshallian and Hicksian demands
is provided in Appendix D. In a general equilibrium setting however, welfare changes that result
from price changes net out on aggregate level, as the effects of price changes occur with reversed
signs both on consumer and on producer side, as demonstrated below. Therefore, the issue of path
dependency is not further explored in this thesis. For a detailed discussion on this issue it is referred
to [139].
4.3.3 Producer Welfare Change Measures
In this section it is investigated how marginal safety changes affect producer welfare. As stated
above, the ultimate goal of the producers is to maximize profits. Therefore, profit is the obvious
candidate for a measure of producer welfare. On the producer side there is no path dependency
problem involved in the measurement of welfare changes on markets where non marginal price
adjustments occur and the derived measures can be given the interpretation of both CV and EV
since they coincide. Producers simply maximize the difference between revenues and cost under
the given safety conditions. In analogy to the indirect utility function of the consumer, the profit
function of the producer constitutes a valuable tool to analyze safety induced welfare changes:
Πf (p, w, r, s) = pF f (Lf (p, w, r, s),Kf (p, w, r, s), s)− wLf (p, w, r, s)− rKf (p, w, r, s) (4.59)
As illustrated above, the publicly provided safety level enters the production function and therefore
affects the amount of output the producer is able to produce from a given amount of inputs. Ac-
cording to equation (4.59) profits are equal to revenues minus variable and fixed cost. In general,
the fixed cost rKf are independent of the level of production the producer decides to produce in the
short term. For reasons of simplicity therefore, the fixed cost is treated as a constant henceforth and
the dependence of the functions x and L on the fixed stock of capital is suppressed. Accordingly,
the following form for the profit function is obtained:
Πf (p, w, s) = pF f (Lf (p, w, s), s)− wLf (p, w, s)− rKf (4.60)
Now, if the publicly provided safety level is increased from s0 to s1 ceteris paribus, the following
change in the firm’s profit results:
∆Πf = Πf (p, w, s1)−Πf (p, w, s0) (4.61)
Straightforwardly, the change in profit is measured directly in monetary terms, so that equation
(4.61) already represents an adequate measure for the producer’s welfare change. Furthermore,
provided that capital is fixed, it becomes obvious that the influence of capital nets out in calculating
the profit change. Therefore, the changes in profits are uniquely determined by the changes in
revenues minus changes in variable cost, which is equal to the firm’s producer surplus or quasi rent.
As a consequence, in the firms short term production decisions it is focused on producer surplus or
quasi rents rather than directly on profits. The term quasi rent is used because on the one hand it
is a rent on the fixed factors of production and on the other hand it may not persist for a long time,
since the firm is able to adjust capital stock long term [129].
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4.3.4 Impact of Marginal Safety Changes on Producer Welfare
As the profits have been identified to be the proper tool to evaluate producer welfare changes, it is
now proceeded with analyzing the impacts of both ceteris paribus and more complex safety changes
on producer welfare.
Ceteris Paribus Safety Changes
In order to analyze the effects of a marginal safety change on producer welfare, it is assumed firstly,
that the safety change does not impact prices and wages on other markets. The effect of such a ceteris
paribus safety change on producer welfare can be assessed by differentiating the profit function with
respect to safety:
∂Πf
∂s
= p(
∂F f
∂Lf
∂Lf
∂s
+
∂F f
∂s
)− w∂L
f
∂s
(4.62)
= (p
∂F f
∂Lf
− w)∂L
f
∂s
+ p
∂F f
∂s
(4.63)
= p
∂F f
∂s
(4.64)
Here, equation (4.64) has been obtained from equation (4.63) by making use of the first order
conditions of profit optimization (4.23). As a result, the impact of the safety change on the firm’s
profits are given by the value of the marginal product of safety p∂F
f
∂s and all second order safety
effects may legitimately be neglected. This is a result of the envelope theorem for unconstrained
optimization problems, that is provided in Appendix C.
The producer’s WTP for the marginal ceteris paribus safety increase is then easily calculated
WTP f = p
∂F f
∂s
ds (4.65)
which simply corresponds to the additional profits or producer surplus the producer obtains from
the enhanced safety level. If the amount WTP f was transferred to the producer under status quo
safety level, she would realize exactly the same profits as after the project. Alternatively, taking
away this amount of money from the producer after the safety change would enable her to realize the
same profits as in status quo condition and she would be equally well off. Therefore, the producer
welfare measure (4.65) can be interpreted in terms of CV and EV and the latter two always coincide
since there are no income effects involved.
Complex Safety Changes
In order to complete the analysis on producer welfare, an expression to measure producer welfare
changes for complex safety changes is derived. Here, the ceteris paribus assumption is relaxed and
prices and wages are permitted to vary in response to the safety improvement. Taking the total
differential of the profit function yields
4.3. EVALUATING SAFETY INDUCED WELFARE CHANGES 89
dΠf =
n∑
i=1
∂Πf
∂pi
dpi +
k∑
j=1
∂Πf
∂wj
dwj +
∂Πf
∂s
ds (4.66)
= xfdp− Lfdw + p∂F
f
∂s
ds (4.67)
where equation (4.67) has been obtained from (4.66) by applying the envelope theorem. As the profits
are already given in monetary units, equation (4.67) already constitutes the appropriate expression
for the producer’s WTP under complex safety changes. Investigating equation (4.67) more closely,
it is seen that the total change in producer welfare is given by the producer surplus changes on the
product and labor markets due to the modified prices and wages resulting from the safety change,
augmented by some additional producer surplus originating from the higher production capacity
under the new safety conditions.
4.3.5 Impact of Marginal Safety Changes on Social Welfare
Once the above described procedure to measure consumer welfare changes has been carried out for
each consumer individually, the single consumer’s WTPs have to be aggregated on social level to
finally arrive at a consumers’ SWTP for the marginal safety increase under investigation. Here, the
aggregation is performed by summing up the individual WTPs over all consumers:
SWTPC =
C∑
c=1
WTP c (4.68)
This result holds because of the public good properties of safety: it is enjoyed by all and the
consumption of safety of one person does not reduce the availability of safety to another. So all
individuals pay collectively for a unit increase in safety and the aggregate marginal value of safety
is the sum of all individual marginal values.
The aggregation of the single producer’s WTP on social level to obtain the producers’ SWTP is
performed analogously by summing up the individual producer’s WTPs:
SWTPF =
F∑
f=1
WTP f (4.69)
The total welfare change to society is given by the sum of the changes in consumer and producer
welfare and is calculated by summing up the respective WTPs of all economic agents that comprise
society:
SWTP = SWTPC + SWTPF (4.70)
This value corresponds to the social price for safety in the economy. Should the SWTP be higher
than the NCHS of the pure safety problem, the project is approved to be efficient in social sense.
Consequently, the Kaldor-Hicks test is passed and a potential Pareto improvement is realizable, as
discussed in Chapter 3. In a consecutive step it then has to be investigated, if the project really
results in a welfare increase to society by means of a social welfare function that includes a value
judgment about distributional desirability.
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This is usually done by attaching distribution weights to the individual WTPs to elevate the relative
influence of comparatively weak individuals in the project decision process. The justification to avoid
an assignment of distribution weights, that is commonly made by economists, is the assumption that
the welfare distribution in society is already on an optimal level, so that the marginal social utility
of income is equal across all individuals [131]. An alternative assumption that could be placed is
that the government smoothens possibly occurring inequities by a progressive taxation of the project
cost. If the marginal social utility of income is equal across individuals, the following relation holds
SWTP −NCHS > 0⇔ ∆W > 0 (4.71)
i.e. efficiency in safety is equivalent to a social welfare increase in society.
Up to now, it has been demonstrated, how consumers and producers WTP for changes in the
publicly provided safety level can be assessed and aggregated on social level to obtain a social
price for safety. All previous derivations were based on the individualistic concept, i.e. each single
individual’s valuation has been included in the derivation of a social price for the safety change, in
line with the individualistic postulate of welfare economics. In real project appraisal however, such
an approach would hardly be possible considering the great heterogeneity of individual preferences
involved, which are generally unknown, and even less at a reasonable cost. At the individual level
there is a wealth of information available that is reflected in the price building process of particular
goods. Abstaining from market distortions, the price of single goods processes all that information
and constitutes a valuable indicator for true social scarcity values, that contain each participating
individual’s WTP contribution.
In the attempt to price non market goods on population level however, this wealth of information
does not exist. In the future, with advancements in information processing and computer technology
and in a perhaps more ideal system of public decision making, such information could become
accessible for public planning. But in contemporary policy analysis planning on population level
often entails the use of representative agent models that rely on a few characteristics only [51]. The
proper question to be considered in this context is whether aggregate validity is improvable by better
handling the characteristics of the representative agent. The construction of a representative agent
model is subject of the following section and serves as theoretical basis for the LQI in Chapter 5.
4.4 Evaluating Welfare Changes in a General Equilibrium Setting
Actual economies consist of millions of consumers and producers that are potentially affected by the
public risk reduction project. Therefore, in theory, the individual cost benefit rules for consumers
and producers that are derived above need to be carried out for each economic agent individually to
finally arrive at the SWTP for the considered safety change provided in (4.70). Beyond doubt, such
a detailed analysis would be very demanding and costly and requires precise information about the
preferences of single individuals and firms, which is not easily obtained. As a consequence, public
policy analysis is often being performed by relying on representative agent models to investigate
changes in a general equilibrium setting or alternatively, it is restricted to partial equilibrium analysis
on single affected markets ceteris paribus.
In order to keep with general equilibrium analysis, it is conventional in welfare economics to proceed
as if the consumers and producers could be aggregated in one single or representative agent each
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Figure 4.7: The representative agent model
[31], as illustrated in Figure 4.7. Then, to simplify the analysis it is assumed that all agents of the
same type are identical and show similar behavior or alternatively, that agents differ, but act in such
a way that the sum of their choices is mathematically equivalent to the decision of one representative
individual or firm, respectively. The whole analysis is based on average values. Especially in the
evaluation of public goods in a general equilibrium setting where each subject is affected by the
same quantity changes, the representative agent model is widely applied [31]. The advantage of this
procedure is that it allows for the use of aggregate market data in evaluating welfare changes and
to eschew the issue of aggregating welfare measures over individuals. Instead it is only focused on
the allocative efficiency effects of a welfare change [31].
Samuelson [226] points out that there are two circumstances where the representative agent model
may legitimately be used to represent many person economies for normative purposes:
1. The government is continually redistributing income optimally by a set of lump sum transfers.
2. Preferences are restricted to be identical and homothetic for all individuals.
Either of these two restrictions is to be looked upon as being quite stringent, but the approach may
serve well as an approximation under limited information to derive a first statement about project
efficiency and thus constitutes a useful analytical device.
4.4.1 The Representative Agent Model
At this point is proceeded as if there was just one single consumer and one single firm in the
model economy and either one or both of the above stated prerequisites for the representative agent
model are assumed to be fulfilled. As before, the ultimate goal of the representative consumer is to
maximize her utility subject to a given budget constraint and the firm’s objective is to maximize
profits. Therefore, all CBA rules derived above hold also in the representative agent case. But one
further simplification is possible: because the firm is ultimately owned by the consumer, all profits
must accrue directly to the consumer as part of her income. This implies that the two problems
of utility and profit maximization are linked through the consumer’s income and a social welfare
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analysis can be carried out by focusing only on the representative consumer’s utility changes. For
this purpose it is sufficient to explicitly account for profit income in the consumer’s indirect utility
function and thus, to split up non labor income y in its components K, Π and τ , so that changes in
the firms profits become visible and are translated into utility changes of the consumer
V (p, w,K + Π− τ, s) := max
xd,Ls
{
U(xd, Ls, s) : K + Π + wLs − τ = pxd
}
(4.72)
where the superscripts c have been omitted and the new introduced superscripts d and s refer to
supply and demand, respectively. In the following it is assumed, that the consumer considers profit
income as being independent of her own actions. From the point of view of the whole economy
however, price and safety changes will affect consumer income through their influence on profits.
Accordingly, changes in consumer income are explicitly accounted for in the model. Furthermore, by
differentiating the indirect utility function (4.72) with respect to p and w and setting the resulting
expressions equal to zero it is easily seen, that social welfare is maximized at the set of prices where
supply equals demand on all markets, so that a general equilibrium is obtained.
It must be emphasized however, that one price needs to be fixed, since general equilibrium models are
only able to determine relative prices, as outlined above. At this point it is assumed, that a general
equilibrium has been reached under status quo safety conditions before the implementation of the
public risk reduction project. Thus, the general equilibrium under initial safety level constitutes the
starting point of the welfare analysis.
4.4.2 Pricing Marginal Safety Changes in General Equilibrium
Relying on the results of Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.3 it is now studied, how a change in the publicly
provided safety level is priced in a representative agent model and rules for application in CBA are
derived. As before, it is only investigated how marginal safety changes influence the model economy
and it is not distinguished between ceteris paribus and more complex safety changes, as the latter
contains the former as a special case. An increase in the publicly provided safety level, however small,
will potentially cause adjustments in prices and wages on distinct markets within the economy. As
stated above, it is not considered how the public risk reduction project is financed and therefore the
tax variable τ is kept constant throughout the analysis. Also the capital variable K is assumed to be
constant as it is only focused on the derivation of a SWTP for a marginal safety change short term.
Furthermore, as the considered economy consists only of one representative consumer and the firm’s
profits are included as part of consumer income, the WTP of the representative consumer already
constitutes the SWTP. Under these simplifications the following implicit formulation for the SWTP
for the safety change is obtained:
V (p1, w1,K + Π1 − τ − SWTP, s1) = V (p0, w0,K + Π0 − τ, s0) (4.73)
where superscript 0 refers to the situation in status quo and superscript 1 stands for the conditions
after project implementation. In order to arrive at an explicit formulation for the SWTP for safety,
firstly the indirect utility function has to be totally differentiated to make utility changes visible:
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dV =
n∑
i=1
∂V
∂pi
dpi +
k∑
j=1
∂V
∂wj
dwj +
∂V
∂Π
dΠ +
∂V
∂s
ds (4.74)
= −λ
n∑
i=1
xdi dpi + λ
k∑
j=1
Lsjdwj + λdΠ +
∂V
∂s
ds (4.75)
= −λ(xddp− Lsdw − dΠ) + ∂V
∂s
ds (4.76)
Here, the terms corresponding to the constant variables τ and K have been omitted and the deriva-
tion has been carried out by making use of the envelope theorem. Furthermore, all derivatives have
been evaluated with respect to status quo equilibrium before the project is implemented. Dividing
(4.76) by the marginal utility of income converts the change in the representative consumer’s utility
to monetary value, yielding the SWTP for the safety increase:
SWTP = −xddp+ Lsdw + dΠ +
∂V
∂s
∂V
∂y
ds (4.77)
Now, by making use of the formula for the producer’s profit change (4.67), which under the new
notation becomes
dΠ = xsdp− Lddw + p∂F
∂s
ds (4.78)
the firm’s profit changes can be included in formula (4.77), so that the following cost benefit rule
for the marginal safety change in general equilibrium is derived:
SWTP = (xs − xd)dp+ (Ls − Ld)dw + p∂F
∂s
ds+
∂V
∂s
∂V
∂y
ds (4.79)
It is important to note that if under perfect competition the prices and wages adjust in response to
the safety improvement in order to restore a new general equilibrium by equating supply and demand
on each market under the new safety conditions, the first two terms in the general equilibrium SWTP
formula (4.79) vanish. This implies that even if the project affects all relative prices in the economy,
the price changes can be neglected in the project evaluation. The reason for this is that positive
effects of price changes on the consumer side are exactly offset by the corresponding negative effects
on producer side and vice versa. They do not contribute to an increase in efficiency if no distortions
have been present in the economy before [105]. Thus, under perfect competition, equation (4.79)
can further be simplified to:
SWTP = p
∂F
∂s
ds+
∂V
∂s
∂V
∂y
ds (4.80)
Equation (4.80) impressively highlights that the value of the safety improvement to society is equal
to the sum of the representative consumer’s direct valuation of the increased safety level and its
direct impact on the representative firm’s profits, which in turn result in a higher consumer income.
Price effects can completely be neglected under perfect competition in a general equilibrium setting.
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Before closing this section, it has to be noted that the general equilibrium safety pricing rule (4.80)
is perfectly in line with a result obtained by Jones-Lee [133] in his influential book on the value of
life. In this work he states, that a reduction in the social fatality rate will have three primary effects
on society: firstly, it will reduce the social resource cost borne by society due to damage of physical
capital (e.g. vehicles, roads etc.). Secondly, it will lead to a net contribution or increase of social
output. The third (and almost certainly most important) effect of a reduction in the fatality rate is
the direct effect on personal wellbeing.
Reconsidering equation (4.80) and keeping in mind that it has been focused on the pure safety
problem throughout the analysis, it becomes clear that all three effects are being accounted for.
The reduction in the social resource cost has been considered in the construction of the pure safety
problem, while the first term of (4.80) captures the increase in social output and the second term
accounts for the net effect of increased personal wellbeing of the representative consumer. Therefore,
equation (4.80) finds good academic support.
4.5 Model Extensions
The above presented model to derive a social price for increased public safety levels has been very
general so far, so that extensions in several directions are thinkable. Possible add-ons are presented
in the following, that help to make the model more applicable for practical purposes.
4.5.1 Private Defensive Expenditures
In the previous sections it has been outlined, that the safety level that is enjoyed by each individual
of society is the result of a twofold process. There is the basic safety level that is provided by the
government that applies to all individuals simultaneously and there is a superstructure of safety
that allows for individual variability. The latter is mainly influenced by the choices for certain
safety related consumption goods and the selection of a particular type of labor with a certain risk
exposure. Consequently, the individual has a certain influence on her personal safety status. This
interaction between private and public safety standards may be incorporated in the above described
model by introducing a so called safety production function
sc = f(s, x, l) (4.81)
that endogenizes the safety level for each individual. Personal safety sc accordingly, is the result of the
interplay between the publicly provided safety level s and the choices that are made in favor of certain
safety related consumption goods x and labor supply l. Consequently, the production function
describes, how different combinations of safety related goods affect total personal safety. Substituting
this function for the individual safety level in the utility functions of the consumers would properly
account for the twofold safety structure and allow for individual variability in safety. The general
approach to derive a SWTP for safety however, would remain unaffected by this modification. More
details on this issue are provided in [131].
4.5.2 Intertemporal Extension
The safety pricing models considered thus far have been discussed without any assumption about
time. Therefore, they constitute so called atemporal or one period models. As public risk reduction
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projects are usually designed for comparatively long time periods, the model has to be extended
to account for these intertemporal aspects. Furthermore, even a onetime increase in the publicly
provided safety level leads to an increase in survival probability not only in the considered period,
but also in all consecutive periods of the consumers’ remaining lives. This holds, because all survival
probabilities in consecutive years are conditional on the survival probability today, as further dis-
cussed in Chapter 5. These dynamic aspects certainly have to be accounted for in deriving a social
price for safety.
Another important feature of intertemporal models in contrast to one period models is that the
consumer is not assumed to spend all her income in the considered period but can partly abstain
from current consumption and save for future periods. These savings augmented by an interest
payment in turn enable the consumer to consume more in the future. Thus, the consumer is able to
distribute her consumption expenditures arbitrarily over her lifetime by means of a properly defined
interest rate r, which generally yields additional utility. Consequently, in an intertemporal context,
the problem of utility maximization turns into the maximization of lifetime utility. The lifetime
utility model can be formulated either in discrete and continuous time.
In the discrete case, the above introduced models may also be given a finite time dynamic interpre-
tation. For this purpose, the commodity and labor vectors as well as the price and wage vectors need
to be extended in their dimension: the vector components then do not simply represent different
goods, but each good of the same kind purchased at different instants in time is treated as a distinct
good that has its own (future) price. Accordingly, the public safety variable must be substituted
by a safety vector that contains the safety levels for each time period as its components. Finally,
the income variable has to be replaced by the present value of lifetime income. If the discrete in-
tertemporal model is considered over t = 1, ..., T periods, by introducing the following additional
notation
x = (x11, ..., x1T , x21, ..., x2T , ..., ..., ...xn1, ..., xnT )
l = (l11, ..., l1T , l21, ..., l2T , ..., ..., ...lk1, ..., lkT )
p = (p11, ..., p1T , p21, ..., p2T , ..., ..., ...pn1, ..., pnT )
w = (w11, ..., w1T , w21, ..., w2T , ..., ..., ...wk1, ..., wkT )
s = (s1, ..., sT )
y =
T∑
t=1
yt
(1 + r)t−1
(4.82)
the above presented models in vector notation are applicable also in an intertemporal world. Such
an approach however requires that agents have perfect foresight with respect to prices and each
decision must be made in presence of presumed future development [93]. It has to be emphasized at
this point, that the trade-off between income and survival probability/time in a one period model
converts into a trade-off between wealth and life expectancy in a lifetime model. This and further
intertemporal aspects are elaborated in detail in Chapter 5.
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4.5.3 Risk Extension
Before introducing the above sketched safety pricing models it has been outlined, that there are
generally two interpretations of the safety variable s: firstly, it may be interpreted in terms of
annual survival probability and secondly, it permits a measurement in terms of expected annual
survival time, measured in years, as the considered time horizon has been outlined to be one year.
In absolute terms the two measures straightforwardly coincide. For the purpose of modeling safety
in terms of a public good and analyzing its influence on consumer and producer behavior in a general
equilibrium setting, the interpretation in terms of time is better suited as it is more tractable in
welfare analysis and allows for straightforward comprehension.
In a great part of WTP literature however, safety s is being modeled in terms of survival probability
(or mortality risk) and thus, the underlying model explicitly accounts for risk. Accordingly, the
latter is based on the von Neumann Morgenstern expected utility theory [184]. In these models it
is often assumed that utility depends only on consumption and that there are only two states of
the world, namely survival A or death D, so that the following function is to be maximized by the
individual
E[u(x)] = s · uA(x) + (1− s) · uD(x) (4.83)
where E denotes the expected value operator. According to the von Neumann Morgenstern expected
utility hypothesis [31], the utility function u must be based on a cardinal utility concept, while the
expected utility E[u] is of ordinal nature. An individual WTP for safety is then derived by analyzing
the trade-off between safety and consumption:
dx
ds
=
uA(x)− uD(x)
su′A(x) + (1− s)u′D(x)
(4.84)
Many authors [52] further hypothesize, that the utility in case of death may be assigned a zero value,
so that uD vanishes from expressions (4.83) and (4.84). Under this assumption, the consumer utility
function that has been employed in the models above can also be given the following interpretation
U(x, l, s) = E(u(x, l)) = u(x, l) · s (4.85)
so that an implicit inclusion of risk becomes possible. As outlined above however, it must be assumed
that the subutility function u(x, l) in expression (4.85) is cardinal, whereas the total utility function
U(x, l, s) is ordinal as before. The results obtained for the individual WTP then coincide with (4.84),
by setting uD = 0 and letting x act as the numeraire good.
4.6 Discussion
In this chapter, the impact of safety on a market economy has been studied and approaches have
been presented that allow for the determination of a social price for safety in a general equilibrium
framework. At the outset, an extensive literature review on existing approaches for deriving a WTP
for safety has been carried out and exemplary VSL values originating from distinctive studies have
been documented.
The valuation approaches have been subdivided into revealed and stated preferences approaches.
VSL values from labor market studies resulted in the highest VSL estimations in the order of US$
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7.8 million, whereas consumer market studies and stated preference approaches generally led to
significantly lower values in the range of US$ 5 million. Throughout all studies, a comparatively
wide range of values could be observed. Several reasons might explain this result. Among these are
possible market imperfections, a difference between perceived and observed risk reduction efficiency
and several other factors that are mainly attributed to individual characteristics and the context in
which the studies have been conducted.
On a population level it might not be admissible to apply values that have been extracted in different
contexts and from different sub populations involved in the market transactions or surveys. A
desirable goal for public policy analysis would be in contrast to use standard VSL values in project
evaluations or the identification of a functional relationship that enables the construction of context
specific VSL values. For this reason, meta analyses have been presented that subsume a great
diversity of VSL studies with the objective to statistically extract reasonable VSLs on social level.
Even the reviewed meta studies could not contribute to significantly more homogeneity in values
however, so that no rule of thumb could be obtained. In order to assess a reliable and stable VSL
on social level, it is necessary to analyze and price safety induced changes on a great diversity of
markets and populations.
To approach this task, a model has been developed that clearly reveals the far reaching influence of
safety in a market economy. In this sense, it has firstly been observed, that the safety level that is
enjoyed by each individual of society is the result of a twofold process: there is a basic infrastructure
that applies to all and is publicly provided and there is some kind of superstructure that allows for
individual variability. With respect to the latter, the market perspective is of particular importance
as private safety precaution is mainly bought on the market when choices are made in favor of
certain safety related goods. The focus of study has been placed on the publicly provided safety level
however, as this is impacted by public risk reduction interventions. Good reason has been presented
to interpret the public safety level as a public good, that simultaneously affects all consumers and
producers in the model economy to equal amounts.
It has further been outlined that safety as a public good impacts both consumers’ and producers’
economic behavior in their ambitions to maximize utility and profits, respectively. Consequently, a
safety change generally leads to shifts in demand and supply curves on a great diversity of markets
and has therefore an influence on the stability of both single market equilibria as well as the general
equilibrium of the model economy. By this cognition it has been demonstrated, that safety improve-
ments allow for an interpretation in terms of a social resource increase, that in turn leads to a shift
in the general equilibrium which is attributed to an increase in efficiency. Consequently, the change
in social welfare in the move from status quo equilibrium to post project equilibrium represents the
social price for safety, if converted to the money scale.
In a next step, consumer and producer welfare measures have been reviewed and individual safety
pricing rules for marginal safety changes have been derived. The total WTP on social level has been
obtained by summing the individual WTPs over all economic agents of society. The limitations
of this approach have clearly been outlined as no distributional value judgment has been included
in the aggregation, which is justifiable under restrictive conditions only. Furthermore, it has been
emphasized that the presented individualistic approach goes perfectly in line with the postulates of
welfare economics, but is hardly applicable in the context of public non market goods that potentially
affect all members of society because of the stringent information requirements.
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Based on this critic, a representative agent model has been introduced that departs from the in-
dividualistic concept with the ambition to make the safety pricing assessment more tractable from
a practical point of view. This however comes at the price of a violation of the welfare economic
postulate in general, as it is theoretically justifiable under restrictive assumptions only. The repre-
sentative agent model merges the consumers’ and producers’ problems by including the firm’s profits
as a part of consumer income, which in turn allows for the endogenous treatment of the consumer’s
non labor income in general equilibrium.
From the obtained SWTP safety pricing formula it became clear, that price changes do not impact
the social safety price as they net out in the move from one equilibrium to another. As it is only
focused on efficiency aspects of the safety change in the representative agent model, this is intuitive,
as prices have predominantly redistributive purposes. The final social price for safety has been shown
to be composed of the consumer’s direct valuation of the safety increase and the increases in total
produced output that are attributed to the enhanced safety level.
Concluding the chapter, three possible model extensions have been presented that allow for the
endogenous treatment of individual safety, the explicit treatment of risk and the expansion of the
approaches to an intertemporal setting. Especially the latter two are of great importance in the
following chapter.
The major essence that has been revealed in this chapter is that a certain discrepancy between the
applicability of a model and its compliance with the individualistic welfare economic postulate is
observable. While individual approaches are in perfect accordance with welfare economic theory, they
are of limited use in the evaluation of non market goods on population level, such as public safety.
Representative agent models in contrast deliver quite fast and sound results, but contradict with
the welfare economic understanding of valuation in general. It might be concluded that theoretical
economists need a far better understanding of the pressures that affect actual decisions, but those
who make actual decisions perhaps also need a far better understanding of economics [200].
In the following chapter top down approaches for valuing safety are presented that refrain from the
individualistic concept and attempt to extract VSL values directly on social level. In particular,
the LQI is discussed, being itself a macroeconomic concept, whose microeconomic foundations lie
in the representative agent model. Therefore, the results obtained above are fundamental for a
comprehensive understanding of the LQI concept and its role in economic theory.
Chapter 5
Pricing Safety - Top Down Approaches
and the Life Quality Index
So far, it has been demonstrated how a social willingness to pay (SWTP) for safety can be derived,
following a bottom up approach: based on preferences towards safety, individual willingness to pay
(WTP) measures for marginal safety improvements have been assessed and aggregated on social
level. Now, it is refrained from the individualistic approach and top down strategies to directly
obtain a SWTP for safety on aggregate level are presented. Here, the above introduced representative
consumer model is to be looked upon as the transition model from bottom up to top down approaches.
In particular, the Life Quality Index (LQI) concept is introduced and analyzed with respect to its
economic foundations. The LQI represents a compound social indicator, taking the GDP per capita,
life expectancy and the fraction of lifetime devoted to work as its life quality defining arguments.
In the LQI context, safety changes are priced in terms of increased life expectancy. Several distinct
approaches to derive the LQI exist in literature, leading to slightly different functional forms and
showing particular conceptual shortcomings each. Addressing this issue, an innovative economically
consistent derivation of the LQI is presented, that clearly reveals the underlying assumptions and
economic reasoning. Here, it is departed from LQI literature in the sense the LQI is firstly derived
in a one period general equilibrium model and then extended to account for intertemporal aspects.
Beside these new economic insights, the major contribution of this chapter is to extend the LQI based
safety pricing rule to include second order income effects and to present strategies for an improved
calibration. In this way, eventually more extensive WTP and value of statistical life (VSL) measures
are obtained.
5.1 Selected Macroeconomic Indicators
To create the basis for the top down safety pricing rules that are developed in the following, several
selected macroeconomic indicators, namely the GDP (per capita), the life expectancy and the life
working fraction are briefly introduced in this section. These measures are of particular importance
in the sequel as they are employed in the formulation of the LQI, which is formally introduced in
Section 5.3 below.
Figure 5.1 provides an overview of these indicators for selected economies and displays how this
information is comprised in the LQI. In particular, in the chart’s plane region the allocation of
different countries with respect to their life expectancy at birth and their GDP per capita is depicted.
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The total GDP on an economy level in contrast, is reflected in the surface size of the countries’ pies,
while their height mirrors the values the LQI assigns to them.
Figure 5.1: The LQI and its components - country overview
In addition, each country’s pie shows, how the average individual in the respective economies splits
her total lifetime into working time and leisure time, which are represented by the red and green
regions on the pies’ surfaces, respectively. It is seen from the height of the pies that Luxembourg
and Japan followed by Canada are the countries with the highest life quality, while Portugal, Poland
and Mexico compose the lower end of the life quality ranking, according to the LQI philosophy.
5.1.1 The Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
The gross domestic product (GDP) is a common indicator of national income and constitutes a
measure for the total output of a country’s economy. It represents the monetary value of all final
goods and services produced within a country’s borders in a given year. In this respect, only value
added activities of the production process are included and double counting is carefully avoided by
excluding intermediate goods and transfer payments. The GDP can therefore be considered as a
surrogate measure for wealth related aspects of life quality or standards of living [217]. It has become
the standard measure for economic performance and income of a nation, as used for instance by the
United Nations [250].
As the national economy on a macro level constitutes a circular flow of goods and services (flow of
product) and of money (flow of cost) between the productive and the consumer sector, the GDP is
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measurable in two distinct ways which are conceptually identical. The two flows of goods and money
between consumers and producers have already been introduced in Chapter 4 when the simplified
economy model was discussed. On a macro level however, it is refrained from considering single
product or factor markets in isolation but they are analyzed on an aggregate or national level. The
expenditure method now measures the flow of money at the point where it flows into the productive
sector, whereas the income method calculates the GDP at the receiving end of the consumer sector
[198].
Approaches to Measure GDP
The first approach to measure the GDP is the so called expenditure method and it is the most
common approach to quantifying the GDP. Seen from this perspective, the GDP constitutes the
value of total expenditures for all final goods and services and is thus equal to aggregate demand:
GDP = X + I +G+ (EX − IM) (5.1)
In this equation X stands for consumption, I for investment, G for government spending and (EX−
IM) represents the trade balance, i.e. the exports minus the imports. The consumption component
represents all expenditures of households for clothing, food, heating and so on and accounts for
around 60% of total GDP in most developed countries. The investment fraction is that part of total
GDP which is spent for the purchase or replacement of productive assets such as plants, equipment,
machinery and infrastructure which are not consumed but are used for future production. The
investment part constitutes usually around 20% of total GDP. Government spending comprises
mainly public expenditures on health care, education, policy and defense and accounts for around
20% of total GDP. The trade balance EX − IM in contrast, represents in most cases only a minor
part of total GDP [217].
Expenditure Method Income Method
private consumption wages
+ government spending + interests and profits
+ investments + indirect taxes
+ exports - trans-border income transfers
- imports + depreciation
= GDP = GDP
Table 5.1: National accounting
The second way to calculate the GDP is the income method. Here, the GDP represents the
total of earnings or income generated in the production process. In particular, this encompasses
compensation of labor W in terms of wages and benefits and of capital in terms of economic rents
R, interests I and profits Π.
GDP = W +R+ I + Π + Statistical Adjustments (5.2)
Labor comprises all human contribution to the output and capital is the stock of all productive
assets, such as land, machines, housing and so on.
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In summary, the expenditure and the income method lead to the same absolute value of the GDP
and represent only different points at which the flow of money is measured. This is due to the fact
that all economic transactions involve both a buyer and a seller and therefore every dollar that is
expended on one side arrives in terms of income at the other side [158].
GDP Production
A macroeconomic production function describes the functional relationship how factors of produc-
tion, in particular labor L and capital K, are transformed into the total output of an economy,
i.e. the GDP. The GDP production function may be interpreted as the macroeconomic counterpart
of the firms’ production functions that have been introduced in the last chapter [197]. One of the
most important and widely used production functions has been developed by Cobb and Douglas [50]
in 1927, based on the observation that the relative contributions of labor and capital in the GDP
production remained quasi constant over a comparatively long period of time [158]. This implies
that GDP is produced with constant relative factor inputs. The Cobb Douglas production function
has been extracted to have the following functional form:
Y = F (K,L) = AKαLβ with 0 < α, β < 1 (5.3)
The labor input L in the macroeconomic production function is measurable in different ways. On
the one hand, it might be thought of as corresponding to the total hours of employment, while on
the other hand it might be interpreted as the total number of employees in the economy. The capital
stock K corresponds to the quantity of machines (or more explicitly, equipment and structures) used
in production, and it is typically measured in terms of the value of these assets. There are multiple
ways in thinking of capital and equally many ways of specifying how capital comes into existence.
Since the objective at this point is to start out with a simple workable model, the simplifying
assumption is made that capital is the same as the final good of the economy [2]. The factor A in
the Cobb Douglas production function denotes a technology factor that describes the total factor
productivity and α and β are the output elasticities of capital and labor, respectively. It is easily
seen that when the two exponents α and β sum up to one, the production function exhibits constant
returns to scale, indicating that an increase in both capital and labor to a certain amount leads to
exactly the same increase in output.
Given the functional form of the Cobb Douglas production function (5.3), it can be investigated how
total output changes due to a variation in factor input. Calculating the partial derivatives of the
production function yields the marginal product of capital and labor, respectively:
MPK =
∂Y
∂K
= αAKα−1Lβ = α
Y
K
MPL =
∂Y
∂L
= βAKαLβ−1 = β
Y
L
(5.4)
From these marginal product equations it follows that an increase in labor input reduces the marginal
product of labor, meaning that each additional unit of labor leads to lesser and lesser increases in
total output. At the same time an increase in labor input causes the marginal product of capital
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to rise, making it more profitable to employ additional capital in the production process. This
eventually leads to the observed constancy in the relative factor inputs.
Furthermore, if the two factors of production are always paid their marginal products, the total
capital income and total labor income amount to MPK ·K and MPL · L, respectively. Then, it is
easily verified from (5.4) that
MPK ·K = α · Y
MPL · L = β · Y (5.5)
indicating that total GDP splits into αY and βY , and α and β represent the share of rents on
capital and wages in total GDP. Therefore, the factor shares of total GDP are only determined by
the parameters α and β and are independent of the total amount of capital and labor employed in the
production process as well as of the technology factor A [158]. Furthermore, it becomes clear that
if the factors are always paid their marginal products under constant returns to scale production,
the total GDP will be exhausted without any surplus or deficit and profits are zero [198]. Figure 5.2
provides an exemplary overview of wage shares in the GDPs of different countries. It is seen that in
most developed economies the values cluster around 50-60%.
Figure 5.2: Wage shares in GDP [data source: Extended PennWorld Tables [159]]
The GDP represents one of the major indicators for the economic situation and development of a
nation. However, there is a large body of literature on the shortcomings of using GDP as an indicator
for social welfare and standard of living. Major criticism addresses that non-market activities such
as housework and volunteer services as well as impacts of production on the environment are not
accounted for. In this sense, a country might achieve high GDP growth rates by exploiting natural
resources or polluting the environment as the sustainability of economic development is not an
issue in national accounting. Moreover, income distribution is not considered implying that a high
GDP might go in line with large disparities in income between the rich and the poor. Alternative
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indicators like e.g. the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) or the Human Development
Index (HDI) have been developed to address these deficiencies. Using these indices, an increase in
GDP may not automatically imply an increase in these alternative indicators [165].
Potential GDP tends to change over time due to three key supply-side events [245]:
1. Changes in the labor force [quantity and quality];
2. Changes in the stock of productive capital [quantity and quality];
3. Changes in "total factor productivity" resulting from technological improvements in the effi-
ciency with which labor and capital inputs are transformed into output.
Measuring changes in the quantity of labor and capital inputs, and to some extent in the quality of
labor and capital inputs, is possible in principle. Measuring changes in total factor productivity on
the contrary is more problematic. Therefore, many researchers attempt to measure changes in total
factor productivity, or "productivity change" for short, as a residual change in actual measured real
GDP after changes in the quantity and quality of labor and capital inputs have been accounted for.
5.1.2 The Life Expectancy
According to Pandey and Nathwani [197] the employment of life expectancy as an indicator for
human development in the LQI rests on three main motives: the intrinsic value of longevity, its
value in helping people pursue various goals and its close relation with characteristics such as safety,
good health and medical care. In particular with respect to safety, the life expectancy is a valuable
indicator as safety improvements reduce the probability of death of people at various ages and
can be quantified intertemporally by means of increases in life expectancy. Moreover, data on life
expectancy are concise, reliable and widely available in terms of life table statistics. Figure 5.3
displays the development of the life expectancy at birth in the period from 1960 to 2005 for selected
countries. A clearly increasing trend throughout all selected countries is observable, being more
emphasized in developing countries. In the developed world, the life expectancies nowadays cluster
in the range of 79-83 years, with Japan taking the lead with a value of 82.9 years.
The close relation between mortality, survival probability and life expectancy at various ages is briefly
discussed in the following, by reviewing the basics about life table calculations: let FD(t) denote
the cumulative probability function of not having survived until age t and fD(t) the corresponding
probability density function of living exactly for t years. Then, the age specific mortality or death
rate is characterized by the following equation:
µ(t) :=
fD(t)
1− FD(t) (5.6)
Accordingly, the age dependent mortality rate equals the probability of dying at age t under the
condition that age t has been reached before. More illustratively, the rate is obtained by analyzing
how many people of a given cohort have reached age t and did not survive until the end of the
interval t+ 1. Dividing the second amount by the first yields the age specific mortality rate.
By means of the distribution FD or alternatively by taking the age specific mortality rate µ into
account, the survival probability is easily calculated:
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Figure 5.3: Life expectancy at birth [data source: WDI [262]]
S(t) := 1− FD(t) = exp
[
−
∫ t
0
µ(τ)dτ
]
(5.7)
Straightforwardly, the survivor function expresses the probability of survival up to at least age t.
Now, by integrating the survival probability from 0 to a maximum attainable age tmax, the life
expectancy at birth is obtained:
e(0) :=
∫ tmax
0
S(t)dt =
∫ tmax
0
exp
[
−
∫ t
0
µ(τ)dτ
]
dt (5.8)
Thus, the life expectancy at birth is calculated by summing up the survival probabilities for in-
finitesimal small time intervals from 0 to the maximum attainable age tmax. In publicly available
life tables, these time intervals are usually normalized to one year so that the life expectancy at birth
is just the sum of annual expected lifetimes. Another important concept that will be of interest in
the following is the life expectancy at age x, that reflects the expected remaining lifetime of a person
that has already attained age x:
e(x) :=
∫ tmax
x
S(t)
S(x)
dt =
∫ tmax
x
exp
[
−
∫ t
x
µ(τ)dτ
]
dt (5.9)
The above introduced concepts constitute the basis for applying the LQI results in an intertemporal
setting and are repeatedly used in this context.
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5.1.3 The Life Working Fraction
The third component that is contained in the LQI constitutes the life working fraction a. The life
working fraction is defined as the fraction of total lifetime the average individual of society spends
in economic production, i.e. in income generating work. The inclusion of this variable in the LQI
is based on the idea that not only a long and healthy life with a high level of income contributes
to high living standards but also the time available to enjoy life. This appears to be a reasonable
assumption considered that most work is dull, boring, troublesome and sometimes dangerous [214].
It can also be verified based on an historical argument. In the 1870ies the average annual time
spent working was approximately 2900 hours, in 1950 still 2000 hours and in present times only
around 1600 in developed economies [217]. Figure 5.4 provides an overview of the development of
the annual working hours per employee over time for selected OECD countries. At the same time
life expectancy increased from 45 to around 80 years due to advancements in safety, health care
and nutrition and the GDP per capita rose more than tenfold due to higher productivity [155].
Consequently, beside higher consumption and life expectancy a significant increase in leisure time
contributed to the great progress in the development of living standards. In addition, it has been
argued repeatedly, that leisure time is the ultimate source of life quality, provided that economical
and health conditions are sound [271].
Figure 5.4: Annual working hours per person in employment [data source: OECD [188]]
In the LQI literature a continuous discussion about how to calibrate the parameter a is observable
[62, 181, 215]. Central discussion points include the question whether to calibrate a relative to a
24-hour day or to subtract the necessary sleep time, whether to count commuting time to the work
place or housework as economic activity and whether to relate a to the entire life span or solely to
the effective work period excluding early childhood and retirement age. As several of these issues
contain subjective judgments (e.g. on how much sleep is necessary) and therefore a high impact for
controversy and would hardly be obtainable from empirical data, it is proposed to define a relative
to a 24 hour day and the entire life span, counting effective work only. Moreover, as becomes clear
later, the definition of the life working fraction has to be in accordance with the measurement of
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the labor force in the GDP production function. Counting housework and commuting time might
therefore cause inconsistencies.
Now, in order to measure the life working time for the average individual of society, principally
two distinct approaches can be followed. Firstly, according to [181] the following formula can be
employed:
a :=
life working period
e(0)
· annual working hours per employee
24 · 365 (5.10)
The second approach in contrast, is based on a snapshot of the current economy and enables to
obtain data on a by considering statistics of the current economy:
a′ :=
number of employees
total population
· annual working hours per employee
24 · 365 (5.11)
The two approaches will lead to identical results only under special conditions, e.g. if the ratio
between life working period and the life expectancy at birth equals the fraction of total number of
employees to total population. Conditions under which this is fulfilled are discussed in [151]. As will
become clear later, the second equation is considered as being more adequate in the LQI calibration
and furthermore, data are easier obtainable.
5.2 VSL Estimations based on Macroeconomic Indicators
In contrary to the approaches presented in the previous chapter, the valuation of saved lives may
also be based on macroeconomic indicators. The two traditional methods for the valuation of life
are variants of the human capital approach or livelihood measure. Here, the value of life is assessed
in proportion to a person’s contribution to the production of the economy. The first method looks
at the economy in terms of national income. The value of life then represents the discounted value
of future earnings over the expected remaining lifetime. The second variant of the human capital
approach is quite similar to the first except for the fact that all consumption expenditures that people
make over their lifetime are subtracted from future earnings. The assumption behind the latter is
that society loses earnings less consumption due to the premature death of one of its individuals
[35].
For the first approach values around US$ 500,000 were obtained in a study of Forester et al. [84] in
1984, whereas Van Manen and Vrijing [253] came to an estimate of 500.000 Euros in a more recent
study performed in 1996. For the second variant of the human capital approach straightforwardly
lower values must be obtained. In this respect, Forester et al. [84] arrived at a value of US$ 369,000
using a 30% consumption rate derived from budget studies perfomed by the US department of labor.
It becomes obvious that the human capital method treats a life just as an asset of productive capital
and estimates the production that is lost from premature death. Or as Acton [3] puts it:
"The normative viewpoint which apparently motivates this approach is either that people
are properly thought of as the chattel of the state, and the loss of a life has a cost to the
state comparable to the cost of a slave’s death to his owner; or the proper objective of
public policy is to maximize gross national product."
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Therefore, the human capital approach lacks satisfactory normative justification as it does not take
individual preferences into account and consequently, strongly contradicts with the individualistic
principle of welfare economics [131]. Freeman [88] emphasizes this point even more drastically by
stating:
"This measure is the antithesis of the individualistic premise of conventional welfare
economics"
If one accepts the view that production is not an end in itself for people, but rather a necessary
intermediate step which allows people to enjoy the outcome of production, then the human capital
approach is clearly inappropriate. Increases in safety and life expectancy help to ensure the continu-
ation of an individual’s ability to enjoy the pleasures of her life and the continuation of the pleasure
which her family and friends derive from their relationship with her, and it is the value of prolonging
this enjoyment which should be assessed in measuring the benefit of public programs that affect
safety [3].
The assessment of VSL values based on the WTP measures in contrast, reflects the whole range
of cost associated with premature death: loss of production (as in the human capital approach),
suffering, losses imposed on other family members and society, and all complex attributes associated
with human life. These WTP estimates are consequently much higher, on average, than those derived
from the human capital approach [68]. For all these reasons the human capital approach is full of
methodological and moral problems and is not further considered in this thesis. For a comprehensive
discussion on the assessment of the human capital approach it is referred to Schelling [229], whereas
Gegax [91] provides a sound overview about critics and historical development of the approach.
What is therefore needed in top down pricing strategies is a method that also takes the "quality
of life" of the average individual into account. This is done by means of utility functions that
are indicators of the level of satisfaction the average citizen derives from living under particular
circumstances. In literature dealing with this aspects [149, 154, 187, 234], economists attempt to
rank countries with respect to the quality of life and take this as a maxim for deciding on public
policy issues. The quality of life in this context is often defined as a weighted average of specific
country statistics or macroeconomic indicators. These include for example income levels per capita,
life expectancy, the literacy level, infant mortality rates and so on.
It is without question that these variables may be very important for the utility levels of single
individuals, the individual utility levels themselves however are not measured by these statistics. A
directly imposed problem then is how to weight the variables against each other. Will quality of
life improve when infant mortality rates are lowered by 1% and the income is decreased by 1% as
a result of the project cost? Or might this 1% decrease in income could have been better invested
to elevate the literacy level of the population? It is clear that when it is not attempted to evaluate
these changes on an indivudual basis by means of personal preferences, the weights chosen in the
design of the index become the decisive criterion. The problem thus of how to weigh these different
variables into a composite quality of life index is a critical issue that is not surprisingly the main
source of disputes among researchers [254].
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The LQI may be seen as an approach that tackles this task by consistently combining the three
macroeconomic indicators GDP, life expectancy and life working fraction into a single index [137].
One of the major contributions of the LQI constitutes the fact that it derives a justifiable rule for
the exchange of lifetime and income [136] and can thus conveniently be applied to derive a SWTP
for reductions in mortality risk.
5.3 The Life Quality Method
The LQI is a social indicator that has been introduced by Nathwani et al. [181] and is particularly
designed to support risk management decisions affecting human safety in social interest. Although
the LQI has evolved in many different forms over time, it constantly represents a function of the GDP
per capita y as an indicator for personal income, the life expectancy e, and the fraction of lifetime
devoted to work a. Based on a chain of economic assumptions and mathematical derivations, the
LQI has been extracted to have the following functional form in its more recent versions [193, 198]
that are based on the utility concept:
LQI = yq(1− a)e, where q = 1
β
a
1− a (5.12)
Assuming that a public risk reduction intervention results in a reduction of the mean disposable
income and a prolongation of (work free) life expectancy for the average individual, the LQI may
be used to judge on the social desirability of the project, summarized in the net benefit criterion.
Throughout its persistence the LQI has been continuously subject to controversial discussions con-
cerning its theoretical foundations and the calibration of the inherent parameters. This resulted in
the development of several distinct versions of the index differing in their functional forms as well as
in the way of application in accordance with economic theory. In this respect, Rackwitz [212, 215]
remarkably expanded the LQI framework and applied it for the first time to derive optimal safety
levels for civil engineering infrastructures. In Maes et al. [156] the LQI was employed to optimize
the life cycle cost of structures and it has further been applied in cost benefit analyses (CBA) of
Canadian air quality standards [194] and nuclear safety design practices [195]. Rackwitz [215] also
performed an extensive study of economic cross country data to present an empirical validation of
the index. Finally, other interesting contributions in the LQI research field that deserve special
attention were put forward by Ditlevson et al. in a series of articles [64, 65, 66]. By focusing the
analysis on the relation between work time, leisure time and productivity, Ditlevson converted the
conventional LQI to pure units of time, which he in turn named the life quality time allocation
index.
In the following, the LQI is analyzed with respect to its economic foundations. Firstly, the traditional
LQI derivation approach to arrive at formula (5.12) is presented and its conceptual shortcomings
are discussed. In a second step, new time and equilibrium consistent LQI derivations are developed
and more extensive acceptability criteria derived. It will become clear, that these are in accordance
with the economic theory surrounding the SWTP for safety assembled throughout the preceding
chapter. In this way, the implicit assumptions behind the index will become more transparent, as
these resulted in some controversial discussion in literature. In this sense, it was put into question
whether the LQI represented a normative or an empirical concept [63].
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5.3.1 The Traditional LQI Derivation Approach
The original derivation of the LQI presented in [181] was based on the assumption that life quality
in a country may be defined as the product of a special income and a particular leisure function. By
means of some elegant mathematical derivations based on a differential equation of the LQI and an
employment of the labor leisure trade-off, the LQI was deduced in its initial form. It is important to
emphasize that the entire derivation was carried out without making use of utility functions. The
single steps of the derivation as well as the LQI in its initial form may be reviewed in Appendix E.
Putting into effect in later articles [193] that the initial LQI derivation was less intuitive and did
not provide sufficient insight about the assumptions and economic implications inherent in the LQI
formula, alternative derivations closely related to utility theory and decision making have been devel-
oped with the aim to promote communication to a wider audience. The utility based reformulation
of the LQI began in [196] and has been extended in [193, 198], where a more realistic relation be-
tween GDP and work time based on the Cobb Douglas production function was introduced. The
final two publications are interpreted as the current state of the art and lead to the LQI formula
(5.12) that is currently most often applied. Therefore, only the latter formulation constitutes the
subject of study in the following. The LQI derivation that is presented subsequently closely follows
the schematic steps in [193, 198] and is given little additional interpretation in order to accentuate
the followed approach.
Starting point for the LQI derivation is the assumption that a person’s enjoyment of life or utility
in an economic sense arises from a continuous stream of resources available for consumption over
the entire remaining life. Therefore, income required to support consumption and the time to enjoy
life are two determinants of life quality. Accordingly, the potential lifetime utility of a person can
be interpreted in terms of income utility over the remaining life. Then, a general ordinal utility
function of the form
LQ = yq(1− a)e (5.13)
is defined in order to serve this purpose.1 By assuming that y is a constant over the remaining
lifetime, the derivation proceeds by calibrating the index with respect to the parameter q.
The actual calibration of the LQI is carried out by formulating the utility function (5.13) in terms
of labor time and then invoking the "labor leisure trade-off", which is broadly considered as the
central LQI innovation in LQI literature [151, 217]. This is done by taking the Cobb Douglas GDP
production function introduced in (5.3) into account to relate income to (leisure) time. For this
purpose, the Cobb Douglas production function has to firstly be transformed in per capita units by
dividing it by the total population size N
F (
K
N
,
L
N
) = A(
K
N
)α(
L
N
)β = Akαaβ = f(k, l) = y (5.14)
to obtain the average income per person under the assumption of constant returns to scale, i.e.
α + β = 1. In equation (5.14) lower case letters denote per capita values and the life working
1Note that the LQI derivation starts directly from taking income y as a utility defining parameter as opposed to
consumption, which is the conventional approach in economics and also the basis of argumentation in LQI literature
before concretely deriving the index.
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fraction a comes into play to represent average labor supply in one year. In a next step, equation
(5.14) is supplemented in equation (5.13) to obtain:
LQ = (f(k, l))q(1− a)e = [Akα]q(aβ)q(1− a)e (5.15)
Under the assumption of constant per capita capital k and technological knowledge A it is easily
verified, that the utility function LQ is now solely defined in terms of labor time, represented by the
life working fraction a. Accordingly, under the hypothesis that capital per person and the factor
A are independent of the work time fraction a, the leisure labor trade-off is employed, meaning
that equation (5.15) is optimized with respect to a. Setting the derivative of LQ with respect to a
equal to zero gives the first order condition that is then taken into account to obtain the previously
unknown parameter q:
dLQ
da
= 0 ⇒ q = 1
β
a
1− a (5.16)
Inserting this value for q in equation (5.13) eventually yields the final formulation of the LQI as
provided in (5.12). The parameter q represents the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption
and serves as a measure of trade-off between the utility derived from longevity and consumption
[196]. This becomes clear in the application of the net benefit criterion, which is discussed next.
5.3.2 The Net Benefit Criterion
In order to judge on the efficiency of public risk reduction interventions on basis of the LQI, the net
benefit criterion [196] is often applied in LQI literature. The net benefit criterion can be interpreted
as the general acceptability condition for investments into safety. To obtain this condition, it is
assumed that the project under investigation leads to a marginal increase in (leisure) lifetime de due
to the enhanced safety levels at constant a and has costs that result in a reduction of income dy
equal to the net cost into human safety (NCHS) per capita. To analyze how small changes in life
expectancy and income affect the LQI, it is totally differentiated:
dLQI =
∂LQI
∂y
dy +
∂LQI
∂e
de (5.17)
Now, for the investment to be approved in social interest it is required that the project induced
changes in the LQI variables result in an increase in total life quality, i.e. dLQI ≥ 0. Calculating
equation (5.17) concretely for LQI formula (5.12) yields the net benefit criterion for risk reduction
in social interest:
dy
y
+
1
q
de
e
≥ 0 (5.18)
Accordingly, a project is considered as socially beneficial, if the relative change in income is compen-
sated by the relative increase in life expectancy weighted by the inverse of the elasticity parameter
q, so that the total change in life quality is not negative for the average individual, as illustrated
graphically in Figure 5.5. The WTP of the average individual of society for the safety induced
change in life expectancy is now easily obtained by setting equation (5.18) equal to zero and thus,
determining the threshold change in income that causes total life quality to stay at its initial level:
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WTP =
∂LQI
∂e
∂LQI
∂y
de =
y
qe
de (5.19)
As a consequence, the WTP based on the LQI is equivalent to the compensating variation (CV)
introduced in Chapter 4. It represents exactly the amount of money that can be taken away from
the average individual of society after a safety induced change in life expectancy, so that she is as
well off as before the change. If the WTP is greater than the NCHS of the risk reduction project
per capita, the project is approved in social sense. Straightforwardly, the net benefit criterion and
the WTP approach always produce similar results and are just two distinct ways of illustration.
Figure 5.5: The net benefit criterion [Nathwani et al. [181]]
To finally obtain a SWTP for the risk reduction project on aggregate levels, the WTP of the average
individual has to be simply multiplied by total population size N :
SWTP = WTP ·N (5.20)
At this point it is important to emphasize, that the WTP formulae (5.19) and (5.20) only hold for a
ceteris paribus safety change, leaving all other variables, i.e. income y, constant (see Section 4.3.2).
What is not considered however is that, leaving the cost of the project aside for the moment, the
pure safety change causes also income to increase. This follows by construction of the life quality
model and can be retraced as follows:
The life working fraction parameter a has been optimally determined in the LQI derivation and is
assumed to be constant over lifetime. Therefore, an increase in total lifetime de decomposes in an
increase in leisure time (1 − a) · de and also in an increase in labor time a · de, proportions being
determined by the parameter a. The increase in leisure time is directly valued in the LQI utility
function and converted into monetary units by division through the marginal utility of income, as
shown in equation (5.19). The increase in labor time however, is not being accounted for. An increase
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in labor time leads to an increase in total production according to the relation specified in the Cobb
Douglas production function that is part of the model. These increases in per capita income in
turn bring additional benefits to the individual, which are not valued by the net benefit criterion.
Therefore, the concept values only the direct effects of risk reduction in terms of increases in (leisure)
longevity. As a consequence, the reversed critics that apply for the human capital approach hold for
the LQI: it values additional lifetime only by the pleasure of longevity without taking the productive
value of time in the GDP production into account.
5.3.3 Critics
As discussed above, the presented LQI derivation represents the current state of the art and has been
developed as a mean to improve the economic foundations of the LQI to promote the concept to a
wider audience [193]. Equipped with the economic theory about utility and profit maximization and
WTP measurement assembled throughout the preceding chapter however, several questions remain
unanswered. In particular, the following aspects are conspicuous in the LQI approach:
• The LQI represents the utility function of a representative consumer that is maximized with
respect to the life working fraction. In the maximization process however, the constrained
utility maximization problem is never stated explicitly and budget constraints do not appear.
Furthermore, the relation between consumption and income (GDP per capita) remains obscure.
• The optimized value for q is inserted in the function LQ to obtain the LQI, implying that the
LQI constitutes a value function. The distinction between direct and indirect utility is not
made though.
• The LQI derivation is not time consistent. It contains the annual income, but employs total
life expectancy as the other utility defining component. Therefore, it is not obvious at first
glance if the LQI methodology relies on an atemporal or dynamical model.2
The first two points, i.e. the omittance of clear budget constraints and the non distinction between
direct and indirect utility, are closely related and eventually lead to the fact that changes in income
due to improved safety levels are not being accounted for in the net benefit criterion. Furthermore,
all three objections collectively make it difficult to verify that the LQI concept actually is of general
equilibrium nature. In fact, there is no publication within LQI research that is known to the author,
where the general equilibrium foundation of the LQI is explicitly stated.
The following sections are designed to approach the above critics. Firstly, the LQI is derived in a
static one period general equilibrium setting by clearly stating constrained utility and profit maxi-
mization problems and eventually presenting an improved net benefit criterion that allows far reach-
ing interpretations. Here, the economic reasoning is closely related to the representative agent model
discussed in Section 4.4, which can be looked upon as the LQI’s microfoundation. In contrast to
Chapter 4 however, the perspective here is to be integrated in macroeconomic theory. In a second
step then, intertemporal aspects are included in the LQI methodology, so that eventually a WTP
for safety and a VSL estimate are obtained.
2In numerous articles [194, 196, 215, 214, 217] the LQI is explicitly considered in dynamic life cycle consumption
models. Here however, the derivation of the LQI is carried out as above, while intertemporal aspects are only added
in application (see Appendix E.2).
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5.4 New Equilibrium Consistent LQI Derivation in a One Period
General Equilibrium Model
It is assumed that the economy consists of N identical consumers that maximize their utility with
respect to their budget constraints and only one firm that maximizes its profits subject to the whole
economy’s output production function, which is of the Cobb Douglas type with constant returns
to scale. Furthermore, there are only three markets available in the economy, namely the labor
market, the capital market and the goods market, where only composite goods are traded. The
influence of the government in terms of taxes is omitted in the model and the economy is closed,
i.e. there is no trade with foreign countries. The focus of attention is the short term perspective,
implying that the consumer is not able to shift consumption throughout different periods and the
firm cannot adjust its capital structure. Therefore, capital is assumed to be constant and the capital
market is in equilibrium. As stated in Section 4.2.6 the general equilibrium model is only suitable
to define relative prices, so the price for consumption is set arbitrarily equal to one, implying that
the composite consumption good acts as a numeraire.
5.4.1 The Representative Consumer
In the above sketched model it can be concentrated on one single representative consumer that freely
decides how much work l to supply on the labor market and how much to consume x on the product
market. Furthermore, she is endowed with a certain amount of time s, fixed capital k and receives
profits pi as the partial owner of the firm, so that her income is determined with the choice of labor
supply. The income y imposes a restriction on her ambition to consume goods and leisure time to
maximize her utility. Here, it is important to outline that total time available to the representative
consumer is modeled stochastically, equivalent to her total expected survival time in the considered
period of one year
s := (365 · 24) · (1− µ) [ hours ]
:= 1 · (1− µ) [ years ] (5.21)
where µ denotes the crude mortality rate affecting all consumers uniformly, as they are identical.
In a one year time span the expected annual survival time s, measured in years, and the annual
survival probability coincide in absolute values and are therefore used interchangeably henceforth.
Therefore, the variable s corresponds to the publicly provided safety level in Chapter 4. The total
expected annual time s can freely be distributed among labor l and leisure time l̂. The representative
consumer takes wages w, rent on capital r and the survival probability s as fixed and exogenous,
i.e. outside her control.
Now, the life quality assumption comes firstly into play. It is hypothesized that the consumer derives
utility LQ from the consumption of the composite good x and leisure time l̂, which is at risk and
dependent on her expected annual survival time s. The relation between expected labor time E[l],
expected leisure time E[l̂] and expected annual survival time s is modeled conveniently by taking
the annual work supply fraction as into account:
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E[l̂] = s(1− as)
E[l] = sas
s = E[l̂] + E[l]
(5.22)
By these conditions and the fact that the annual survival time s is exogenously given, the utility
maximization with respect to leisure time can be reduced to maximizing the utility with respect to
as, as with the work supply fraction as labor and leisure time are uniquely determined. Therefore,
it is focused on as rather than l̂ or l in the following.
According to the life quality approach, the utility function of the representative consumer is assumed
to have the following mathematical representation
LQ(x, as, s) = E
[
u(x, l̂)
]
= xq(1− as)s (5.23)
where E denotes the expected value operator, accounting for the fact that the enjoyment of utility is
uncertain and depending on survival s. The utility function LQ is closely related to equation (5.13)
the LQI derivation departed from, except for the fact that income y is replaced by consumption x and
life expectancy e by the expected annual survival time s to make the utility function time consistent.
Furthermore, it becomes obvious that the utility function LQ is a von Neumann Morgenstern [184]
expected utility function, that assigns zero utility to the state of non survival, as discussed above.
As a consequence, LQ may be interpreted in terms of ordinal utility, while the subutility function
u(x, l̂) must be of cardinal nature in order to be applied in an expected utility framework according
to the von Neumann Morgenstern expected utility hypothesis [31].
A restriction to the consumer’s utility maximization problem in terms of a budget constraint is now
derived. The consumer earns her income y by selling her full annual time endowment s on the labor
market, by the rents on fixed capital k and by obtaining profits pi as a partial owner of the firm.
Therefore, total income y amounts to:
y = ws+ rk + pi (5.24)
She spends her income y entirely by consuming goods x on the product market and leisure time l̂,
so that total expenditures are given by:
y = x+ wE[l̂] (5.25)
Here, it has to be noted that the consumer first sells her entire time endowment on the labor market
and then repurchases a fraction of this total time in terms of leisure consumption. This approach
might seem a little peculiar but is common practice in general equilibrium theory and labor economics
when modeling leisure time as an utility argument [243]. Furthermore, by this way of modeling it
becomes clear, that the wage rate w in general equilibrium is not only the price obtained for selling
labor on the labor market but also the value of leisure in terms of opportunity cost [256]: every hour
that the representative consumer spends in leisure activities could have been supplied on the labor
market, increasing her income by the respective wage rate. Therefore, whenever making a decision
of how much labor to supply and how much leisure to consume, the consumer faces this labor leisure
trade-off, which is a central concept of labor economics as discussed for instance in [42, 122].
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Subtracting equation (5.25) from equation (5.24) and making use of relation (5.22) yields the final
budget constraint the representative consumer faces in the utility maximization process
x = wE[l] + rk + pi
= wsas + rk + pi
(5.26)
which is again formulated in terms of labor time that is at risk. In summary, the representative
consumer’s life quality maximization problem may be stated as follows:
max
x,as
LQ(x, as, s) = xq(1− as)s
s.t. x = wsas + rk + pi
(5.27)
The first order conditions to this constrained maximization problem are easily obtained by means
of Lagrange multipliers
∂Λ
∂x
= qxq−1(1− as)s+ λ = 0 (5.28)
∂Λ
∂as
= −xqs− λws = 0 (5.29)
∂Λ
∂λ
= x− wsas − rk − pi = 0 (5.30)
where λ represents the Lagrange multiplier and thus, the marginal utility of income. Dividing
equation (5.29) by equation (5.28) and rearranging terms yields the marginal rate of substitution
(MRS) between the work supply fraction as and consumption x:
MRSas−x =
x
q(1− as) = sw (5.31)
This result highlights the fact that the representative consumer’s decision to supply labor on the labor
market is influenced both by the persisting wage rate w as well as the annual survival probability s.
At higher annual survival probabilities each infinitesimal increase in the annual life working fraction
brings more absolute additional labor time on the market than if the survival probability was at a
comparatively lower level. Dividing equation (5.31) by the annual survival time s yields
MRS
l̂−x =
x
q(1− as)s = w (5.32)
the MRS between leisure time and consumption, showing that at the optimum, the representative
consumer trades leisure for consumption at the (real) market wage rate w. In principle, it could be
proceeded with solving the life quality maximization problem, but at this point this would produce
only unnecessary clutter. After switching to the producer side it will become clear that condition
(5.32) is already sufficient to derive the LQI in a general equilibrium setting.
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5.4.2 The Representative Firm
When switching to the producer side the steps to be employed are more easy and straightforward than
those on the consumer side. Here, it is possible to rely to large extents on the previously obtained
results. The only difference to the derivations in Chapter 4.2.5 is that the production function
takes the Cobb Douglas form and that the labor component L has to be modeled stochastically.
By assumption, there is only one firm that decides how much output Y to produce and how much
labor L to hire. In analogy to the consumer side, the decision how much labor to employ may be
characterized by a parameter ad, which represents the fraction of annual time the firm wishes to
demand from the average individual. It takes the capital stock K as fixed and follows the profit
maximization strategy under exogenous wages w, interest rate r and survival probability of the
consumers s. The ambition to maximize profits is limited by the production technology captured
by a Cobb Douglas production function given through:
Y = F (K,E[L]) = F (K,NE[l]) = F (K,Nsad) = AK
α(Nsad)β (5.33)
Here, it is important to outline that the labor component in the production function refers to labor
in terms of time, i.e. total hours of employment, and not in terms of number of people employed. As
a consequence, an increase in the survival probability s under constant ad leads to the fact that more
labor time enters the production function, which in turn causes total output Y in the economy to
rise. Furthermore, it becomes clear under the placed assumptions of constant capital and technology,
that the total output of the economy is uniquely determined by the firm’s labor demand decision,
represented by the parameter ad.
Dividing equation (5.33) by total population size N and assuming constant returns to scale, the per
capita production function is obtained as follows:
y = f(k,E[l]) = f(k, sad) = Ak
α(sad)β (5.34)
By means of this per capita production function, the per capita profit is defined as:
pi = pi(ad) = f(k, sad)− wsad − rk (5.35)
Maximizing the per capita profit with respect to ad yields the following first order condition:
∂pi
∂ad
= βAkα(sad)β−1s− sw = β y
sad
s− sw = 0 (5.36)
Rearranging terms leads to
β
y
ad
= sw (5.37)
which shows that also the firm’s decision to demand the labor fraction ad from the representative
consumers depends both on the wage rate w and the annual survival time s. This is due to the
fact that at higher annual survival times an incremental increase in labor demand ad brings more
absolute labor time in the production process than at comparatively lower survival times. Dividing
equation (5.37) by the annual survival time s yields
MPL = β
y
sad
= w (5.38)
118 CHAPTER 5. PRICING SAFETY - TOP DOWN APPROACHES
which shows that in optimum, the firm employs labor until the MPL is equal to the (real) wage rate.
In the given model, the MPL also corresponds to the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) between
labor and consumption. Furthermore, as labor employment constitutes the only decision variable of
the producer, equation (5.38) already characterizes the firm’s optimal decision. Eventually, if labor
and capital are always paid their marginal products, at the optimum a zero profit results from the
constant returns to scale property of the production function.
5.4.3 General Equilibrium
It has been demonstrated so far that the consumer’s optimal decision must satisfy equation (5.32),
whereas the producer’s optimal decision is characterized by equation (5.38). Now, under perfect
competition the wage rate w would adjust to a value w∗ at which labor supply as equals labor
demand ad for the given survival probability s and the utility and profit maximizing ambitions
become accordable. Thus, at the optimal wage rate w∗ the MRS of leisure for consumption equals
the MRT between labor and consumption, as illustrated previously. Furthermore, as the capital
market is in equilibrium by assumption and the optimal wage rate w∗ causes also the labor market
to clear, it follows from Walras’ Law, that the goods market must be in equilibrium as well. As a
consequence, a general equilibrium solution is obtained and total output is consumed, so that x = y
holds.
Rather than adjusting the wage rate to its optimal value, it has to be kept in mind that the parameter
q of the life quality function LQ has not yet been determined. To calibrate q, the life quality approach
therefore implicitly assumes that the considered economy is currently in an equilibrium state where
the observed wage rate already constitutes the optimal one and thus as = ad = a holds. Under this
premise, the parameter q is determined by equalizing the MRS (5.32) and the MRT (5.38):
x
q(1− a)s = β
y
sa
(5.39)
By simply rearranging terms and keeping in mind that total output is consumed x = y, the parameter
q is obtained:
q =
1
β
a
1− a (5.40)
Inserting this value for q in the utility function LQ gives the LQI as in equation 5.12, with e
substituted by the annual survival time s.
The above shown LQI derivation is being referred to as decentralized equilibrium derivation as the
consumer’s and firm’s problems have been considered separately to highlight the assumptions behind
the approach. Now, it is also possible in a general equilibrium setting to integrate the consumer’s and
producer’s problem into the so called Social Planner’s Problem (SPP) and determine the parameter
q in this framework. By means of the latter it is more convenient to analyze, how changes in the
survival probability due to enhanced safety standards affect the total model economy. An important
feature of the SPP is that it operates without prices, as price changes do not contribute to welfare
increases in a competitive general equilibrium setting, as demonstrated in Section 4.4.2.
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5.4.4 Social Planner’s Problem to Maximize Life Quality
In macroeconomic general equilibrium models the SPP is well-known and widely applied [2]. Here,
the representative consumer’s utility maximization problem and the firm’s profit maximizing prob-
lem are unified in one single constrained optimization problem, being representative for the whole
economy. Accordingly, it is often being referred to as centralized allocation problem. In this model,
a fictitious and benevolent social planner is introduced, that maximizes consumer utility by choosing
consumption and labor on their behalf subject to the aggregate resource constraint, given by the
production function. Among all possible solutions the social planner searches for the best possible
allocation, which is Pareto optimal. Furthermore, he does not follow prices, but he understands
opportunity cost [266]. Starting again from the direct utility function LQ under the new notation,
the SPP for the life quality maximization is formulated as:
max
x,a
LQ(x, a, s) = xq(1− a)s
s.t. x = f(k, sa) = Akα(sa)β = y
(5.41)
As the economy as a whole is considered in the SPP, the previously introduced distinction between
as and ad becomes superfluous so that solely a is employed in the formulation of (5.41). The solution
to this problem gives the best feasible bundle of consumption and leisure that is attainable in the
model economy and is therefore Pareto optimal. The SPP may now be solved either by directly
imposing the constraint through the insertion of the production function in the objective function,
as done by the LQI derivation approach in Section 5.3.1, or by Lagrange optimization. As the use of
Lagrange multipliers more evidently shows that the solution to the SPP is absolutely identical to the
decentralized equilibrium solution obtained in the last section, it is briefly discussed subsequently.
The Lagrange function to (5.41) is constructed to be
Λ = LQ + λ(f(k, sa)− x) (5.42)
so that the following first order conditions are obtained:
∂Λ
∂x
=
∂LQ
∂x
− λ = qxq−1(1− a)s− λ = 0 (5.43)
∂Λ
∂a
=
∂LQ
∂a
+ λ
∂f
∂a
= −xqs+ λβ y
sa
s = 0 (5.44)
∂Λ
∂λ
= x−Akα(sa)β = 0 (5.45)
Dividing equation (5.44) by equation (5.43) yields
x
q(1− a) = β
y
a
(5.46)
which is identical to the general equilibrium solution (5.39) after dividing it by s. Finally, by making
use of the constraint to the social planner’s problem, which enforces that x = y, equation (5.46)
can be solved for q to obtain the form of the LQI as stated in (5.12), with e replaced by its annual
counterpart s.
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Figure 5.6: Solution to the SPP
To sum up, the LQI is the utility function of a representative consumer that is calibrated with
respect to the general equilibrium. Either a decentralized or a centralized approach can be followed
to obtain the LQI in its final form. In the LQI derivation known in literature, the function LQ
constitutes the objective function of a SPP that is restricted by the economy’s resource constraint,
represented by the GDP production function. The problem is solved by directly imposing the
constraint. The solution of the problem yields the optimal trade-off between labor and leisure a∗,
by equalizing the MRS of leisure for consumption to the MRT between labor and consumption,
as visualized in Figure 5.6. Accordingly, the general equilibrium solution is allocated at the point
where the economy’s production possibilities frontier (PPF)3 is just tangent to the highest reachable
indifference curve of the representative consumer’s utility function LQ. Consequently, as the LQI
represents the maximized value of LQ
LQI = LQI(y, s) := max
x,a
{
LQ(x, a, s) : x = f(k, sa) = y
}
(5.47)
it constitutes a value function in analogy to the indirect utility functions introduced in Chapter 4.
5.5 New Annualized Net Benefit Criterion
With the annualized version of the LQI at hand and equipped with the new insights on the economic
foundations of the LQI, the net benefit criterion is reconsidered in this section. The LQI’s constrained
maximization problem and in particular the restrictions to the problem have clearly been stated.
Furthermore, it has been emphasized that the LQI constitutes a value function that yields the
optimal LQ for a given income and safety level. Therefore, it can be conveniently applied to perform
3Represents a graph depicting the maximum amount of output that can be produced out of a given amount of
input, given society’s production technology.
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comparative statics and analyze, how life quality changes when the safety level is elevated and the
annual survival probability increased due to the implementation of a public risk reduction project.
The WTP for a marginal increase in survival probability from s0 to s1 formulated terms of the CV
measure introduced in Section 4.3.1 must satisfy:
LQI(y −WTP, s1) = LQI(y, s0) (5.48)
To arrive at an explicit formulation for the WTP, it is proceeded as in Chapter 4 and the LQI is
totally differentiated:
dLQI =
∂LQI
∂y
dy +
∂LQI
∂s
ds (5.49)
Now, by keeping in mind that the consumer’s income y = f(k, sa) is in particular a function of the
expected annual survival time s, the following expression for the income change in response to the
safety change is obtained:
dy =
∂f(k, sa)
∂s
ds (5.50)
Inserting equation (5.50) in equation (5.49) yields
dLQI = (
∂LQI
∂y
· ∂f(k, sa)
∂s
+
∂LQI
∂s
)ds (5.51)
= (qyq−1(1− a)s · β y
sa
a+ yq(1− a))ds (5.52)
which represents the change in life quality utility resulting from an incremental increase in the
publicly provided safety level ds. Dividing this expression by the marginal utility of income λ = ∂LQI∂y
to convert the change in utility to monetary units yields:
dLQI
λ
= (
∂f
∂s
+
∂LQI
∂s
∂LQI
∂y
)ds (5.53)
This amount corresponds to the monetized change in LQI utility resulting from the considered
safety change ds. If the representative consumer’s income is reduced by this amount after the safety
change, she maintains exactly her initial level of life quality. Consequently, expression (5.53) already
represents the consumer’s WTP for the safety change ds. Note that WTP formula (5.53) coincides
with the safety pricing rule of the representative agent model discussed in Section 4.4. Solving
equation (5.53) concretely gives:
WTP = (β
y
sa
a+
y
qs
)ds (5.54)
Now, by keeping in mind that q = 1β
a
1−a and by definition E[l] = sa represents the expected annual
labor time of the representative consumer, equation (5.54) can slightly be rearranged to yield a
surprising economic interpretation:
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WTP = (β
y
sa
a+
y
s
β
1− a
a
)ds (5.55)
= (β
y
E[l]
a+ β
y
E[l]
(1− a))ds (5.56)
= (MPL · a+MPL · (1− a))ds (5.57)
= MPL · ds (5.58)
The WTP for the marginal safety change obtained from the annualized LQI equals the total increase
in expected annual survival time ds valued at the MPL. The representative consumer directly benefits
from the increase in expected leisure time (1− a) · ds, which is valued at its opportunity cost equal
to the MPL. In addition, as a represents a constant that has already been optimized, the increased
expected annual survival time causes also consumer income to increase. This is due to the fact that
at constant a an increase in total expected survival time leads to an increased expected labor input
a · ds in production. This in turn causes total output and thus, GDP to increase by the MPL times
the increased labor time. To sum up, the increase in safety leads to an increase in total expected
time endowments of the individuals of society which is valued at the MPL.
Accordingly it becomes clear in particular, that the LQI values increases in safety in terms of
increased expected survival time. As the WTP formula given in equation (5.55) has been derived
in an one period model however, it values only the extension in survival time that accrues in the
considered period: ifm lives are saved in society due to the implementation of a public risk reduction
project, the mortality rate is decreased by m mortality risk reduction units m · 1N , so that each
individual enjoys a time gain of
ds = s1 − s0 = 8760(1− µ1)− 8760(1− µ0)
= 8760(1− M −m
N
)− 8760(1− M
N
) = 8760 · m
N
[
hours
year
]
(5.59)
in the considered period. As above, M refers to the total number of expected fatalities in the
considered time horizon of one year prior to the implementation of the risk reduction project and
8760 is the total number of hours in one year. Therefore, the WTP for the current time gain of each
(identical) individual of society can be reformulated to be
WTP = (
∂f
∂s
+
∂LQI
∂s
∂LQI
∂y
) · 8760 · m
N
(5.60)
leading to the following expression for the SWTP:
SWTP = WTP ·N = (∂f
∂s
+
∂LQI
∂s
∂LQI
∂y
) · 8760 ·m (5.61)
Now, by either dividing the individual WTP formula (5.60) by the size of the mortality risk reduction
dµ or the SWTP formula (5.61) by the total number of lives saved dM = m, the social value of one
statistical life year (VSLY) is obtained:
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V SLY =
WTP
dµ
=
SWTP
m
= (
∂f
∂s
+
∂LQI
∂s
∂LQI
∂y
) · 8760 (5.62)
Table 5.2 provides a collection of VSLYs for selected economies. The VSLY estimates cluster in the
range US$ 150,000-250,000 for industrialized western economies with the outliers Luxembourg that
shows the highest value of more than US$ 0.5 million and Mexico that is allocated at the lower end
of the estimates with a VSLY of only US$ 50,000. Furthermore, it is clearly seen that beside the
GDP, the most influential parameters on the VSLY of a country are the life working fraction a and
the parameter β that all together determine the labor productivity in a country and thus the MPL.
Table 5.2: VSLY estimates from the annualized LQI
Country GDP1 β2 a3 s4 VSLY5
France 32,686 0.52 7.7 0.991 220,375
Germany 34,391 0.53 8.1 0.989 227,475
Italy 30,381 0.47 8.7 0.989 165,827
Luxembourg 79,793 0.51 7.3 0.992 555,375
Poland 15,989 0.45 10.2 0.990 71,697
Portugal 22,815 0.45 10.4 0.989 100,737
UK 35,669 0.53 9.6 0.990 199,612
Canada 38,500 0.52 10.6 0.992 191,863
USA 45,489 0.57 10.6 0.992 248,863
Australia 37,565 0.49 9.7 0.993 190,070
New Zealand 27,431 0.55 10.4 0.993 146,356
Japan 33,626 0.57 10.6 0.991 180,956
Mexico 14,004 0.31 8.6 0.995 50,346
1 (US$ 2007), from OECD [188]
2 from PennWorldTables [110, 159]
3 [%], from OECD [188] and WDI [262], after formula (5.11)
4 from CIA World Factbook [49], after formula (5.21)
5 after formula (5.62)
Now, in order to take into account the full benefits in terms of increased survival time that result
from a reduction in crude mortality, it has to be emphasized that a reduction in crude mortality
today has an impact not only on the survival time in the considered time span of one year, but
affects all consecutive survival probabilities over the representative consumer’s remaining life. This
is due to the fact that the survival probabilities S(t) in all future years t are conditional on survival
today, as becomes clear from formula (5.7). Consequently, in order to arrive at a VSL measure on
social level, these increases in future survival times have to be assessed and included in the valuation.
This is subject of the next section.
5.6 Intertemporal Extensions
The safety pricing rule derived from the LQI constitutes a measure to place a value on increased
survival time. Whereas in the one period model, the increase in annual survival time is based on
the change in the crude mortality rate and equal across all (identical) individuals, in the lifetime
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evaluation further refinements are necessary in order to measure the total time gain over the average
individual’s life. These refinements address in particular the fact that people of different ages have
different remaining life expectancies, so that a change in the mortality rate today will impact the
gain in total lifetime to different extents depending on age. Moreover are individuals of different
ages exposed to age specific mortality rates µ(x) rather than to a uniform crude mortality rate µ,
which represents the average of all age specific mortality rates.
5.6.1 Mortality Risk Reduction Regimes
In order to quantify the total time gains that individuals of society enjoy from a change in the
mortality rate, it is first necessary to specify the so called mortality risk reduction regime [218],
which defines the way changes in crude mortality distribute across the age specific mortality rates
µ(x). There are generally two standard cases how this may be accomplished: the proportional or
relative risk reduction regime and the uniform or absolute mortality risk reduction regime. When
considering changes in age specific mortality due to the implementation of some specific risk reduction
measure, the general all cause level of mortality a subgroup of the population is exposed to at age
x is commonly being referred to as background mortality µ(x) [151].
The relative mortality risk reduction regime is based on the assumption that a change in crude mor-
tality dµ = δµ impacts individuals of different age classes proportional to their respective background
mortality
µ1(x) = µ0(x)(1 + δ) for all x (5.63)
where subscript 0 refers to the background mortality before the implementation of the risk reduction
measure and 1 describes the respective value in post project state. This criterion implies that
people who are subjected to a higher background risk are more affected by the mortality change δ.
As background mortality is in tendency increasing with age, this mortality risk reduction scheme
assigns the major benefits of risk reduction to people of advanced ages. It might describe reality
well in case of disease prevention and the reduction of air pollution, but is generally considered to be
incompatible with the equality principle of modern societies [215], which dictates that a distinction
between different age groups is not feasible in the derivation of a VSL.
By applying the uniform mortality risk reduction regime, it is assumed that an infinitesimal change
in crude mortality dµ = ∆ distributes equally as a constant throughout all ages. Therefore, the
mortality change has an impact on every member of society regardless of her age and background
mortality so that
µ1(x) = µ0(x) + ∆ for all x (5.64)
is obtained for the change in age specific mortality, where subscripts are defined as above. This
mortality risk reduction regime is of particular relevance for technical applications, such as structural
reliability, flood protection, earthquake resistant design and disaster risk reduction interventions
in general [214]. If for instance a structure collapses, every occupant inside faces more or less
the same risk of dying, independent of actual background mortality, age and sex. Certainly, the
mobility of affected persons, which is generally higher at low and medium ages, will also influence
the risk of dying in a disaster in reality, but the regime is nevertheless assumed to hold in good
approximation. Furthermore, it is implicitly hypothesized, that the subgroup of affected people is
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distributed representatively, in accordance with the age distribution of the entire society. Also this
assumption might be criticized, but the democratic equality principle prohibits a distinction between
different age groups and enforces a valuation on basis of average values [215]. For all those reasons,
the absolute mortality risk reduction regime is adopted henceforth.
5.6.2 Converting Changes in Mortality to Changes in Life Expectancy
After the mortality risk reduction regime has been specified, it is now analyzed, how changes in
mortality risk translate into changes in total lifetime for the average individual of society. It has
been outlined above that a change in mortality risk µ(x) today has an impact on all future survival
probabilities S(t), t > x the individual faces over her entire remaining life, as they all are conditional
on survival today. If a person of age x is considered, the survival probability to survive until at least
period t is conditional on survival to age x and can be expressed as
S(t|x) = S(t)
S(x)
=
1
S(x)
exp
[
−
∫ t
0
µ(τ)dτ
]
= exp
[
−
∫ t
x
µ(τ)dτ
]
(5.65)
making the dependency of the survival probabilities on µ(x) obvious. Now, as it is aimed at as-
sessing all changes in future survival probabilities due to the mortality change today, the remaining
life expectancy at age x is the proper measure to be employed as it subsumes all future survival
probabilities over the individual’s remaining life
e(x, µ) :=
∫ tmax
x
S(t|x)dt =
∫ tmax
x
exp
[
−
∫ t
x
µ(τ)dτ
]
dt (5.66)
where tmax represents some maximum attainable age taken from life table records and is in the range
of 110 years. By formula (5.66) the relationship between mortality rates, survival probabilities and
remaining life expectancy at an arbitrary age x is clarified. In particular, it is easily verified that
a change in mortality today has a larger impact the lower the age of the considered individual, as
there are more remaining increased survival probability terms to be summed until the maximum
attainable age is reached, which in turn results in a larger gain in total life expectancy. Now, in
order to make these gains in life expectancies time consistent and to enable a valuation on basis of
the VSLY measure introduced above, the additional time increments that occur in the future have
to be discounted back to the time of valuation. This can conveniently be done on basis of the so
called discounted life expectancy ed(x)4
ed(x, µ, r) :=
∫ tmax
x
S(t|x) exp
[
−
∫ t
x
r(τ − x)dτ
]
dt
=
∫ tmax
x
exp
[
−
∫ t
x
µ(τ) + r(τ − x)dτ
]
dt
=
∫ tmax
x
Sd(t|x)dt
(5.67)
4Note that in equation (5.67) the mortality rate µ(τ) is dependent on the considered individual’s age, while the
discount factor is age independent and refers to the time the considered individual aged x will be τ years old, so that
the factor r(τ − x) is to be applied to discount the survival probabilities.
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where r denotes a suitably chosen discount rate that is further discussed below. In essence, the
discounted life expectancy ed at age x is a measure of the individual’s total remaining disposable time
adjusted for the individual’s time preferences and economic growth. It allows for an interpretation
in terms of the net present value (NPV) of total remaining lifetime and takes on values of around
22-24 years if evaluated for x = 0 at a discount rate of 4% following the typical age structure of
industrialized countries. Now, the discounted life expectancy is taken into account to value the total
time gain an individual of age x derives from a reduction in mortality risk today. If the vector
µ0 = (µ(x), µ(x+ 1), ..., µ(tmax − 1)) (5.68)
denotes the collection of age specific mortality rates prior to the risk reduction intervention and
µ1 = (µ(x) + ∆, µ(x+ 1), ..., µ(tmax − 1)) (5.69)
represents the vector of age specific mortality rates the considered x-year old individual faces after
project implementation over her remaining life, the total gain in discounted life expectancy at age
x amounts to:
ded(x,∆, r) = ed(x, µ1, r)− ed(x, µ0, r) (5.70)
This difference represents the present value of the total expected time gain the individual derives
from an immediate mortality risk reduction over her remaining life at age x and is measured in
years. As a consequence, the WTP of an individual at age x for an instant mortality risk reduction
dµ = ∆ can be valued by means of the VSLY measure derived above:
WTP (x) = V SLY · ded(x,∆, r) (5.71)
As the total population consists of individuals of all age classes, the age specific WTP measures are
to be averaged over the age distribution of the total population in order to arrive at a measure that
represents the WTP of the average individual of society. For a constant population growth n over
the considered time horizon, individuals are distributed over different age classes by the function
h(x, n) :=
exp [−nx]S(x)∫ tmax
0 exp [−nx]S(x)dx
(5.72)
so that the average individual’s WTP for the considered reduction in mortality risk becomes:
WTP =
∫ tmax
0
WTP (x)h(x, n)dx (5.73)
The SWTP is then easily calculated by multiplying the age averaged WTP by total population size
N :
SWTP = WTP ·N (5.74)
Eventually, the VSL comprises all the above information and standardizes the WTP measures to
the value of saving one statistical life in society:
V SL =
WTP
dµ
=
SWTP
dM
(5.75)
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As the above described procedure to derive the VSL from the age specific WTP values constitutes a
rather time consuming and elaborate procedure, a possible simplification based on a linear approx-
imation is introduced before closing this section. Reconsidering formula (5.71) it becomes obvious
that the only variable factor in the age specific WTP is given by the gain in discounted remaining
lifetime ded(x,∆, r), which is in particular depending on the age of the considered individual. There-
fore, in the derivation of a VSL on social level it is possible to abstract from age specific individual
considerations by introducing the concept of age averaged discounted life expectancy
e˜d : = Eh [ed(x, µ, r)] =
∫ tmax
0
ed(x, µ, r)h(x, n)dx =
=
∫ tmax
0
∫ tmax
x
exp
[
−
∫ t
x
µ(τ) + r(τ − x)dτ
]
dth(x, n)dx
(5.76)
which constitutes the population average of all age dependent discounted life expectancies ed(x) over
all existing age classes. It is strongly dependent on the age distribution of the considered population
as well as the discount factor chosen to determine the discounted life expectancies. Values of around
e˜d = 16− 18 years are obtained for typical demographies of industrialized countries, when applying
a discount rate of 4%. By means of the age averaged discounted life expectancy e˜d changes in
discounted life expectancy due to the mortality change under investigation can directly be assessed
on social level. In this context, Rackwitz [214, 215, 217] proposes a linearization of the relationship
between the change in mortality risk dµ = ∆ across all age classes and the change in age averaged
discounted life expectancy de˜d by means of the first term of a McLaurin series:
Eh
[
ded(x,∆, r)
ed(x, µ, r)
]
≈
∫ tmax
0
− dd∆ed(x,∆, r)|∆=0 ·∆
ed(x, µ, r)
h(x, n)dx
=
∫ tmax
0
− dd∆
∫ tmax
x exp
[
− ∫ tx µ(τ) + ∆ + r(τ − x)dτ] dt|∆=0 ·∆∫ tmax
x exp
[
− ∫ tx µ(τ) + r(τ − x)dτ] dt h(x, n)dx
= −
∫ tmax
0
∫ tmax
x (t− x) exp
[
− ∫ tx µ(τ) + r(τ − x)dτ] dt∫ tmax
x exp
[
− ∫ tx µ(τ) + r(τ − x)dτ] dt h(x, n)dx ·∆
= −C∆ ·∆
(5.77)
Clearly, such an approximation is only permissible for reasonably small changes in mortality risk,
which constitute the subject of study throughout this thesis. It has to be noted however, that in
the derivation of approximation (5.77) a simultaneous change throughout all age specific mortality
rates has been considered, so that an additional division by ed(x, µ, r) is necessary to obtain the
correct relation between ∆ and de˜d. Furthermore, it is easily verified that the factor C∆ obtained in
(5.77) is a constant that is specific for the demography of the considered country and represents a
measure for the shape of the survival curve S(x) [212]. For the typical age structure of industrialized
countries and a discount factor of 4% it takes values in the range of 15-18 and equals roughly the
total age averaged discounted life expectancy e˜d. The convenience of approximation (5.77) is to
be seen in the fact that once the demographic factor C∆ has been calculated, it can repeatedly be
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applied in WTP and VSL calculations as the demographic structure of society is not expected to
change significantly in the short to medium term perspective.
Finally, the age independent WTP of the average individual of society for the considered uniform
mortality risk reduction change dµ = ∆ is easily obtained
WTP = V SLY · de˜d = V SLY · C∆ ·∆ (5.78)
which can in turn straightforwardly be employed to calculate the VSL in the considered society:
V SL =
WTP
dµ
= V SLY · C∆ (5.79)
The so obtained VSL calculation formula is in line with the VSL estimation approach suggested in
[94]. Table 5.3 eventually provides an overview of VSL estimates for the above chosen economies.
Country GDP1 e2 a3 γ4 r5 n6 C∆7 VSL8
France 32,686 80.9 7.7 1.9 4.6 0.55 16.2 3,575,293
Germany 34,391 79.9 8.1 1.9 4.6 -0.05 15.6 3,556,438
Italy 30,381 81.6 8.7 2.0 4.6 -0.05 15.7 2,610,904
Luxembourg 79,793 79.4 7.3 2.3 4.9 1.17 15.9 8,809,751
Poland 15,989 75.4 10.2 1.6 4.2 -0.05 16.0 1,149,663
Portugal 22,815 79.1 10.4 2.1 4.6 0.28 15.9 1,602,856
UK 35,669 79.5 9.6 1.3 4.0 0.28 17.0 3,385,692
Canada 38,500 80.4 10.6 2.0 4.5 0.82 16.5 3,162,347
USA 45,489 78.2 10.6 1.8 4.4 0.98 16.7 4,156,087
Australia 37,565 81.7 9.7 2.0 4.6 1.2 16.8 3,198,041
New Zealand 27,431 79.4 10.4 1.2 3.9 0.94 17.7 2,594,928
Japan 33,626 82.9 10.6 2.7 5.1 -0.19 14.8 2,676,402
Mexico 14,004 76.06 8.6 1.4 4.0 1.13 17.9 901,193
Table 5.3: VSL estimates from the annualized LQI
1 (US$ 2007), from OECD [188]
2 taken from period lifetables from the Human Mortality Database [267]
3 [%], from OECD [188] and WDI [262]
4 [%], from Maddison [155] and extended Penn Worldtables [159]
5 [%], after formula (5.84) below, with ρ=3% and  = 1− q
6 [%], from CIA Worldfactbook [49]
7 after formula (5.77)
8 (US$ 2007), after formula (5.79)
It is clearly seen from Table 5.3 that the VSL estimates derived from the annualized LQI are in
general significantly lower than those obtained from the microeconomic approaches introduced in
Chapter 4. The mean VSL obtained from the LQI across all selected countries is US$ 3,183,046
with a standard deviation of US$ 1,951,709, while the mean value throughout all microeconomic
studies clustered in the range of US$ 5-6 million. If it is focused only on those countries instead,
for which microeconomic data have been collected in Chapter 4, e.g U.S., Canada and Western
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Europe, the mean VSL from the LQI amounts to US$ 4,179,502, which is still at the lower end of the
microeconomic studies, but in the same order of magnitude however. The reason for these differences
might be seen in the fact that in most microeconomic studies, respondents are directly faced with
the risk of death and asked to state the amount of money they would require as compensation for
changes in the risk level. Apart from the broadly observed difficulty to judge on small changes in
mortality risk correctly, people not only fear the event of death per se, but also the dreadful process
of dying and are potentially willing to pay large amounts of money to avoid such events. In the LQI
methodology in contrast, the trade-off between risk and money is determined in a less emotional
context [151]. By observing the daily choices that people make to allocate their time between work
and leisure activities, a social value of time is derived, which is eventually transferred to evaluate
highly emotional decisions, involving the prospect of death.
5.6.3 Relation to Conventional LQI Approach
The above described procedure to determine a VSL based on the LQI methodology differs signif-
icantly from the conventional approaches presented in literature. Here, the LQI has been derived
firstly in a one period general equilibrium model, where the life expectancy term has been replaced
by the annual survival probability to make the derivation time consistent. Based on this approach
an annualized version of the net benefit criterion has been obtained that could be employed to derive
a VSLY, which constitutes a standardized measure of the average individual’s WTP for increased
annual survival time and may be seen as the annual counterpart of the VSL.
By the insight that the LQI based acceptability criterion values increased safety in terms of time,
the safety pricing rule obtained in the one period model has been applied to value changes in total
lifetime that accrue to the average individual as a result of an instant reduction in mortality risk.
By assessing the total time gains over the individual’s life and discounting them back to the decision
point, the VSLY could be employed to derive a VSL on social level. As a consequence, the LQI
derivation procedure and the valuation of intertemporal safety effects have been split.
This is to be seen in sharp contrast to conventional LQI approaches to estimate the VSL. Here, the
LQI is firstly derived as illustrated above to calibrate the parameter q and then somehow integrated
in a lifetime utility model to account for intertemporal aspects, as shown in detail in [217] and
summarized in Appendix E.2. In the lifetime utility approach however, it is started from a general
unspecified power utility function that contains consumption as its sole argument which is then
optimized to maximize lifetime utility:
max
c(t)
L(x) =
∫ tmax
x
u(c(t))Sd(t|x)dt (5.80)
The relation of this utility function u(c(t)) to life quality utility remains unclear though. After a
constant consumption c(t) = c over lifetime has been declared to be the optimal consumption path
over lifetime, the time invariant utility function is then taken out of the integral to obtain:
L(x) = u(c)ed(x) (5.81)
Finally, the parameter q of the LQI derivation is substituted for the so far unspecified exponent of
the general power utility function u(c), consumption c is replaced by income y and the function L(x)
is age averaged over the age distribution of society h(x, n) to obtain the societal LQI (SLQI):
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SLQI = u(c)e˜d = yq e˜d (5.82)
The latter formula (5.82) is then taken into account to determine the WTP for safety after equation
(5.19):
WTP =
y
q
· Eh
[
ded
ed
]
=
y
q
· C∆ ·∆ (5.83)
which closely resembles the WTP equation (5.78) derived above. Essentially, the two formulae
are closely related, the crucial difference is to be seen in the fact that formula (5.78) contains the
additional second order income effect in the VSLY measure, which is neglected in (5.83), as discussed
above. As a consequence, the newly derived WTP equation (5.78) yields estimates that are in the
range of 10% higher than those obtained by the conventional formula (5.83) for the same size of risk
reduction ∆.
As observed for the one period case, also in the above sketched lifetime utility model, budget
constraints are not explicitly considered in the optimization process. It is simply stated that under
perfect market conditions, a constant consumption rate can be shown to be the optimal path, as
demonstrated by Shepard and Zeckhauser [235, 236]. This however holds only if the rate of time
preferences with which utilities are discounted equals the employed interest rate and if perfect and
fair life insurance is available [127]. The assumption of fair life insurance in turn makes it necessary
to include the survival probabilities in the budget constraint, so that it follows from the dynamic
envelope theorem that changes in the budget constraint would have to be accounted for as well in
evaluating increases in safety, as shown for instance in [6, 41, 132, 224]. These additional changes
in the optimal consumption path are not considered in the intertemporal WTP criterion (5.83).
Furthermore, it remains questionable if the parameter q that has been calibrated with respect to
the general equilibrium in a one period model may simply be substituted to define the elasticity
of an instantaneous utility function that is employed in a lifecycle model. In this respect, it has
to be emphasized that while the utility exponent q defines the trade-off between income and safety
in a one period model and allows for an interpretation in terms of a risk aversion parameter, in
an intertemporal model it determines the intertemporal rate of substitution between consumption
today and consumption in the future [224]. This issue certainly requires additional research to be
resolved.
As the LQI was originally meant to represent "a snapshot of the current economy" [197], the above
illustrated methodology to derive the LQI in a one period model and then to discount additional
lifetime back to the time of evaluation seems to go much better in line with this kind of thought than
to consider the LQI in an intertemporal lifecycle model of consumption without really accounting for
intertemporal aspects. In this way, rather complex issues of dynamic optimization for determining
the optimal consumption program and capital accumulation over time are avoidable and at the same
time an economically consistent derivation and application assured.
5.7 Calibration
In LQI literature it is continuously discussed how to calibrate the parameters inherent in the LQI
formula as well as the social discount rate to account for time preferences in order to guarantee an
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economically consistent application. As the new derivation approach presented above has shed some
new light on the LQI concept, several controversial aspects are readopted in the following and given
some new interpretation.
5.7.1 GDP
When the net benefit criterion is applied to derive a SWTP for safety changes it is frequently
discussed whether to employ the full GDP per capita in the formula or just that part of the GDP that
is available for consumption, which amounts to roughly 60% of total GDP. Authors [151, 214, 217]
who recommend using only 60% of the GDP base their arguments on the fact that only the private
consumption fraction of the GDP is actually available to be spent for risk reduction activities, as
the other parts like investment and government spending are necessary to maintain the functionality
of the economy and are therefore to be excluded from the consideration. From the author’s point
of view in contrast, the full GDP should be taken into account for two main reasons. Firstly and
most importantly, as demonstrated in the derivation of the modified net benefit criterion, it has
become clear that the LQI values increased safety in terms of time, which is priced at the MPL. If
only 60% of the GDP was taken into account in the WTP formula (5.54), the productivity of labor
would be underestimated which in turn would result in a biased estimate of the MPL and therefore
of the money value of time. Secondly, in special application to disaster risk reduction interventions
it can hardly be stated in general who takes over the cost of the project eventually. This is to be
determined case specifically and therefore, potentially all parts of the GDP might be affected by the
project.
5.7.2 Life Working Fraction
In the estimation of the life working fraction a it is often hypothesized whether to count housework
or commuting time to the workplace as labor time. Beside the fact that it would be rather difficult
to obtain reliable and objective estimates for these time spans on aggregate level, it has to be
emphasized, that the estimate of the parameter a must be in accordance with the labor values that
enter the Cobb Douglas production function. As commuting time and housework are not included
in national accounting, they do not count as GDP producing activities and are therefore to be
excluded from the valuation. Furthermore, by keeping in mind that the above derived procedure to
value safety is based on "a snapshot of the current economy", formula (5.11) is clearly advantageous
over formula (5.10) to determine the parameter a.
5.7.3 Life Expectancy
Lastly, there is the question whether to employ life expectancy at birth, age averaged life expectancy
or age averaged discounted life expectancy in the formulation of the LQI. Here, it has to be dis-
tinguished if the LQI is seen as a social indicator that is taken into account to describe the socio
economic situation of a country or if it is interpreted in terms of a utility function of the represen-
tative consumer. In the first case life expectancy at birth or age averaged life expectancy might
be advantageous to give a straightforward and easily interpretable insight in a society’s health and
safety conditions.
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In the second case in contrast, discounting and age averaging becomes a necessity. Here the time
gains are to be seen as an economic good, that bring utility to the consumer. Only if they are reliably
assessed in the periods they occur, discounted back to the point of valuation and age averaged to
represent the time gain for the average individual, a consistent WTP measure for safety can be
established.
5.7.4 Social Discounting
Discounting is a fundamental issue in economics and the choice for a certain discount factor has a
main influence on the outcome of project decisions. Public investments into disaster risk reduction
must be discounted as any other investments that are made by private firms. Confronting public with
private investments however, a crucial distinction has to be made. Private investors would certainly
refuse to invest in (risky) projects with a yield on capital below the market interest rate, as they
could otherwise purchase fixed government bonds and receive approximately the market interest
rate without taking any risk. So the market interest rate serves as a baseline in private sector
decision making. Public investments in contrast are usually made with a considerably larger time
horizon where both present and future generations are concerned. Employing such a comparatively
high discount factor could therefore be problematic as it implicitly attaches little weight to future
outcomes. Considering the fact that preventative risk reduction measures are often undertaken with
design periods well above 50-years, aspects of sustainable development and intergenerational justice
seem very relevant in this context.
Public interest rates vary greatly among countries and rates in the range of 2-8% can be observed
[217], indicating that there is no general consensus on this issue as the rates are often set according
to quite different rationals. While for instance Weinstein and Statson [263] are convinced that life
saving measures should be based on the same discount factor as any other cost and equal the market
interest rate, others [39, 230] do not employ any dicounting at all, primarily on ethical reasons when
nuclear waste disposal, global warming or the extensive use of natural ressources are concerned.
These two opinions are rather two polar cases, rational discounting presumably lies somewhere in
between.
The public interest rate is strongly related to real economic growth, where it is important to take per
capita values because of the counteracting effects of population and economic growth [217]. Among
others, there are two important macroeconomic models that are widely applied and employable to
determine the optimal discount rate for stable economic growth: the Ramsey Neoclassical Growth
Model [220] and the so called Overlapping Generations Model, devised by Allais [8] in 1947 and
popularized by Samuelson in 1958 [227]. According to the Ramsey neoclassical approach, the market
interest rate for optimal stable economic growth under perfect market conditions is given through
r = ρ+ γ (5.84)
where ρ denotes the rate of pure time preferences, γ represents the consumption (income) growth
rate per capita and  is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. The subjective element in
this equation is the rate ρ, which describes the phenomenon that people value things that occur in
the future less than if they occurred today, due to human impatience, myopia, the lack of telescopic
capacity and so on. While the determination of ρ often results in controversy, its existence has
widely been observed in economic literature [209]. The growth rate per capita γ, on the other hand,
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is often being determined from observed long term averages for developed economies. Comparing
the GDP per capita in the time from 1870-1992 gives γ = 1.9% for industrialized western economies
such as Western Europe, USA, Canada, Japan; γ = 1.4% for Eastern Europe and γ = 0.9% for
Africa [155]. The elasticity of marginal utility of consumption  stems from the concrete formulation
of the utility function employed in the Ramsey model, which is often hypothesized to be of the
constant proportional risk aversion type. The employment of this class of utility functions entails
that the effect of increased wealth upon marginal utility is expressed by a constant elasticity value.
It is commonly assumed that  = 1. For the total value of r Nordhaus [186] obtains 0.05%, with
ρ = 0.03, γ = 0.2 and  = 1, which seems to be a quite reasonable range where many other
sustainable development studies fall into [215].
In economic literature the adequacy of the Ramsey model has been seriously put into question. The
critics mainly address the issue that there is a conflict between the preferences of persons currently
alive ρ > 0 and the needs of sustainability and intergenerational equity. Often, the above mentioned
Overlapping Generations Model is advocated instead. The main reasoning behind this approach
is that interests of living generations should be discounted at the full discount rate provided in
equation (5.84), while for all yet unborn generations only the fraction γ should be employed: pure
time preferences ρ are an attribute of the living generation, while yet unborn individuals are unable
to express their corresponding demands. With respect to the latter, society should act as a trustee
[151]. For a detailed discussion on the Overlapping Generations Model it is referred to [23, 211].
5.8 Discussion
This chapter dealt with top down approaches for valuing increases in the publicly provided safety
level. Refraining from the individualistic concept it has been shown, how macroeconomic indicators
may be employed to value reductions in mortality risk. In particular, the human capital approach
has been reviewed, that bases the VSL estimation on the concept of forgone earnings that are lost
in case of premature deaths of single individuals. As in the human capital approach human life is
just seen as a factor of production and the life quality that people derive from the pleasure of living
is not accounted for, it lacks satisfactory normative justification and is full of moral and conceptual
problems. Therefore, it is commonly rejected and has not been further elaborated.
Addressing the critics of the human capital approach, the LQI has been introduced as a concept
that combines several macroeconomic indicators in a composite index, with the intention to measure
life quality on aggregate scales and improving the normative justification of estimating VSLs in a
top down fashion. In particular, the LQI combines the GDP per capita, the life expectancy and
the life working fraction into one single index that is supposed to reflect the most important human
concerns by measures that are widely available.
Throughout its evolution over time, the LQI has been continuously subject to controversial discus-
sions regarding its derivation and role in economic theory. This resulted in a great variety of different
functional forms and ways of calibrating the index for practical application. The latest LQI deriva-
tion based on the utility concept has been the subject of study. By reviewing the contemporary
derivation approach, several critics have been placed: most important has been the omittance of
budget constraints and the time inconsistency of defining a utility function over annual income but
total life expectancy. As a consequence of the latter critic it is not clear, if the LQI concept is to
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be integrated in static or dynamic models. Furthermore, the general equilibrium nature of the LQI
approach has never been explicitly stated in literature.
Addressing these critics, a new equilibrium and time consistent derivation of the LQI has been
presented in a one period general equilibrium model. To highlight the theory surrounding the index,
the new derivation has firstly been carried out by means of a decentralized derivation approach,
i.e. by considering representative consumers and firms separately. In a second step, the index has
been derived in a centralized economy, based on the SPP. It turned out that the conventional LQI
derivation constitutes a particular solution approach to the SPP.
Having obtained the solution to the SPP, it has been demonstrated that the LQI constitutes a
value function that is calibrated with respect to the general equilibrium of the model economy.
Furthermore, it has been shown that the conventional approach to derive a SWTP by means of the
net benefit criterion neglects second order income effects. Increases in the public safety level lead
to increases in total annual survival time for the average individual, that decompose in an increase
in leisure but also in an increase in labor time, at a fixed and optimized annual working fraction.
Only increases in leisure time are valued by the net benefit criterion, while the additional benefits in
terms of higher production and thus higher income due to increased labor input are not considered.
The reason for this neglect is the omittance of budget constraints. Extending the net benefit criterion
to include these effects, a surprising result has been disclosed: the LQI, if applied time consistently,
values additional total time due to increased safety levels at the MPL, which corresponds to the
wage rate in general equilibrium under perfect competition. The conventional LQI pricing strategy
in contrast, values only increases in leisure time at the MPL. As the considered time period has been
restricted to one year, the standardization of the WTP measure to one mortality risk reduction unit
yielded the VSLY.
Based on the observation that instant reductions in mortality risk do not only cause annual survival
time to increase, but affect all survival probabilities over the average individual’s remaining life,
the approach has been extended to account for these intertemporal effects. By evaluating the total
increases in lifetime that result from an increase in safety today and discounting them back to the
decision point, firstly age dependent WTP measures have been derived. By averaging these over the
population’s age distribution, a SWTP for safety and a VSL estimate could be obtained.
Additionally, it has been shown, how the VSL calculation procedure can be simplified by linearly
approximating the relation between reductions in mortality risk and total increases in age averaged
discounted life expectancy. The VSL values obtained from the LQI turned out to be in the range of
US$ 4 million for countries considered in the studies of Chapter 4. Thus, the VSL estimates based
on the LQI are significantly lower than the microeconomic estimates, but are in the same order of
magnitude though.
Eventually, the relation of the presented approach to the conventional LQI methodology has been
outlined and recommendations for calibrating the LQI have been provided. The central innovation of
the presented approach lies in the fact that the derivation procedure of the index and the accountancy
for intertemporal aspects have been split, while they are inconsistently mixed in the conventional
method. The finally obtained WTP and VSL formulae resembled each other, with the difference that
second order income effects are included in the new LQI pricing formula while they are neglected
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in the conventional one. This yielded increases in the VSL of around 10%, depending on the actual
value of the life working fraction. In addition, it has been shown to be adivisable to employ the full
GDP instead of only the 60% fraction that is available for consumption in order to obtain a correct
social value of time. In summary, the innovations and new insigts have lead to an increase well above
50% in the LQI based VSL estimates, which is seen as a valuable improvement, considering the fact
that the latter have been and still are significantly lower than the estimates from microeconomic
studies.
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Chapter 6
Uncertainty - The Real Option Approach
The previously presented strategies to determine the WTP for safety have been carried out under the
assumption of perfect information. Perfect information is a basic assumption of perfect competition
that may not approximate many real world situations [139]. In practical applications of social CBA,
it is hardly possible to determine cost and benefits with certainty, but uncertainty can be reduced
by gathering information. Any investment into risk reduction that is made now, which commits
resources or generates cost that cannot be recovered subsequently, constitutes a so called irreversible
investment. In the realm of irreversible investments that are made under uncertainty it may pay to
delay the investment to some future point in time to reduce the risk of misinvestment. The value of
information that is gained from that delay is the option value or quasi option value of the project.
This chapter explains how this option value arises and presents strategies how it may be priced in
the context of public risk reduction investments based on a discrete option pricing model. In this
way, profound decision rules whether to invest immediately, to postpone the investment or to reject
the project are derived. The main ideas behind the presented methodology have been worked out in
[147] and further been extended in [202], which serves as a baseline for the subsequent presentation.
6.1 Option Pricing
6.1.1 Options in Finance
The term "call option" or often labeled just "call" describes a financial contract between two parties.
The buyer or holder of the option purchases the right, but not the obligation to buy a predefined
quantity of a commodity or particular financial instrument, the underlying S, from the seller of
the option at a certain time, the expiration date T , at a certain price, the so called strike price P .
In opposition to the buyer, the seller is obliged to sell the underlying in case the buyer decides to
make use of her right, i.e. to exercise the option. Therefore, the buyer has to expend a cost of
acquiring the option in order to enter in the contract. Whether the buyer will finally exercise the
option depends on the price development of the underlying. Thus, options are often being referred
to as contingent derivatives. Is the market price ST of the underlying at expiration time T below
the strike price P , the owner of the call option will prefer to purchase the underlying on the market
instead of exercising the option. In this case the possession of the option is not beneficial to the
owner. Should the market price of the underlying ST move up above the strike price P at expiration
time T in contrast, the option is said to be "in the money" and the owner will receive a payoff ST −P
from exercising the option. At this point it is important to emphasize that the option’s payoff is
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conceptually different from the option’s profit. The profit of the option is to be seen as the net gain
resulting from exercising the option and is obtained by subtracting the option price CT from it’s
payoff ST − P . Moreover, it is important to realize that the owner of the option sometimes will
exercise the option and make a loss overall. This case occurs when the notation of the underlying
at expiration T exceeds the strike price P only by an amount that is smaller than the option price
CT . Nevertheless is this behavior advantageous for the holder to limit overall losses as the price for
the option has already been expended initially. Therefore, in general, call options should always be
exercised at the expiration date if the stock price is higher than the strike price. To summarize, the
payoff CT of a call option is depending on the market price of the underlying ST at expiration time
T , leading to the following relationship:
CT = max {ST − P, 0} (6.1)
From this equation it becomes clear, that the owner of a call option is able to fully profit from the
positive development of the underlying while she is at the same time safeguarded against potential
losses. This asymmetric payoff stream ensures that the option value can never become negative. As
depicted in Figure 6.1, the payoff streams may be visualized on basis of so called "payoff functions",
that display an option’s payoff as a function of the underlying’s price.
Figure 6.1: A call’s payoff function in dependence of the underlying’s market price
So far the concept of call options has been illustrated on basis of European call options, which allow
the holder to exercise the option only on expiration date T itself. American call options in contrast,
may be exercised at any time before and at maturity. In this case T constitutes only the latest
possible exercise date. This flexibility in the exercise time directly raises the question to the owner
under which circumstances it is profitable to exercise the option prior to maturity. In order to find
the optimal time to exercise the option, she has to constantly weigh the payoffs obtained from an
immediate exercise and the corresponding loss of the purchasing right against the probable price
evolution of the underlying as well as potentially due dividend payments.
Within option pricing theory it is generally assumed that the price evolution of an option is merely
a function of the price development of the underlying and of time. The most important factors that
have an influence on the option price are consequently:
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• The current price (spot price) of the underlying St
• The volatility of the underlying σ
• The exercise price P
• The time to maturity T
• The interest rate r
• Due dividend payments D
From equation (6.1) it becomes clear that the option value is positively correlated with the price of
the underlying St and furthermore increases with decreasing strike price P . Whereas for European
call options no general statement for the influence of the time to maturity T on the option value can
be derived, for American call options a longer time to maturity causes an augmentation in option
value. This is due to the fact that the right to exercise the option is valid for a longer time period
which in turn increases the probability that the spot price St will surpass the strike price P .
The volatility σ of the underlying is an important measure for the uncertainty in its price develop-
ment over time. With increasing volatility the probability that the stock price fluctuates in both
directions increases, which generally has a positive influence on the option value. This follows from
the asymmetric payoff structure of the option, i.e. the owner takes the full benefits from a positive
development of the underlying while she is safe against adverse evolutions and can lose maximally
the price she expended for the option.
The risk free interest rate r affects the price of an option in a less clear cut way. A higher risk free
interest rate implies that investors generally demand higher expected returns from the stock. In
addition, the present value of any future cash flow received by the holder of the option decreases.
The combined effect on the option price is generally positive1 [120].
Dividend payments D normally cause a reduction in the option value because the owner of the
option does not profit from dividend payments, while they are at the same time anticipated in the
price of the underlying. Table 6.1 summarizes the influences on the option value schematically.
6.1.2 The Binomial Model of Cox Ross and Rubinstein
After the basics about options as well as the influencing factors on the option price have been
provided in the last section, it is now discussed how the option price may be determined explicitly
on basis of an option pricing model. The subsequently introduced option pricing model of Cox,
Ross and Rubinstein [57] is built on the principle of arbitrage free pricing, that requires a short
explanation.
In finance, the term "arbitrage" characterizes a market transaction that involves no negative cash
flows at any temporal state and a positive cash flow in at least one state. In simpler terms, arbitrage
corresponds to a risk free profit [37]. In the simplest case, arbitrage can be realized by buying an
1Here it is assumed that the interest rate changes while all other variables, such as the price of the underlying,
remain constant. In practice, when interest rates rise, stock prices tend to fall. Therefore, the overall effect of an
interest rate increase and the accompanied stock price decrease remains ambiguous.
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Parameter European American
call option call option
Price of underlying + +
Strike price − −
Time to maturity ? +
Volatility + +
Interest rate + +
Dividends − −
Table 6.1: Influences on the option price
asset at a low price on one market and reselling it simultaneously on another market for a higher
price. Thus, the risk free profit is obtained by taking advantage of a price differential between two
or more markets. In a perfect capital market in equilibrium state2, that is in particular free of
information- and transaction cost, the absence of arbitrage directly follows [86]. The absence of
arbitrage is the first necessary condition of arbitrage free pricing and directly implies the so called
"law of one price" that may be formulated as follows [36]:
If two financial positions A and B that lead to the same payoffs zsA,t = z
s
B,t at every future point in
time t under all envisioned potential future situations s, they need to be traded at the same price if
the capital market is in equilibrium.
The second necessary condition for arbitrage free pricing is the assumption of a complete capital
market. A complete capital market is given, when there are as many distinctive financial positions
with linear independent payoff vectors as there are possible future outcomes [53]. Under this premise,
every possible cash flow may perfectly be replicated by constructing an adequate replicating portfolio.
Is the composition of the replicating portfolio as well as the market prices of all contained positions
known, the law of one price is employable to determine the price of the replicated cash flow.
Under the presumption of perfect and complete capital markets in equilibrium, the Binomial Model
of Cox, Ross and Rubinstein is now introduced. It belongs to the class of discrete option pricing
models, implying that the value of the option and that of the underlying are only permitted to
change at discrete points in time. Moreover are the stochastic variables, that are considered in the
model, restricted to adopt particular predefined values only. Thus, it follows that the underlying,
that is assumed to be a stock in the following, can only take two values in the respective next period
when departing from the current quoting S0:
Su1 = S0 · (1 + u) or Sd1 = S0 · (1 + d) (6.2)
In this respect, u > 0 generally describes the case of an upturn in the stock quoting ("up"), whereas
−1 < d < 0 represents a downturn in the stock price ("down"). If φ denotes the probability of
an upturn in the stock price, 1 − φ must capture the probability of a downturn as there are only
two possible value developments of the stock price in the change from one period to another. For a
2Implies the absence of taxes and transaction cost, information efficiency, perfect competition and rational behavior
of all market participants [206].
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European call option on the stock S with strike price P and execution time T , the exercise payoff
in case of an upturn or downturn respectively is given through:
Cu1 = max {Su1 − P, 0} = max {S0(1 + u)− P, 0} (6.3)
Cd1 = max
{
Sd1 − P, 0
}
= max {S0(1 + d)− P, 0} (6.4)
Because there are only two possible outcomes in t = 1, the option’s payoffs are reproducible by
means of two positions with linear independent cash flows. This is done by constructing a replicating
portfolio out of ∆ stock shares S and investing B units in a bond at the risk free interest rate r:
∆ · S0 · (1 + u) +B · (1 + r) = Cu1 (6.5)
∆ · S0 · (1 + d) +B · (1 + r) = Cd1 (6.6)
Subtracting the second equation from the first allows for an elimination of B:
∆ · S0 · (u− d) = Cu1 − Cd1 (6.7)
⇒ ∆ = C
u
1 − Cd1
S0 · (u− d) ⇒ B =
Cd1 · (1 + u)− Cu1 · (1 + d)
(u− d) · (1 + r) (6.8)
By construction the replicating portfolio now leads to the same cash flows as the call option under
all possible circumstances, so that the law of one price implies that the value of the portfolio in t = 0
must be equal to the price of the call option C0 . The latter is then easily calculated by taking ∆
and B into account:
C0 = ∆ · S0 +B = 11 + r · (C
u
1 ·
r − d
u− d − C
d
1 ·
u− r
u− d) (6.9)
Denoting r−du−d =: p, this option price formula simplifies to:
C0 =
1
1 + r
· (Cu1 · p− Cd1 · (1− p)) (6.10)
This expression resembles an expected value, that is being discounted by the risk free interest rate
r. If p ∈ (0, 1) was the probability that the stock price moved upwards, equation (6.10) would
correspond to the option pricing formula of a risk neutral investor. In fact, p must be identical to φ
in a risk neutral world. This is due to the fact that a risk neutral investor evaluates the stock only
on basis of its expected value, implying that the expected return on the stock must be equal to the
risk free interest rate r, so that the identity p = φ must hold:
E(
S1 − S0
S0
) = φ · u+ (1− φ) · d =: r ⇒ φ = r − d
u− d = p (6.11)
This equation illustrates an important general principle in option pricing theory known as risk neutral
valuation. The principle states, that it is permissible to assume that the world is risk neutral when
pricing an option. The price that is obtained is correct not just in a risk neutral world but in the real
world under arbitrary risk preferences as well. This can be verified by emphasizing that equation
(6.10) has been derived only by relying on arbitrage free pricing, without employing a risk neutrality
requirement. Under non risk neutral preferences, p constitutes the artificial probability of an upturn,
which is to be clearly distinguished from the real upturn probability φ. Remarkable is at this point,
142 CHAPTER 6. UNCERTAINTY - THE REAL OPTION APPROACH
that the true probabilities φ and 1 − φ for the two possible states of stock price development are
not being accounted for in the option pricing formula. The reason for this is, that the option price
is not valued in absolute terms but in terms of the underlying stock price. Consequently, as the
expectations of the market participants with respect to the stock price development are already
included in the current stock quoting, it is not necessary to consider them again when valuing the
option in terms of the stock price [120].
The above described one period Binomial Model can now be generalized to the n period case.
This intention in mind it is assumed that the parameters u and d characterizing the stock price
development remain constant in each of the considered periods. In this way it is assured that an up
move followed by a down move in two consecutive periods lead to the same stock price as if first a
down move and then an up move had occurred. The stock price development is best illustrated by
means of a binomial tree that visualizes the stock price evolution over time, as depicted in Figure
6.2. Hereby, each node of the binomial tree represents a possible stock price resulting from different
combinations of up- and downturns in the single periods.
Figure 6.2: The Binomial Model of the underlying’s price development for n periods
The artificial risk neutral probability p of an up move in a single period is to be calculated absolutely
analogously to the one period case:
p =
r − d
u− d ∈ (0, 1) (6.12)
By means of (6.12) and simple combinatorics it is now possible to calculate the probability that the
stock price in period n will be equal to S0 · (1 + u)k · (1 + d)n−k in a risk neutral world, after k up
and n− k down movements have taken place:
n!
k!(n− k)! · p
k · (1− p)n−k =
(n
k
)
· pk · (1− p)n−k (6.13)
The remaining task is to determine the option price for each node of the binomial tree. After k up
and n− k down moves the following expression holds for the option price after n periods:
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Ck,n−kT = max
{
S0 · (1 + u)k · (1 + d)n−k − P, 0
}
(6.14)
Now, following the rationale of risk free pricing, this option value at time T is taken into account to
determine the current option price C0 at t = 0 by discounting the expected payoffs that have been
determined by means of the risk free probabilities p:
C0 =
1
(1 + r)n
·
n∑
k=1
(n
k
)
· pk · (1− p)n−k · Ck,n−kT (6.15)
In analogy to the single period case it can be shown that the option pricing formula (6.15) is also valid
in real world applications with arbitrary risk attitudes other than risk neutrality. This is achieved
by relying on the law of one price and constructing an adequate replicating portfolio. Here it has to
be emphasized, that the replicating portfolio is held for the duration of one period only. After this,
the composition of the portfolio needs to be modified to precisely duplicate the development of the
option price in the next period. In the absence of transaction cost, which may be taken for granted
due to the presumption of a perfect capital market, the portfolio adjustment in each period is self
financed, meaning that in each period only changes in the composition of stock shares and risk free
bond investment take place, without causing any cost [57].
The above listed prerequisites of the Binomial Model are limiting the applicability of the option
pricing formula (6.15) in practice. Although the model is extendable in several directions, this often
goes in line with complex computational requirements. But the simplified and time discrete modeling
may also be looked upon as one of the model’s advantages. Through simple backtracking even more
complex problems of option pricing can be solved. Examples that are of particular interest in the
following are the inclusion of dividend payments on the underlying or the pricing of an American
call option that may be exercised at any time before expiration.
For this purpose, firstly a tree similar to that of Figure 6.2 of possible future states is constructed,
based on which the option price at expiration time T is easily obtained. Like before, by means of
risk neutral pricing, the option prices at all nodes in period n−1 are then easily calculated. Through
gradual repetition of this procedure the root of the tree may eventually be reached, delivering the
current option price. In addition, it has to be decided at each node if it pays to exercise the option
prior to expiration.
6.2 Public Risk Reduction Opportunities as Real Options
The opportunity to invest in a risk reduction intervention within preventive disaster management
can be interpreted as an American call option on the project. Hereby, the public decision maker
represents the owner of the option that has to decide whether to invest immediately or to postpone
the investment decision to some future point in time when better information is available. Because
she has the authorization to freely decide about the time when to initiate the project, she will
instantly invest only if the measure is judged to be cost efficient with adequate reliability.
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Should the expected value of the estimated benefits only slightly exceed the investment cost and is
there significant uncertainty involved in the benefit estimation process, it might be advantageous
to postpone the investment to a later point. In this manner, the additional disposable time may
be used to perform a detailed analysis to improve the information basis about the hazard and the
efficiency of the risk reduction project.
Now, the analogy between public risk reduction possibilities and American call options is further
illustrated with the objective to finally obtain a discrete pricing formula for the specific real option
based on the Binomial Model of Cox, Ross and Rubinstein.
6.2.1 The Option Analogy of Investment Opportunities
In the (real) option analogy the risk reduction project under investigation corresponds to the stock
on which the option contract is being issued. The value of the underlying risk reduction project is
equal to the monetized social benefits that are expected to result from the reduced disaster risk. In
Chapter 2 it has been outlined that these benefits are given by the monetized reduced disaster losses
of all four consequence categories. Following the notation of Chapter 2, the total benefits BT of the
risk reduction project sum up to:
BT = Becon +Bhum +Benv +BCSH (6.16)
Here, in particular the benefit component Bhum corresponds to the social WTP for safety derived
in the last two chapters. The total value of the risk reduction project at time t is then given by the
net present value (NPV) of all the benefits that occur after t:
St =
T∑
x=t
BTx
(1 + r)x−t
(6.17)
Here, the planning horizon may also be infinite, i.e. T = ∞. The benefit estimation must always
be performed on basis of imperfect information and therefore represents just an approximation
of the true value. The true value however, is hardly assessable due to the numerous aleatoric
uncertainties involved. What may be done instead is to improve the knowledge about the hazard
induced endangerment by collecting more information and thus, to reduce the epistemic uncertainty.
Then, under an improved information basis, the estimated social benefits of the risk reduction
intervention may have to be properly adjusted. Because the direction of the adjustment cannot be
foreseen in advance and depends on the specific outcome of the study, the value of the risk reduction
project St will have to be modeled by means of a stochastic process that best describes the possible
evolution of the discounted expected benefits over time.
Smaller scatterings in the value of the risk reduction project might be imposed by slight changes
in the basic parameters, such as market prices of certain assets or a change in interest rates. In
addition, also newly acquired information about the expected effectiveness of the measure contribute
to fluctuations in the value. This new information might be obtained from performing a more detailed
study on the risk, from latest research cognitions or from a more exhaustive data collection on past
events. For all these reasons, the estimated value of the project must be continuously updated to
perfectly go in line with the actual level of information.
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In the following, all these and other imaginable influences on the social evaluation of the benefits are
termed "steady information gains". In the short term, these information gains generally have only a
small influence on the value of the risk reduction project, in the long term they might accumulate to
significant changes in value though. In the considered Binomial Model these local up- or down moves
are incorporated by multiplying the social value of the risk reduction project St at any discrete time
step by the factors (1 + u) or (1 + d), respectively.
Figure 6.3: Value evolution of the risk reduction project over time
In sharp contrast to small value adjustments imposed by steady information gains is the information
gain that results from the occurrence of a natural disaster and its immediate aftermaths. The
occurrence of an extreme event might have a tremendous influence on the risk reduction project,
causing an abrupt change in its value. Valuable data about the characteristics of the extreme event
are collected, a large amount of information about the damages and losses is obtained and people’s
risk awareness instantly increases, generally leading to a higher WTP for protection.
All these impacts on the social value of the risk reduction project St are being referred to as "disaster
imposed information gains" in the following. It is not possible to predict in which direction the
social value of the (still not executed) project will change. It is thinkable that the natural event just
highlights the necessity to treat the risk. On the other hand it might be possible, that the occurrence
of the disaster and the newly acquired information show, that the risk reduction intervention would
not have been effective anyway. Even a loss of the investment possibility is imaginable, for instance
if a building that should have been rehabilitated against earthquake load has collapsed.
A possible evolution of the value of the public risk reduction project over time is depicted in Figure
6.3. At the beginning of the project evaluation, the project value is estimated to be S0. Smaller value
adjustments due to steady information gains are represented by the constant zigzagging movements
between the three abrupt value changes at t1, t2 and t3. The three jumps in the value development
are due to disaster imposed information gains. At t1 the value is sharply corrected downwards as
it turned out that the value of the project has been overestimated in the first assessment. In t2 in
contrast, the value makes a significant jump upwards as the new disaster information showed that
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the measure could have prevented significant losses. In point t3 the value of the project approaches
zero as the disaster occurrence led to the destruction of the assets that should have been protected
by the measure.
American call option Social real option
(on a stock) (on a RR-project)
Stock quotation S Social value of RR-project
Strike price P Investment cost
Expiration time T Time for which RR-project
is possible
Risk free interest rate r Social discount rate
Dividends D Forgone benefits from
delaying the project
Table 6.2: The option analogy of risk reduction projects
The probability that a natural disaster occurs during a discrete time step is denoted as "disaster
probability" Ψ in the following. It is further assumed that Ψ will remain constant over all considered
time steps. The sudden jump in the change of the value of the social risk reduction project is
integrated by means of a jump factor 1 + Y . As neither the size nor the direction of change is
predictable, Y represents a random variable. Therefore, a conditional probability function has to be
defined, that describes the size of the jump in case of disaster occurrence. If it is hypothesized that
all deterministic developments are anticipated in the current value of the risk reduction measure,
the expected value change will be zero, so that Ey(Y ) = 0 holds. Theoretically, all values Y ≥ 0
are thinkable, even the total loss of the investment opportunity is feasible, leading to Y = −1
(multiplication of the project value by 0).
The value of the public risk reduction project is estimated under best available information and
permits an interpretation in terms of the daily quotation St of the underlying. The life cycle cost
of the risk reduction measure CT , to be determined as discussed in Chapter 2, corresponds to the
strike price P . The time for which the risk reduction investment opportunity persists is equivalent
to the time to maturity T . This time may be finite, for instance for a building that has a limited
service life, or the opportunity to invest never expires or at least not in a predictable time horizon.
In the latter case T → ∞ is fulfilled. Table 6.2 summarizes the option analogy of risk reduction
opportunities.
Once a risk reduction project has been postponed, there is always the possibility that a natural
disaster occurs in the meantime that could have been prevented or at least confined by an imple-
mentation in time. The losses that occur in this case are to be accounted for by means of lost profits
in the model. This is being recognized by introducing a dividend payment D on the underlying
that is discharged to its owner. For the holder of the option this dividend is lost. Problematically is
hereby, that the dividend payment occurs at unknown times in the future as well as in not foreseeable
amounts.
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Such a stochastic dividend payment cannot be accounted for in established option pricing models:
in the evaluation of options on stocks it is usually assumed that future dividend payments are
announced in advance and are thus anticipated by the market. The risk reduction measure however,
may only be evaluated by means of the expected reduced losses that occur statistically every year -
if at all and when these reduced disaster losses actually occur is not predictable and can therefore
not influence the investment decision.
The longer the implementation of the risk reduction investment is postponed, the higher is the
probability that losses will occur, that could have been prevented by an execution of the measure
in time. Therefore, it seems only logical to incorporate the forgone benefits in terms of forgone
reduced losses on basis of an annual dividend payment D. The expectation towards the reduced
disaster losses is changing over time, making a continuous adjustment of the project value necessary.
Consequently, also the expectations towards the dividend payment are changing in the same way,
so that it is modeled proportionally to the total value of the risk reduction measure. The size of the
dividend payment relative to the absolute value of the project however, is assumed to be constant
over time.
6.2.2 Prerequisites for Applying Real Option Theory
The above illustrated analogy between a financial call option and the possibility to invest in a public
risk reduction project suggests to evaluate the project by means of financial option pricing models
to account for the flexibility and uncertainty involved in the project decision. To proceed in this
way, it has to be investigated firstly, if the prerequisites for applying real options theory are met. A
detailed discussion on this issue is provided in [141]. Here, just the main points are discussed.
A necessary condition for arbitrage free pricing is that the cash flows of the real option’s underlying,
i.e. of the risk reduction project, are replicable by the cash flows of financial instruments that are
traded on free markets. Because social risk reduction projects are not traded on markets, the real
option on the project cannot be replicated simply by the underlying and a risk free bond, as it is
done with options on stocks. Therefore, the existence of a traded asset having identical cash flows
like the risk reduction project is often assumed. In reality however, it will hardly be possible to find
such a "twin security" on the market. Also the alternative assumption of market completeness (see
Section 6.1.2), which would in principle guarantee the replicability of an arbitrary cash flow, is at
least questionable.
If real option pricing is understood as an extension of conventional investment theory in contrast,
the real option can simply be replicated by a portfolio consisting of a risk free bond and the risk
reduction project without the flexibility about the investment timing. The evaluation of the current
value of the project, representing the current quote S0, can then be carried out by relying on classical
methods to evaluate investments, whereas the flexibility is priced by means of option pricing. As
neither the real option nor the risk reduction project are traded on the market, the discussion
of arbitrage free pricing is a pure theoretical issue. Nevertheless, the replicability assumption is
justifiable at least in the sense that it is rather common in "inflexible" investment appraisal. Within
the latter it is just attempted to guess the price that a non traded project would have on the free
market [141]. It has to be emphasized however, that the evaluation of the option price on non traded
investment projects on basis of arbitrage free pricing is to be seen just as an approximation.
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Another important assumption for the applicability of real option theory is the full or at least
partial irreversibility of the investment cost. The irreversibility of public risk reduction projects has
been discussed in Chapter 2.6. If the investment cost was fully reversible, the evaluation of the
flexibility to postpone the investment would become superfluous and a project appraisal by means
of conventional investment theory would be sufficient.
Additionally, it is necessary that the investment option is exclusive for the owner, meaning that its
value is not influenced by decisions of competitors. In case of public risk reduction projects this
condition is straightforwardly fulfilled as they are not carried out under competition.
Finally, interactions between several distinctive investment projects as well as between single steps
to be undertaken within one particular project have to be excluded (no inter- and intra-project
interactions). If this prerequisite is violated, the option pricing approach has to be extended to
evaluate several interdependent real options. In principle this would be possible, but comes at the
cost of increased complexity.
In the following, the stated prerequisites for applying real option theory are assumed to be fulfilled.
Only the first assumption about the replicability of the project’s cash flows by traded assets has to
be considered as being critical. Accordingly, the application of pricing models that have been derived
under free market conditions in the context of public project appraisal may be challenged. But then
also the application of several models of conventional investment theory, such as the discounting of
a project’s cash flows on basis of a risk adjusted interest rate, has to be questioned as it relies on
similar or at least related assumptions.
6.3 Discrete Pricing Model for the Special Real Option
After the option analogy of public disaster risk reduction opportunities has been discussed, this
section aims at deriving a concrete price for the flexibility inherent in the project decision. If a
discrete random process is considered to be appropriate to describe the value development of the
public risk reduction project, the impact of steady information gains can be modeled by relying on
the Binomial Model of Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (see Section 6.1.2). The jumps in the project’s
value evolution due to disaster imposed information gains are accounted for by means of a special
discrete approach developed by Amin [9].
6.3.1 Derivation of a Discrete Pricing Formula
In order to derive a discrete pricing model for the real option it is started with the construction
of a portfolio consisting of the real option Ct itself, ∆ parts of the investment project St without
flexibility and an investment B in a risk free bond with interest rate r. Under the premise that the
portfolio is self financed, the portfolio value at construction time t is zero:
Vt = ∆ · St +B + Ct = 0 (6.18)
As discussed in Section 6.2.1, the expected forgone risk reduction benefits are modeled by a constant
dividend payment on the underlying that is paid in any period, also without the actual occurrence
of a natural disaster. The size of the dividend payment is assumed to be proportional to the project
value St, that is determined on basis of the best available information in the respective period, and
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will be included by means of a dividend rate D. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that the value
of the risk reduction project due to newly available information only changes at the end of each
period. The total amount of dividend payment at t + 1 is consequently calculated by multiplying
the dividend rate D with the project value of the previous period St. Therefore, the value of the
total portfolio under both possible developments without disaster occurrence is obtained by:
V ut+1 = ∆ · St · (1 + u+D) +B · (1 + r) + Cut+1 (6.19)
V dt+1 = ∆ · St · (1 + d+D) +B · (1 + r) + Cdt+1 (6.20)
As in the Binomial Model of Cox, Ross and Rubinstein it is assumed that the value of the portfolio
is known for the duration of one period, given that in this period no disaster occurs. Consequently,
the portfolio value after a local up move V ut+1 must be equal to the portfolio value after a local down
move V dt+1. A subtraction of equation (6.20) from equation (6.19) allows for an elimination of B:
∆ · St = −
Cut+1 − Cdt+1
u− d (6.21)
⇒ B = 1
1 + r
·
[
(Cut+1 − Cdt+1) ·
1 + u+D
u− d − C
u
t+1
]
(6.22)
These expressions for ∆ and B may then be inserted in equation (6.18), yielding:
Vt = − 11 + r ·
Cut+1 · (r −D)− du− d︸ ︷︷ ︸
=p
+Cdt+1 ·
u− (r −D)
u− d︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(1−p)
+ Ct = 0 (6.23)
A closer look at equation (6.23) clarifies that it has been deviated from the Binomial Model in
Section 6.2 only in so far as the risk free interest rate r within the risk neutral probabilities p has
been reduced by the dividend payment D. In the model of Cox, Ross and Rubinstein such a risk
free portfolio, that has zero value in t, must also be valueless in t + 1. In the considered case on
the contrary, the possibility of natural disaster occurrence must be accounted for in the modeling of
the portfolio value development. In this respect it may be shown, that it is impossible to perfectly
replicate options on underlyings whose price development follows a stochastic jump process. A
dynamic portfolio adjustment cannot be self financed in periods where jumps occur [179].
This follows immediately from the fact that the compound stochastic process permits more than two
possibilities in the value development in each period. Therefore, it is impossible for the investor to
make her portfolio safe against value jumps on basis of two linear independent assets only. In order
to be safeguarded, there must be as many financial instruments with linear independent cash flows
as there are possible outcomes. Consequently, as the construction of a save portfolio is not possible
in the considered case, the option price cannot be derived on basis of arbitrage free pricing only. An
additional assumption for the case of disaster occurrence is required.
Up to now, no assumption has been made with respect to the risk attitude of the public decision
maker. In the realm of public project decision making under uncertainty it is often referred to
the Arrow Lind Theorem [15] in literature. The latter postulates that the public authority should
150 CHAPTER 6. UNCERTAINTY - THE REAL OPTION APPROACH
decide on risky projects under risk neutrality, as it is capable of bearing the risk itself through risk
pooling and risk spreading, see for instance [164]. This implies that a decision should be made
by taking only the expected value of the cash flows into consideration, while completely neglecting
the uncertainty inherent in their estimation. While some authors generally take the validity of the
Arrow Lind Theorem for granted in particular for governments of industrialized western countries
[115], there are other voices that are convinced of the opposite [142]. Brent [35] for instance states
that for public investments the theorem is unlikely to hold and therefore a risk adjustment must
necessarily be conducted in the cost and benefit estimation.
Relying on the Arrow Lind Theorem is not very useful in the present context as a neglect of uncer-
tainty would make a postponement of the investment only necessary, if the project was not profitable
on basis of expected values, i.e. if the expected cost was higher than the expected benefits. This
in turn would make an evaluation by means of a real option approach superfluous. As a matter of
fact, even if the expected net project value is positive, a postponement of the investment might still
be advantageous if it is likely that there will be better information about the cash flows available in
the future, and thus uncertainty about the project development can be reduced.
The value of the investment flexibility should therefore preferably be estimated on basis of arbitrage
free pricing only and therefore without restricting assumptions concerning the public risk attitudes.
With respect to the disaster imposed information gains in contrast, i.e. the jump component of the
stochastic process, risk neutrality is assumed in the following. Accordingly, they are included only by
means of their expected values. This approach may be justified in particular if the disaster probability
is comparatively low and if rather small postponement intervals to acquire better information about
the disaster are considered. Under this assumption, the option value can be calculated in terms of
an expected value, relying on the artificial probabilities for the occurrence of local information gains,
while taking the true probability for the disaster occurrence into account.
To finally determine the option price, firstly the portfolio development is to be modeled for all
possible outcomes in t + 1. For local information gains this is done by a combination of equations
(6.18), (6.19) and (6.21):
V
u/d
t+1 = C
u
t+1 · p+ Cdt+1 · (1− p)− Ct · (1 + r) (6.24)
The portfolio value in case of disaster occurrence is determined as follows:
V˜ yt+1 = ∆ · St ·
[
(1 + Y˜ ) +D
]
+B · (1 + r) + C˜yt+1
= −C
u
t+1 − Cdt+1
u− d ·
[
Y˜ − (r −D)
]
− (1 + r) · Ct + C˜yt+1
(6.25)
This value is a random variable as the size of the multiplicative jump factor Y˜ is entering the equation
stochastically. In the following, it is denoted Ey for the expected value operator with respect to
the probability distribution of Y˜ conditional on the disaster occurrence Ψ. As discussed above it
is assumed that Ey[Y˜ ] = 0. The value of Ey[C˜
y
t+1] in contrast is unknown due to the asymmetric
payoff function of the call option and is to be determined dependent on the value of the investment
project in the previous period St. By taking the periodical probability of disaster occurrence Ψ into
account, the expected portfolio value at t+ 1 is calculated under all possible outcomes:
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E
[
V˜t+1
]
= (1−Ψ) · V u/dt+1 + Ψ · Ey
[
V˜ yt+1
]
= (1−Ψ) ·
[
Cut+1 · p+ Cdt+1 · (1− p)− Ct · (1 + r)
]
+ Ψ ·
[
(Cut+1 − Cdt+1) ·
r −D
u− d + Ey
[
C˜yt+1
]
− Ct · (1 + r)
] (6.26)
Under the assumption of risk neutrality with respect to disaster imposed information gains, the
public decision maker will value the considered portfolio equal to a fictive second portfolio, that
leads to the same cash flows with certainty. A portfolio that was self financed at time t must be
valueless at any time in the future due to the absence of arbitrage. This implies, that portfolio
value (6.26) may be equalized to zero. From this observation the first formula for the option price
is obtained:
Ct =
1
1 + r
·
[
(1−Ψ) ·
(
Cut+1 · p+ Cdt+1 · (1− p)
)
+ Ψ ·
(
(Cut+1 − Cdt+1) ·
r −D
u− d + Ey
[
C˜yt+1
])
]
(6.27)
By defining new artificial probabilities p′, this option pricing formula can substantially be simplified.
In this respect, equation (6.27) is rearranged in a way that the option values are ordered according
to the different possible outcomes in t+ 1:
(1 + r) · Ct = Ψ · Ey[C˜yt+1] + (1−Ψ) · [Cut+1 · p′ + Cdt+1 · (1− p′)] (6.28)
Consequently, the new artificial probabilities are given through:
p′ =
r−D
1−Ψ − d
u− d and 1− p
′ =
u− r−D1−Ψ
u− d (6.29)
As a result, the option price is again derived from risk free pricing, even if this time the artificial
probabilities for up and down moves could not be obtained on basis of arbitrage free pricing only.
The value Ct is to be interpreted as the value of the decision to postpone the investment for at
least one more period and thus, to keep the option alive. As the considered option constitutes an
American call option, it has to be constantly evaluated, if an early execution of the option and thus
the decision to immediately invest is optimal. Therefore, expression (6.27) needs to be extended to
the following form:
Ct = max
{
St − P, 11 + r ·
(
Ψ · Ey[C˜yt+1] + (1−Ψ) ·
[
Cut+1 · p′ + Cdt+1 · (1− p′)
])}
(6.30)
In each period a decision has to be made between investing immediately and thus exercising the
option or to postpone the investment decision to the next period by keeping the option alive. In
the first case the project value St less the investment cost CT = P is obtained. The decision to
postpone the investment should be made in contrast, if the value of keeping the option alive is higher
than the profit resulting from an instant investment. This weigh out between investing immediately
and postponing the investment is influenced by all future optimal decisions as they are already
anticipated in the current option value, as indicated by the recursive structure of equation (6.30).
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6.3.2 Solution Approaches for Real Options of Finite and Infinite Duration
Is the investment opportunity valid for a finite number of periods, it is possible to determine the
option price at any point in time through backwards induction starting from expiration time T .
However, sometimes it might be possible to postpone the investment arbitrarily in the future so
that the investment opportunity never expires or at least not for a predictable number of periods.
Nevertheless, also in case of infinite expiration time T →∞ it is possible to determine the optimal
investment strategy. In this respect, it is made use of the repetitive structure of the decision process
that is implicit in equation (6.30). Real options with infinite durations have a value that is actually
independent of the decision point t, implying that a recursive form of equation (6.30) may be used to
price the option. The value of the investment opportunity surely is still dependent on the estimation
of the social value of the project S that is estimated with best available information. If S˜′ is denoted
for the estimated value of the project in the next period, the option can be priced by:
C(S) = max
{
S − P, E[C(S˜
′)|S]
1 + r
}
(6.31)
This equation follows the Bellman optimality principle [24], which characterizes the property of
an optimal policy. It says that whatever the initial state and initial decision are, the remaining
decisions must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decision
(as expressed by the Bellman equation) [22]. This optimality principle is related to the concept
of optimal substructure and fundamental within dynamic programming. It allows breaking down
a dynamic optimization problem into simpler subproblems, by assessing the value of a decision
problem at a certain point in time in terms of the payoff from some initial choices and the value of
the remaining decision problem that results from these initial choices.
Therefore, the Bellman principle allows to comprise all future decisions in a so called continuation
value. In the considered case this corresponds to the value of the investment possibility if the
decision to postpone the investment is made and may be calculated in dependency of S by taking
equation (6.27) into account. The decision with respect to the optimal investment timing is then
characterized as a classical optimal stopping problem, which is concerned with determining the
optimal time to take action. Stopping in the considered case means initiating the investment and
therefore to terminate the decision process.
Dixit and Pindyck [67] show that for such a problem a threshold value S∗ for the estimated value
of the social risk reduction project exists, from which onwards an immediate investment becomes
optimal. Consequently, for all estimated values of the risk reduction project satisfying S > S∗ an
immediate investment is optimal, whereas in the case S < S∗ it is optimal to postpone the investment
for at least another period. If equality S = S∗ is given, there is indifference between the two actions.
The threshold value S∗ may be calculated numerically by means of the recursive pricing formula. In
this respect, based on a reasonably defined starting function C(S) not only the threshold value but
also the option price function must be determined iteratively until equation (6.31) holds.
Is the value of the risk reduction project S without the flexibility to postpone the investment
estimated to be higher than the threshold value S∗, an immediate initiation of the project becomes
the optimal decision. Consequently, the new decision rule leads to different results in comparison the
conventional NPV criterion in all cases where P < S < S∗ and the threshold value S∗ is calculated
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to be higher than the investment cost CT = P . Therefore, the difference S∗ −P corresponds to the
value of the possibility to postpone the investment.
6.4 Discussion
The methodology developed in this chapter constitutes a first move in applying financial real option
theory to the management of natural disaster risk. The cost and benefits of natural disaster risk
reduction projects are subject to substantial uncertainties that have to be properly accounted for
in the project decision. With the possibility to delay the investment initiation to a future point in
time, new information can be acquired that allows a more precise estimation of the project’s cash
flows. This reduction in epistemic uncertainties reduces the risk of misinvestment and has a value
that is to be included in the appraisal, but comes at the price that a natural disaster might occur
in the meantime that could have been confined by a project implementation in time.
The theoretical basis for the suggested approach has been presented by introducing the discrete
Binomial Option Pricing Model of Cox, Ross and Rubinstein. It has been demonstrated that the
possibility to invest in a public risk reduction project permits an interpretation in terms of an option
that the public authority possesses to acquire the project, similar to that the owner of a financial
call option has on buying the underlying. By modeling the social value of the risk reduction project
as the stock quotation, the investment cost as the strike price and the time for which the investment
possibility exists as the expiration time, the risk reduction project has been integrated in the option
pricing context.
The possibility that a natural disaster occurs during a postponement of the investment has been
accounted for by introducing a regular dividend payment that is proportional to the social value of
the risk reduction project. In this way, forgone benefits in terms of reduced disaster losses could
be integrated in the model. By defining a stochastic process that describes the evolution of the
project’s social price over time on basis of steady and disaster imposed information gains, eventually
a discrete pricing formula for the value to postpone the investment has been derived.
The limitations of the suggested approach have clearly been outlined. An application of financial
real option theory to public project appraisal certainly goes in line with the requirement that the
prerequisites for applying real option theory are fulfilled. Critical in this respect was the assumption
that the project’s cash flows could be replicated by the cash flows of a twin security that is traded on
free markets or alternatively, the assumption of market completeness. The replicability of the cash
flows must be satisfied in order to be able to rely on arbitrage free pricing, which is the fundamental
principle of option pricing theory. In reality however, the replicability assumption is a rather strong
requirement that will hardly be fulfilled. Therefore, the above presented derivation of the option
price is to be seen as an approximation only.
The second encountered difficulty constituted the incorporation of disaster imposed information
gains in the model as they caused the social value of the risk reduction project to jump in arbitrary
directions and amounts. This further contributed to the complexity to construct a dynamic repli-
cating portfolio. Therefore, it was assumed that the public decision maker was risk neutral with
respect to the jump component, so that it could be included in the model by means of its expected
value only. In comparison to the often placed hypothesis of public risk neutrality with respect to
the whole project however, this constitutes a relaxation.
154 CHAPTER 6. UNCERTAINTY - THE REAL OPTION APPROACH
So far the derivation of the option pricing methodology has been a purely theoretical exercise. In the
following chapter an application of the real option methodology to public risk mitigation measures
in the flood risk context is presented in order to demonstrate the consistency of the above results.
Chapter 7
Application of the Proposed
Methodology
The final chapter of this thesis is assigned to the task to demonstrate how the introduced risk man-
agement concepts are to be applied in practice by means of two selected case studies. In particular,
the city of San Francisco, California constitutes the subject of study and is investigated with respect
to earthquake risk. For this purpose, different earthquake scenarios are simulated by making use of
the disaster loss estimation program HAZUS [108], developed for the U.S. Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency (FEMA). Firstly, the results of the simulations are employed to assess the total
risk of the city by systematically following the steps of the probabilistic risk management frame-
work. In a next step, two possible public risk reduction interventions are considered that improve
the seismic performance of diverse building classes according to the design levels prescribed by the
U.S. Standards. By assessing the reduced disaster losses and potential cost of the two strategies, it
is decided within a cost benefit analysis (CBA) whether the interventions are socially worthwhile.
In a second illustrative example an application of the real option approach to flood risk manage-
ment is discussed. In particular, the construction of a rain storage reservoir is evaluated by the new
investment criterion and different decision outcomes in comparison to the net present value (NPV)
rule are presented.
7.1 General Information about HAZUS
HAZUS, which stands for "Hazards U.S.", is an integrated computer-based framework developed
by the National Institute of Building Sciences for the FEMA to provide a tool for estimating losses
from natural disasters. In particular, the program enables the assessment of different kinds of losses
in any study region throughout the U.S. due to earthquakes, storms and floods. The earthquake loss
estimation module, which constitutes the focus of the present chapter, provides a decision support
tool for assessing the effects of scenario earthquakes with user-defined magnitude and location. This
forecasting capability allows anticipating the consequences of future seismic events and developing
plans and strategies for risk reduction.
The methodology can be applied to study local, regional and state areas with differently exposed
population. It is designed to produce loss estimates for use by federal, state, regional and local
governments in planning for earthquake risk mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. The
program provides damage and loss estimates in a set of predefined building classes, infrastructural
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elements such as bridges, essential facilities such as hospitals, schools and fire stations, and high
potential loss facilities such as nuclear power plants, dams and military installations. Thus, the pro-
gram covers nearly all aspects of the built environment. Extensive national databases are embedded
within HAZUS, containing information such as population demography in a study region, square
footage for different occupancies of buildings and number and location of essential infrastructures.
HAZUS allows for a profound damage analysis of different system components. The damage of a
structure is described in terms of nature and extent of damage exhibited by its components (beams,
columns, walls, ceilings, piping, etc.). For example, such component damage descriptions as "shear
walls are cracked", "ceiling tiles fell", "diagonal bracing buckled" or "wall panels fell out", used
together with such terms as "some" and "most" would be sufficient to describe the nature and
extent of overall building damage. Accordingly, damage is described by five damage states: none,
slight, moderate, extensive and complete, as visualized in Figure 7.1.
Based on these damage state descriptions, the HAZUS methodology supplies two different damage
functions for each building type and for structural and non-structural damage: fragility curves
that describe the probability of reaching or exceeding different damage states given peak building
response, and building capacity (push-over) curves that are used to determine peak building response.
As the focus of this chapter lies on the estimation of losses, it is referred to the HAZUS technical
manual for further details about damage evaluations [106].
Figure 7.1: Damage state classification [HAZUS User Manual [107]]
In the loss estimation module, HAZUS basically distinguishes between three types of losses: direct
loss, indirect loss and casualties. In the direct economic loss estimation the previously gathered
damage state information is evaluated and converted to monetary units (US$ 1994). The loss
appraisal covers structural and nonstructural repair and replacement costs, the associated loss of
building content and business inventory as well as loss of functionality. The latter includes in
particular business interruption and rental income losses. Indirect economic losses in contrast,
account for possible dislocations in economic sectors not sustaining direct damage. The extent of
such losses depends upon such factors as the availability of alternative sources of supply and markets
for products, the length of the production disturbance and deferability of production. The losses
are given in terms of employment and income effects for the study region and are available up to 15
years after disaster occurrence.
In the assessment of human losses HAZUS takes into account the strong correlation between building
damage (both structural and nonstructural) and the number and severity of casualties. Depending
on earthquake intensities and associated damage states, HAZUS estimates the number of people that
will potentially be injured and killed by the considered earthquake, based on population distribution
data, inventory information (building stock distribution), damage state probabilities and casualty
rates revised from ATC-13 [17]. The casualties are classified into four severity levels that describe
the extent of the injuries and potential fatalities:
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1. Severity Level 1: Injuries that require medical attention but hospitalization is not needed.
2. Severity Level 2: Injuries that require hospitalization but are not considered life-threatening.
3. Severity Level 3: Injuries that require hospitalization and may become life threatening if not
adequately treated.
4. Severity Level 4: Victims are killed by the earthquake.
The casualty estimates are provided for three times of day: 2:00 AM, 2:00 PM and 5:00 PM. These
times represent the periods of the day where different sectors of the community are at their peak
occupancy loads. The 2:00 AM estimate considers that the residential occupancy load is maximum,
the 2:00 PM estimate considers that the educational, commercial and industrial sector loads are
maximum and 5:00 PM represents peak commute time.
To sum up, in a simplified form, the steps to perform a hazard scenario within HAZUS include:
1. The selection of the study area. The region of interest may be created on basis of census tracts,
census blocks, counties or even the whole state.
2. The specification of the magnitude and location of the scenario earthquake. In developing the
scenario earthquake, consideration should be given to potential fault locations.
3. Optionally, the provision of additional information describing local soil and geological condi-
tions.
4. The use of the formulas embedded in HAZUS to compute probability distributions for damage
to different classes of buildings, facilities and lifeline system components.
5. The use of damage and functionality information to compute estimates of direct economic loss,
casualties and shelter needs and indirect economic impacts on the regional economy for the
years following the earthquake.
These steps are now applied for selected earthquakes scenarios affecting the city of San Francisco,
California.
7.2 Seismic Risk Management for the City of San Francisco
In this section, earthquake scenarios corresponding to five different return periods and magnitudes
are simulated for the city of San Francisco, California. These in turn are employed for a total seismic
risk estimation and the identification of risk treatment alternatives by consecutively following the
steps of the probabilistic risk management framework introduced in Chapter 2.
7.2.1 System Definition: Characteristics of the Study Region
As outlined in Chapter 2, the risk management framework starts with the definition of the system
and the identification of risks that might put the functionality of the system in danger. The sole
risk to be analyzed in the following is associated with the occurrence of seismic events in the region
of San Francisco, California. The geographical size of the region is 47.26 square miles and it is
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composed of 176 census tracts, as depicted in Figure 7.2. There are over 329,000 households living
in the region and the total population amounts to 776,733 people (US Census Bureau data for the
year 2000).
Figure 7.2: Map of the study region with census tract boundaries [HAZUS [108]]
The total building stock of the city is composed of an estimated 158,000 buildings with a total
building replacement value of around US$ 84 billion1, excluding contents. Approximately 94% of
the building stock and 73% of the building value are associated with residential housing. The
replacement value of the transportation and utility lifeline systems is estimated to be US$ 2,337 and
US$ 627 million, respectively. However, for reasons of simplicity, damages and losses corresponding
to transportation and utility lifelines are not being accounted for in the subsequent analysis.
7.2.2 Hazard Assessment
In order to initiate the risk analysis procedure, a hazard assessment for the study region has to
be carried out. The first step of hazard assessment constitutes the hazard analysis phase where
the intensity and frequency of earthquake events have to be estimated that are relevant for the
study region. The two elements frequency and intensity are closely related and their modeling often
1Corresponds to US$ 117.5 billion in 2007 dollars.
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requires similar sets of data. One possibility is to rely purely on historical records of past events.
For this purpose, HAZUS provides the possibility to select from a huge database of past events that
are available within the deterministic procedure for simulating earthquake scenarios offered by the
program. By this feature, historical events may be reconstructed and parameters modified to study
potential risk reduction effects.
The second and more extensive procedure to estimate the relevant intensity and frequency param-
eters is to rely on probability distributions that have been constructed on basis of historical data,
expert opinions and statistical techniques that take into account well-established scientific principles
and an understanding of how natural hazards behave. In this way, it is possible to include also rare
extreme events that exceed historical records. For this intent, HAZUS enables characterizing the
ground shaking demand by means of probabilistic seismic hazard contour maps developed by the
United States Geological Survey (USGS). The methodology includes maps for eight probabilistic
hazard levels, ranging from 100-year to 2500-year return periods.
Figure 7.3: Building classification by model building type [HAZUS [108]]
The secondly introduced probabilistic approach has been adopted in the present study. In particular,
five different hazard scenarios have been considered, corresponding to return periods of 100, 250,
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500, 1000 and 2500 years and user defined moment magnitudes of 6.9, 7.2, 7.5, 7.7 and 7.9, respec-
tively. The moment magnitude values have been specifically derived for the city of San Francisco
as proposed in [239]. In particular, the peak ground accelerations (PGA) corresponding to different
exceedance probabilities have been deduced and related to the earthquake magnitudes using the
following equation2:
logPGA = 0.67 + 0.43Mw − 1.08 log(D2e + 72)
1
2 ± 0.35 (7.1)
Formula (7.1) is suitable for moderate to large earthquakes and has been extracted from a huge data
set. In this equation PGA represents the peak ground acceleration measured in g,Mw corresponds to
the moment magnitude, De is the distance to the epicenter in kilometers and the last term expresses
the standard deviation of the predicted value. To determine the distance to the epicenter, a standard
value of 10 km has been assigned, which approximately corresponds to the shortest distance of San
Francisco to the San Andreas fault. The San Andreas fault is a continental transform fault that runs
at a length of around 1,300 km through California and forms the tectonic boundary between the
North American and the Pacific plate. Throughout recorded history it has been observed that the
epicenters of numerous significant earthquakes in California were allocated along the San Andreas
fault [270].
Figure 7.4: Distribution of population and building stock in SF [HAZUS [108]]
As the relevant intensities and frequencies of the earthquake hazards have been estimated, it is
proceeded with the decomposition of the system in the elements at risk (EaR). The elements at
risk subdivision is carried out within the HAZUS program automatically. In particular, buildings
with similar characteristics influencing their structural response are classified into model building
types which correspond to the EaR classes, as outlined in Chapter 2. Typical characteristics of
each model building type are construction material (wood, steel, concrete, masonry), number of
stories and square footage, following the classification system of FEMA 178 [80]. An overview of
the building classification is provided in Figure 7.3. Furthermore, for each EaR class additional
information about occupancy in terms of functional use of the building (residential, commercial,
industrial, educational, etc.), number of occupants, dollar exposure and foundation type is provided.
The total population and building stock exposure distributed over the census tracts is depicted in
Figure 7.4.
2It is worth noting that a number of alternative equations that cover the relationship between PGA and moment
magnitude are available in literature [43], highlighting the fact that there is no general scientific consensus on this
issue.
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The final step in the hazard assessment phase is to convert the hazard intensity occurring at the
epicenter to a hazard load that is affecting the EaR classes. This is partly covered by equation (7.1)
that transforms the moment magnitudeMw into an approximate PGA for the city of San Francisco.
The further evolution of the hazard within the city is carried out by HAZUS automatically, taking
into account local soil and geographical characteristics, so that eventually the hazard load for each
EaR is obtained.
7.2.3 Damage Assessment
A crucial characteristic that significantly influences the performance of a building under seismic
excitation is its seismic design level as dictated by modern codes, such as the 1976 Uniform Building
Code, the 1985 NEHRP Provisions or later editions of these model codes. Model building types may
be designed to either high-code, moderate-code, or low-code seismic standards, or not seismically
designed at all. The program integrated damage functions in terms of capacity and fragility curves
are differentiated with respect to the above mentioned design levels.
The study area of San Francisco is appropriately modeled using building damage functions with a
seismic design level that corresponds to the seismic zone 4 of the 1976 Uniform Building Code or
map area 7 of the 1985 NEHRP Provisions. In areas of high seismicity like San Francisco, buildings
of newer construction (i.e. post 1973) are described by high-code damage functions, while buildings
of older construction are represented by moderate-code damage functions, if built after about 1940,
or mostly by low-code damage functions, if built before about 1940. Accordingly, the whole building
stock of San Francisco consists of 2.2% low-code buildings, 64.5% moderate-code buildings and 33.3%
high-code buildings, which corresponds to a total number of 3,431, 102,076 and 52,802 buildings,
respectively.
Figure 7.5: Damage states for different design levels
In the five different earthquake scenarios that have been simulated for the city of San Francisco,
the total damage of the city’s building stock has been assessed with respect to the damage states
introduced above and damaged buildings have been grouped according to their design code levels. In
Figure 7.5 the simulation results have been processed for the smallest and largest considered event,
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i.e. a 100-year earthquake with a moment magnitude of 6.9 and a 2500-year earthquake with a
moment magnitude of 7.9, respectively. In particular, it is shown for each of the three design levels,
how damage distributes over the considered damage states. Each column in the graph represents
the fraction of buildings falling into a certain damage state relative to the total building population
of each design level in the city.
As expected, the low design buildings exhibit generally much higher probabilities that high damages
will occur across all simulated earthquake scenarios. Whereas for the 100-year event the low code
buildings are almost normally distributed over the damage states, the moderately and even more
the highly designed buildings are heavily skewed to the left, providing a much higher level of safety.
The probability mass of the distribution moves consecutively to the right as the earthquake intensity
is increased and more rare events are considered. This is especially emphasized by the 2500-year
chart, where over 70% of the low designed buildings are expected to collapse, 66% of the moderate
code buildings exhibit moderate or extensive damage, wheras 81% of the highly designed buildings
feature at most moderate damage and thus, still perform very well. A detailed overview of the
damage state results for each considered return period and design level is shown in Appendix F.1.
7.2.4 Loss Assessment
As the damage states across the total building stock of San Francisco have been assessed for the
different earthquake scenarios and processed with respect to the different design levels, the next
step of the risk analysis phase constitutes the estimation of losses that are expected to go in line
with the given damage states. As outlined above, there are in particular three major loss categories
that are assessable within HAZUS: casualties, direct economic losses and indirect economic losses.
With respect to these loss categories, HAZUS generally does not provide the possibility to directly
assign the respective losses to each design level. Instead, losses are supplied by location, occupancy
and building type as well as for the city as a whole by means of global summary reports. As it is
intended to study the effects of public risk reduction interventions in terms of an update of seismic
design codes however, the assignment of losses to design levels is necessary for performing a CBA.
How this has been achieved is explained subsequently for each loss category separately.
Casualties
The casualty estimation has been calibrated with respect to the day time of 2:00 PM, which showed
the most severe results throughout all performed simulations. The casualty data supplied by the
program is available either by occupancy (commercial, residential, etc.) and building type (W1, W2,
etc.), and is subdivided by the above sketched severity levels indicating the degree of injury or fatal
outcome. However, this data was of limited use for the present analysis since no reference to the
design levels is provided. Thus, in order to allocate the casualties to the three building design levels,
the calculation of casualties has been carried out separately. For this purpose, firstly the average
number of occupants per building has been approximated by the following equation:
Average no. of people/building =
Total population of SF
Total no. of buildings
= 4.9 (7.2)
Thus, the simplifying assumption has been made that all inhabitants linger inside buildings at
the moment of disaster occurrence, so that only indoor casualties have been accounted for in the
simulations. Based on this number it has been calculated subsequently, how many people were
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staying in buildings of a certain design level damaged according to a certain damage state. In this
respect, the previously obtained data of the damage assessment phase have been used, which are
summarized in Appendix F.1. Having the average number of occupants per damaged building of each
design level on hand, the casualty rates provided in the HAZUS manual [106] have been employed
to calculate the corresponding number of casualties. The casualty rates indicate the likelihood
of suffering a certain degree of injury when staying in a building of a certain damage state and
are inferred from data statistics and combined with expert opinion. An exemplary table of these
coefficients is provided in Appendix F.6 for the case of extensive building damage. The so obtained
results are summarized in Appendix F.3 for each design level and earthquake scenario.
Figure 7.6: Casualties by design level and hazard scenario
In Figure 7.6 the absolute number of casualties for each design code level is displayed for each
hazard scenario, subdivided by non fatal and fatal casualties. The percentage numbers in brackets
on the axis of abscissae correspond to the fraction of respectively designed buildings relative to San
Francisco’s total building population. This explains the comparatively higher number of injuries and
fatalities within the moderate design class in comparison to the low design class. If the casualties
are scaled per 1000 buildings of the respective design classes in contrast, the expected outcome of
having the greatest number of casualties in the low design class, followed by the moderate and the
high design classes is observed, as shown in Figure 7.7.
In particular, in the move from an average low design class to an average moderate design class
building, a decrease of around 85% in the fatality rate is recorded in media throughout all hazard
scenarios, while the move from an average moderate design to an average high design building leads
to a decrease in the fatality rate of around 80%. Similar observations can be made with respect
to the number of injuries. The total number of fatalities for the lowest considered 100-year event
amount to 234 at city level, while for the highest 2500-year event 2,756 fatalities are recorded.
In order to obtain a statement about the accuracy of the casualty estimates, the separately calculated
results have been summed over the three design levels to assess the casualties at city level, which in
turn have been confronted with the direct output of the program. Throughout all hazard scenarios,
the compliance with the HAZUS results turned out to be sound as the maximum observed deviation
was in the range of 15%.
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Figure 7.7: Fatalities per 1000 buildings of respective design class
Direct Economic Losses
In the assessment of direct economic losses, HAZUS distinguishes between capital stock and income
losses. The capital stock losses subsume in particular the cost of structural and non-structural
damage as well as content and inventory loss, while the income loss category mainly comprises the
cost due to reduced building functionality, i.e. relocation-, capital related-, wage- and rental losses.
For structural and non-structural damage costs, the results are displayable by design code level,
whereas this information is not available for losses of the other categories. To overcome this lack
of information, the assumption has been made that the losses related to the other categories arise
proportionally to those of structural damage.
Figure 7.8: Total direct economic loss by design level and hazard scenario
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In Figure 7.8 the total economic losses corresponding to the five considered hazard scenarios have
been processed with respect to the building design levels where they accrue. For reasons mentioned
above, the highest fraction of losses in absolute terms occurs in the moderate design building class
throughout the considered scenarios, as 64.5% of San Francisco’s total building stock is accordingly
designed. The low and high design classes in contrast contribute to the total losses to approximately
equal extent. The low design class however corresponds to only 2.2% of the total building stock,
while highly designed buildings make up one third of the total building population.
If evaluated in relative terms on a per building level though, the losses are significantly higher in low
design buildings and descending until the high design code is reached, confirming the intuition. The
total direct economic losses for the 100-year earthquake throughout all design levels on city level sum
up to US$ 8,489 million, while the total losses for the strongest considered 2500-year event amount
to US$ 39,923 million. In Appendix F.4 detailed summary tables of the total direct economic losses
are listed by design level, damage state and earthquake scenario.
Also for the direct economic losses the above sketched approach to assign direct economic losses
to design code levels has been verified by confronting the results to the HAZUS outcome at city
level. Also in this case the approximation matched the HAZUS results quite well and the deviations
throughout the considered scenarios have been below 10%.
Indirect Economic Losses
In the assessment of indirect economic losses, HAZUS distinguishes between income and employment
losses over the first 15 years following disaster occurrence. The discounting procedure to the current
date is automatically done by the program. Whereas the income losses are given in monetary terms,
the employment losses cover the change in the city’s employment situation in number of workers.
As it was not clear if the employments losses are already processed and evaluated within the income
loss category, only the first indirect loss category has been included in the analysis.
Again, the program does not offer the possibility to display these losses by design code level, due to
the fact that indirect losses generally occur throughout single building classes and potentially affect
the whole system. Nevertheless, indirect losses have been set in proportion to total direct losses
and accordingly distributed over the three design levels to enable their inclusion in a cost benefit
analysis for design code updates.
Figure 7.9 displays the indirect losses for the simulated earthquake events. As the indirect losses
have been related to the direct losses, the loss distribution over design levels resembles that of Figure
7.8, with different scales however. The indirect losses amount to roughly 30% of the direct losses
throughout the considered scenarios. Accordingly, the 100-year event leads to indirect economic
losses of US$ 2,664 million, whereas the 2500-year event results in US$ 12,820 million of indirect
losses. The indirect economic loss results are summarized in Appendix F.5 by design level, occurrence
in time and earthquake scenario.
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Figure 7.9: Total indirect economic loss by design level and hazard scenario
As performed for the other two loss categories, the separately calculated indirect economic losses have
been compared to the HAZUS results showing differences of around 10% for each hazard scenario,
which is considered to be in an acceptable range.
7.2.5 Total Risk Assessment
After the damage states for each design level and considered hazard scenario and the corresponding
losses have been assessed, the final step in the risk analysis phase constitutes the calculation of risk.
For the purpose of this case study, it is focused on losses and thus on the assessment of total risk.
The total risk comprises all previously collected information about losses and links them to their
probability of occurrence, to finally obtain an expected earthquake loss estimation for the city of
San Francisco on an annual basis.
For this purpose, firstly the above obtained loss values for all three loss categories have been com-
prised in Table F.10 of the appendix, separated by hazard scenario. The next step to be performed
in the risk calculation is to convert these values in annualized losses, by means of their annual occur-
rence probabilities. In this respect, it is necessary to firstly transform the return period information
in annual exceedance probabilities by means of formula (2.1) and then to convert the latter to an-
nual occurrence probabilities. The relation between exceedance probabilities and annual occurrence
probabilities is provided by formula (2.4). Table 7.1 summarizes the correspondence between re-
turn periods, exceedance probabilities and occurrence probabilities for the five considered hazard
scenarios.
Table 7.1: Calculating annual occurrence probabilities from return periods
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Having the annual occurrence probabilities for each hazard scenario on hand, the annualized losses
for each hazard scenario are easily calculated by taking the product of the total loss values provided
in Table F.10 and the annual occurrence probabilities, listed in Table 7.1 above. The so obtained
results for the annualized losses are summarized in Table 7.2 by design level and hazard scenario.
Table 7.2: Total annualized losses by design level and hazard scenario
From Table 7.2 the relative contributions of the considered earthquake scenarios to the total annu-
alized losses become obvious. While comparatively frequent events with lower return periods lead
to lower absolute losses, their relative share in the total annualized losses is rather significant due
to their higher annual occurrence probabilities. In terms of direct and indirect economic losses the
contribution of the 100-year event to total annualized losses is approximately three to five times
higher than that of the 2500-year earthquake across all design levels. For human losses in contrast,
the differences across hazard scenarios are less emphasized. This is due to the fact that stronger
intensity events lead to a greater fraction of severely damaged buildings within the total damaged
building stock which in turn disproportionately strongly increases the probability of getting injured
or even killed by the disaster. This in turn compensates the low associated occurrence probabilities.
Table 7.3: Total earthquake risk by design levels
To finally obtain the total earthquake risk for the city of San Francisco, the annualized losses need
to be summed up over all hazard intensities, in line with formula (2.19). As outlined in Chapter 2,
this accumulation may either be performed for each loss category separately or alternatively over
all categories simultaneously, if a reasonable way has been found to convert the intangible disaster
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losses to monetary value. In Table 7.3 the total earthquake risk is listed for each considered loss
category apart, still subdivided into the three different design levels, which will turn out to be useful
in the subsequent CBA.
Table 7.4: Value of statistical life and injury valuation
The last step to be performed in order to comprise the accumulated loss data into a single value,
which then represents the total risk covering all loss categories, is to place a monetary value on the
separately listed injuries and fatalities. How to value statistical lives has been one major topic of this
thesis and extensively studied throughout Chapters 4 and 5. For the purpose of total risk calculation,
the valuation is based on the value of statistical life (VSL) obtained from the Life Quality Index
(LQI). The estimations of LQI based VSLs for different countries have been carried out previously
and are summarized in Table 5.3. The value for the U.S. amounted to US$ 4.156 million which is
adopted for the present calculation.
As holds for the VSL, also the valuation of injuries is a highly debated issue within safety literature
and so far no general consensus has been achieved. An interesting approach to include non fatal
human consequences in form of injuries or diseases in LQI based safety evaluations is presented
in [151]. For the present study however, it is necessary to distinguish between the above outlined
severity levels 1, 2 and 3 in appraising the injuries. For this purpose, the U.S. Department of
Transportation [71] suggests to value injuries as a proportion of the VSL depending on severity. The
proposed fractions have been transformed to the injuries classification of HAZUS and are summarized
in Table 7.4.
For the final total risk calculation it has to be noted that the HAZUS dollar values of direct and
indirect economic losses listed in Table 7.3 are provided in terms of US$ 1994, whereas the VSL
obtained from the LQI has been estimated in US$ 2007 . Therefore, for reasons of consistency, the
HAZUS results have been converted to US$ 2007 by using the consumer price index to account for
inflation. Accordingly, the value of US$ 1 in 1994 corresponds to US$ 1.4 in 2007 [269]. Accounting
for these adjustments, the following estimate for the total earthquake risk of San Francisco is obtained
Total SF Earthquake Risk = 283
[
US$ 2007 million
year
]
(7.3)
which includes all loss categories and in particular the monetized human losses. The fraction of
direct economic losses in the total risk is 67.2%, that of indirect economic losses 21.1%, while the
contributions of fatalities and total non fatal injuries amount to 8.6% and 3.1%, respectively. The
comparatively low share of human losses in the total risk highlights the fact that the seismic safety
standards in San Francisco are already on a very advanced level.
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7.2.6 Risk Reduction Interventions
After the total earthquake risk of San Francisco has been assessed, risk reduction interventions
may be implemented within the risk treatment phase. In particular, two public risk reduction
interventions are considered in the following. Both strategies examine a hypothetical update of the
buildings’ design code level in order to meet the modern code requirements at portfolio, i.e. city
level. The first strategy consists in rehabilitating all low design code buildings to reach the moderate
design code level. The second strategy in contrast, analyzes the hypothetical retrofitting of all low
and moderate design code buildings until they attain the high design code. In the subsequent section,
a detailed CBA shall reveal if these potential mitigation strategies are socially worthwhile.
7.3 Cost Benefit Analysis
As the status quo seismic risk analysis of San Francisco has been completed, it is subject of this
section to study the effects of the above outlined public risk mitigation interventions and to judge
whether they are cost effective. In this respect it has to be investigated, how the interventions
impact the total expected disaster losses over time and an estimation of the rehabilitation cost has
to be carried out. As risk reduction interventions on a portfolio level are not directly implementable
within HAZUS, the cost and benefit estimations of the mitigation measures have been carried out
aside from the program, as illustrated in the following.
7.3.1 Cost Estimation
The cost component of the two considered public risk reduction interventions is given by the reha-
bilitation cost that is necessary to elevate the respective parts of San Francisco’s building stock to
an advanced seismic performance level. The rehabilitation costs have been calculated according to
FEMA 156 [81], that includes a comprehensive set of costs for the seismic rehabilitation of existing
buildings based on a 2,088 buildings database. According to this regulation, the total rehabilitation
cost CT can be expressed as the product of different cost factors. These include in particular a
typical cost (so called Building Group Mean Cost C1) which represents the mean structural cost
for the seismic rehabilitation of a building, excluding the cost of replacing architectural finishes.
The typical cost is then building (-group) specifically modified by some adjustment factors Ci, i =
2,...,5. The adjustment factors account for building surface, seismicity of the area and performance
objective, location and time to adjust for inflation.
The total cost CT to seismically rehabilitate a building is thus estimated using the following equation
CT = C1 · C2 · C3 · C4 · C5 (7.4)
where C1 is the Building Group Mean Cost (provided in US$ 1993/sq.ft.), C2 corresponds to the
Area Adjustment Factor, C3 is the Seismicity and Performance Objective Adjustment Factor, C4
is the Location Adjustment Factor and C5 represents the Time Adjustment Factor. The values of
each coefficient are given in [81], differentiating between eight building groups into which all building
types listed in Figure 7.3 are clustered, based on cost distribution similarities. The specific values
employed in the considered case study are summarized in Table 7.5. In the first column of the
table the classification of the HAZUS building types according to [81] is provided, while the second
column contains the number of buildings in San Francisco that fall into the respective category,
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including their medium building surface in 1000 sq.ft., which is included in the third column. The
last two columns provide an overview over the factors C1 and C2, while the cost factors C3, C4 and
C5 have not been listed as they are equal for all building groups in San Francisco for each considered
rehabilitation option.
Table 7.5: Rehabilitation cost factors by building group [FEMA 156 [81]]
The value for C3 however, is particularly interesting in performing CBA for seismic design code
updates. It contains information about the cost adjustment that is necessary to reach a certain
performance objective. Therefore, it has been of special relevance to estimate the cost of the two
considered portfolio mitigation measures. In this respect, it has to be noted that FEMA distinguishes
between three rehabilitation levels, i.e. Life Safety (LS), Damage Control (DC) and Immediate Oc-
cupancy (IO), that do not coincide with the design levels defined in HAZUS, i.e. low, moderate
and high design code. Therefore, the HAZUS code levels have been assigned to the FEMA perfor-
mance levels with reasonable assumptions. In particular, rehabilitation to DC level is hypothesized
to coincide with the attainment of moderate design code and rehabilitation to IO level is assumed
to equal the retrofit to high design code. Accordingly, the coefficient C3 for the retrofit from low to
moderate design has been extracted to be 1.43, while the rehabilitation coefficient from low to high
design is 2.08.
Eventually, the C4 coefficient for location adjustment has been set to 1.12, which corresponds to
the city of San Francisco, and the C5 coefficient for the time adjustment has been determined by
converting the US$ 1993 into US$ 2007 on basis of the consumer price index to account for inflation,
resulting in a value of 1.43 [269].
Table 7.6 provides an overview about the three possible risk treatment options and their corre-
sponding cost. The cost for the first RR intervention has been estimated as the rehabilitation cost
necessary to rise the 2.2% low designed buildings of the total city’s building stock to moderate code.
In this respect, the simplifying assumption has been made, that the low code building distribution
over building types coincides with that of the whole city to reduce complexity in calculation3. The
final cost has been obtained by multiplying the mean rehabilitation cost in US$/sq.ft. per building
group, given in formula (7.4), and the average surface of low design code buildings within the build-
ing group. For the second risk reduction intervention, the rehabilitation cost consists of bringing
3In reality however, in particular concrete, reinforced masonry and unreinforced masonry buildings take a dispro-
portionately high share in the low design building fraction. The precise building distribution over building types is
displayable for each design class within the program’s inventory module.
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the 2.2% of low design buildings and the 64.5% of moderate design buildings to the high code level.
Also here it has been assumed for reasons of simplicity, that the moderate design buildings are
distributed over building types representatively for the whole city’s building stock4. The costs have
been assessed analogously to the first risk reduction intervention.
Table 7.6: Risk reduction interventions and their cost estimates
To validate the estimated cost data for the two considered risk reduction interventions, they have
been compared to the results of the FEMA provided Online Seismic Rehabilitation Cost Calculator
[82], which constitutes an interactive tool to calculate the seismic rehabilitation cost for distinct
building types to attain certain performance objectives in different locations throughout the U.S..
As the calculator is based on the same regulation FEMA 156, the online results matched the manually
calculated results very well.
7.3.2 Benefit Estimation
After the cost of the two considered interventions have been assessed, it is proceeded with the
estimation of the measures’ benefits to figure out if they are socially worthwhile. As outlined above,
the benefits of a public risk reduction intervention consist of the reduced disaster losses after project
implementation in comparison to status quo state. In this respect, the latter have to be assessed
throughout the different loss categories and over time. The time period over which the benefits
occur has been assumed to equal the design life, which is generally 50 years for buildings and
common structures. Table 7.7 summarizes the benefits from each considered risk reduction strategy,
subdivided in prevented (direct and indirect) economic losses and number of prevented injuries and
fatalities. These benefits occur statistically every year, if the respective risk treatment option is
implemented.
In order to estimate the benefits of the first considered risk reduction strategy to retrofit all low
designed buildings in the city until they reach moderate design, the total annualized disaster losses
provided in Table 7.3 have been recalculated by assuming that San Francisco’s building stock was
composed of 66.7% (= 64.5% + 2.2%) of moderately and 33.3% of highly designed buildings. In
this respect, the losses accruing in the low design class have firstly been subtracted from the status
quo annualized losses and in a second step the moderate losses have been augmented by the 2.2%
according to their increased fraction in the city’s total building population. The so obtained updated
annualized losses after the implementation of the first intervention have finally been subtracted from
the status quo annualized losses to net out the benefits of the intervention.
4Here, the assumption is well supported by the program’s inventory information.
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Table 7.7: Risk reduction interventions and their annual benefits
The assessment of benefits for the second risk reduction intervention to rehabilitate all non highly
designed buildings to the high code standards has been performed by recalculating the total annu-
alized status quo disaster losses under the assumption that San Francisco’s total building stock was
homogeneously consisting of high design code buildings only. With this ambition, firstly the losses
accruing in the low and moderate design classes have been subtracted from status quo annualized
losses and in a consecutive step, the losses emerging in the high design class have been proportionally
augmented by 66.7%, which represents the increase of the high design building fraction in the total
building population. Eventually, the so obtained updated disaster losses after the implementation
of the second mitigation measure have been subtracted from annualized status quo losses to extract
the benefits of the intervention.
7.3.3 Project Decision
In order to finally decide about the risk reduction measures under investigation, the projects’ cost
need to be confronted with the benefits that are expected to go in line with it. As the cost and
benefits of the interventions have already been estimated and are on hand, what remains to be done
is to convert the projects’ benefits to monetary units and to make the cost and benefit streams time
consistent by discounting future values back to the decision point. With this ambition, Table 7.4
above is firstly taken into account to place a monetary value on saved lives and prevented injuries
based on the LQI’s VSL estimations for the U.S.. Then, by means of Table 7.7 the cost and benefits
of the two risk mitigation options relative to status quo state may be formulated in terms of cash
flows occurring at different points in time, as shown in Table 7.8.
Table 7.8: Cash flows of the risk treatment strategies
As mentioned above, in the calculation of the projects’ benefit stream it has been assumed that
the structural retrofit of the two considered risk reduction strategies remains effective over the
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whole design period of the structures, which has been set equal to 50 years. Furthermore, it is
hypothesized that the cost for the risk reduction interventions are instantly due in period t = 0,
while the structural retrofitting is completed at the beginning of period t = 1 and remains equally
effective over the whole design period until the end of the service life in t = 50 is reached. This in
turn implies that the benefits of the risk reduction measures occur statistically every year and to
equal amounts.
Table 7.9: Project outcomes by decision rules
In order to make the benefits comparable to the project cost however, they need to be discounted back
to the decision point t = 0 by means of an appropriate discount rate. According to the discussion
in Section 5.7.4, the discount rate applied in this study has been determined according to formula
(5.84) of the Ramsey Neoclassical Growth Model, which resulted in a discount rate of r = 4.4% for
the U.S..5 Taking into account this discount factor, the NPVs of the project alternatives are easily
calculated by means of formula (3.8).
For project alternative one to retrofit all low design buildings until they are in compliance with the
moderate code standards, the initial project cost have been calculated to be US$ 400 million, while
the expected discounted benefits sum up to US$ 932 million over the 50 year design life, so that
a NPV of US$ 532 million is obtained. Accordingly, this results in a benefit to cost ratio B/C of
2.33 and an internal rate of return (IRR) of 11.53%. Consequently, the expected benefits clearly
outweigh the cost of the project by over 200%, so that a reliable recommendation to implement the
project may be given.
For the second risk mitigation project under investigation to rehabilitate all non highly designed
buildings of San Francisco to the high building code standards in contrast, a completely different
outcome is obtained. In this case, the initial cost of the intervention sums up to an impressive US$
5,909 million, as roughly 67% of the total city’s building stock needs be retrofitted to attain the high
design, while the expected discounted benefits of the measure are estimated to be less than half the
cost, namely US$ 2,296 million. This yields to a benefit to cost ratio B/C of 0.39 and an IRR of
-0.13%. As a result, the discounted benefits that are expected to go in line with the risk reduction
strategy are significantly lower than the cost, so that clear advice to reject the project can be given.
The results of the CBA are schematically summarized in Table 7.9.
5See Table 5.3 for details.
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Sensitivity Analysis
In order to gain additional insight about the sensitivity of the project decision with respect to the
dependent variables, a sensitivity analysis has been performed. As most of the variables impacting
the final value of the risk reduction projects are implemented within HAZUS or predefined by the
FEMA regulations and are thus modifiable only with prudent reasoning, the sensitivity analysis has
been restricted to variations in the VSL and the employed discount rate r. In particular, the VSL
estimates have been varied between US$ 1 and 10 million, representing the range where the great
majority of values obtained in Chapters 4 and 5 fell into, while the discount rate has been changed
in the range of 1 to 10%.
Figure 7.10: Sensitivity of project decision for RR intervention 1
The results of the sensitivity analysis for the first risk mitigation project are displayed in Figure
7.10 for all possible combinations of VSL and discount rate ranges. It is easily seen that project
one is cost effective, i.e. yields a positive NPV, for all employed value combinations, so that the
implementation of the project should strongly be supported by the public authority. For project
two in contrast, the reverse situation turned out to hold: even if the lowest discount factor of 1%
in combination with the highest VSL of US$ 10 million were assigned, the project still disclosed
a negative NPV. Therefore, the decision to reject the project is well confirmed by the sensitivity
analysis.
Discussion
The above performed CBA for the two considered risk reduction interventions delivered unambiguous
results that could directly be employed to give sound project recommendations. In both cases, the
cost and benefits of the respective risk reduction measures differed in order of magnitudes. Both
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initial outcomes have further been confirmed by a sensitivity analysis, varying the VSL and discount
rate in reasonable ranges. As several parameters influencing the project outcome could not be
reasonably changed for above discussed reasons and the difference between project cost and benefits
has been that significant, the real option approach to account for uncertainties in the project decision
turned out to be unsuitable for the present case study and has not been applied. To demonstrate
the applicability of the latter, a separate illustrative case study is performed in the next section.
To draw a conclusion, the results of the performed risk analysis and CBA confirmed the very ad-
vanced earthquake safety standards in San Francisco. Only roughly 10% of the expected annual
disaster losses are attributed to human losses, while the majority of losses are direct economic losses
with a share of approximately 70% and indirect economic losses accounting for roughly 20%. Fur-
thermore, it could be shown that a great fraction of total annualized losses accrue due to rather
frequent events with lower return periods, especially when economic losses are concerned. With
respect to fatalities and injuries in contrast, a more proportional distribution of losses throughout
the considered earthquake scenarios is observed.
Finally, it has been demonstrated that the retrofit of the low design code buildings to moderate code
could bring along large benefits on portfolio level. The rehabilitation to high code in contrast, is
to be generally evaluated with care when confronting the benefits with the project cost. In certain
cases of essential and high potential loss facilities6 however, the attainment of high code standards
generally constitutes a reasonable objective as additional benefits (such as cultural social historical
(CSH) and environmental), that have not been accounted for in the present analysis, are expected
to occur. If the project recommendations are transferable on an individual building level, the city’s
current distribution over code classes seems sound and is well supported by the present analysis.
7.4 Application of the Real Option Approach
In the concluding section of this thesis it shall be illustrated, how the innovative real option pricing
model may be applied to decide on an investment possibility under uncertainty with flexibility about
the investment timing. In particular, a hypothetical preventative risk reduction measure in flood
control management is considered, which deals with the construction of a rain storage reservoir that
reduces the expected losses of a model region in case of river flooding. It is assumed that the cost to
implement the measure can be estimated with some accuracy, while the benefits in terms of reduced
disaster losses are highly uncertain and hardly predictable reliably.
If a flood event with a 50-year return period is considered, both the expected losses in status quo
condition as well as the estimation of the reduced losses after the implementation of the measure
may only be approximated due to the epistemic uncertainties involved and the lack of reliable
information on past events and expert opinions. It is further assumed that the flood probabilities
have been assessed on basis of incomplete information about historical water levels that were only
available for locations with a certain distance from the study region and are thus questionable in
their reliability. Consequently, the estimation of the social value of the risk reduction project S0 at
the decision point is seen as a rough estimation only and the investment decision has to be made
under substantial uncertainties. Furthermore, it is clear that the cost to construct the rain storage
6Such as nuclear power plants, military installations, hospitals and so on.
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reservoir are not easily recaptured in case of adverse project development, so that the investment is
irreversible.
In order to obtain better information about the effectiveness of the project, there is now the possi-
bility to perform a study in the model region to collect further data about water levels at different
measure points directly within the affected area. As the measurement requires some time to de-
liver accurate data about the variability of the water levels, a time period of two years is granted
by the local authority to perform the study. The results of the study after the first year however
might be processed to come to a precocious decision, if the data uncertainty could have already been
sufficiently reduced. Accordingly, the maximum time to delay the investment decision is two years
in order to obtain better information. For reasons of simplicity it is further hypothesized that the
study is free of cost as it has already been scheduled prior to the evaluation of the intervention.
The influence of the information gains obtained by the study on the social value of the risk reduction
project S0 is modeled by the two parameters u and d, which describe the value of steady information
gains in the evolution of S0 over time. In particular, the probability of an upturn in the value is
set equal to u = 0.1, while the probability of a downturn is fixed at d = −0.09, as it is assumed
that the previously available information on historical water levels in status quo state systematically
underestimates the true flooding probabilities, and thus |u| > |d| holds. The annual probability
that a 50-year or even a greater flood event occurs in the model region is calculated by taking the
reciprocal of the return period according to equation (2.1) and is thus equal to 0.02.
Furthermore, it is hypothesized that smaller flood events than the 50-year flood do not lead to
significant changes in the social value of the risk reduction project S0 and are therefore not considered
as disaster events that cause the value of the project to jump due to disaster imposed information
gains. The jump component that causes an abrupt change in the value S0 is to be applied only if
a 50-year or stronger event occurs and can adopt the values -0.3 and 0.3, respectively. Accordingly,
in case of disaster occurrence, the social value of the risk reduction project is to be either reduced
or increased by the respective proportion and it is not known beforehand in which direction the
disaster imposed information gain will make an adjustment in the estimated value necessary.
The risk free interest rate is set equal to 5% for the purpose of the considered application and the
investment cost CT = P to construct the rain storage reservoir is arbitrarily set to US$ 1 million.
The value of the risk reduction measure is assumed to be US$ 1.1 million under the information
level at time t = 07. Furthermore, the dividend rate D is assumed to be equal to 7%, indicating
that the annualized benefits of the risk reduction project in terms of reduced disaster losses amount
to US$ 77,000 per year on average. Accordingly, if a 50-year flood occurs in the model region, a
reduction in total losses after the construction of the rain storage reservoir in the size of US$ 3.85
million (US$ 77,000/0.02) in comparison to the status quo situation is expected to be realized.
Under these assumptions, the net value of the possibility to invest in the construction of a rain
storage reservoir including the flexibility to delay the investment can be assessed by calculating the
call option price C0 on the project. This is done through backwards induction from the second period
t = 2: firstly, the option value is calculated in period t = 2 for all possible values of S2, by making
7The assigned values for the construction of the rain storage reservoir as well as the project value have been
arbitrarily chosen for illustrative purposes and do not claim to be in an authentic range.
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Figure 7.11: Variation of the project value
use of equation (6.1). These in turn are needed in order to determine the state contingent option
values in t = 1, that are calculated by means of equation (6.30) under anticipation of the optimal
investment strategy. The same procedure is then repeated to obtain the option value in t = 0 in
dependence of the respective t = 1 values. Having calculated the option prices in the relevant time
periods, the optimal investment strategy under the flexibility to postpone the investment can be
determined under the new real option investment criterion.
For this purpose it is firstly analyzed, how a variation in the estimation of the initial project value
S0, that has been carried out under substantial uncertainty, affects the optimal investment decision.
In Figure 7.11 the option value C is plotted against the payoff that would be realized if the project
was immediately implemented. By means of the classical investment criterion based on the NPV,
it would be advantageous to initiate the project, as soon as the value of the risk reduction project
outweighed the investment cost, i.e. if S > P was fulfilled and a payoff of S − P would be realized.
In the graph this corresponds to the area from which on the red straight line S−P takes on positive
values, which holds for S > US$ 1 million.
With the new decision criterion including the possibility to delay the investment in contrast, an
immediate project initiation is optimal only if the project value S is higher than the investment
cost augmented by the value to postpone the investment and thus higher than the threshold value
S∗, that has been characterized in Section 6.3.2. In the graph this is firstly fulfilled at the point
where the option value curve C opens out into the straight line S − P and for all values of S that
are beyond this point. Accordingly, S∗ takes on a value of around US$ 1.1 million and the NPV
and the real option criterion give different advices if S falls in the range between US$ 1 and 1.1
million. Has the value of the risk reduction project been estimated to be higher than S∗ however,
the expected advantage in terms of a high immediate payoff outweighs the expected additional value
of information derived from the study to prevent a misinvestment.
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Figure 7.12: Variation of the dividend rate
Analogous quantitative observations are made when the dividend rate D is varied, holding all other
variables at default settings. The dividend rate provides the incentives for an immediate project
initiation, as it models the fraction of losses that accrue in case of flood occurrence in the time of
postponing the investment, which could have been prevented by a project implementation in time.
Therefore, the dividend payment is an indicator for the effectiveness of the risk reduction measure,
with higher values corresponding to greater efficiency. This leads to the fact that the threshold value
S∗, from which on an immediate investment becomes optimal, falls as the dividend rate is increased.
This logical interrelation is illustrated in Figure 7.12. If the dividend rate D takes on comparatively
low values in the range of 0-5%, even a slight increase in the dividend rate leads to large decreases
in the threshold value S∗, making an immediate investment more attractive. In this respect, it is
to a lesser extent the absolute value of the dividend rate that is crucial for the investment decision,
but rather the level of the dividend rate relative to the risk free interest rate r. The ratio of these
two variables decisively influences the payoff of the invested means during the postponement of the
investment and thus constitutes a major factor in determining the opportunity cost.
Accordingly, an increase in the dividend rate D leads to the fact that a delay of the investment
becomes comparatively more expensive. If the dividend rate takes on values that are significantly
above the risk free interest rate, an asymptotic convergence of the threshold value S∗ to the invest-
ment cost P can be observed. This is seen in the figure from dividend rates of approximately 10%
onwards. In this case, the risk of not having taken appropriate precautious action in the case of dis-
aster occurrence outweighs the uncertainty with respect to project efficiency and the corresponding
risk of misinvestment.
Chapter 8
Synopsis
This thesis is devoted to present a general approach for managing disaster risk in public interest.
The main focus constitutes the investigation of public risk reduction interventions that affect human
safety. In the following, a summary of the thesis’ results is provided and new achievements are
reviewed. Eventually, directions for future research are presented.
8.1 Summary
At the outset of this thesis it has been demonstrated, how widely the definitions and understandings
of the term risk can range. Applied across various disciplines and often used in multidisciplinary
collaborations, so far no consistency in the understanding of disaster risk has been achieved. The
heterogeneity of risk definitions is mainly attributed to different understandings of the basal terms
hazard, vulnerability, exposure, consequences, damage and loss. These terms occur repeatedly
throughout different risk definitions and are often used interchangeably.
This lack of a harmonized concept has been addressed by introducing a clear and flexible risk man-
agement framework, that provides assistance in analyzing, comparing and treating disaster risk. A
mathematical description of the basal terms has been provided and each risk management step has
been clearly outlined, leaving some range for problem specific modifications. Frequently used risk
definitions originating from literature have been reviewed and integrated in the concept, so that
their interrelations were disclosed. In a next step, the necessity for the government to engage in risk
reduction activities has been discussed and risk reduction projects have been characterized econom-
ically. By demonstrating how the cost and benefits of a risk reduction project may systematically
be assessed, the foundation for project appraisal by means of cost benefit analysis (CBA) was laid.
The theoretical basis for CBA is found in welfare economics, that provides guidelines for analyzing
both individual and social welfare. The two fundamental principles that are propagated in welfare
economics are that individual preferences are to be taken as the basis for social welfare measurement
and that social welfare can only be improved by a change, if each member of society is made better
off without making anyone worse off. A public risk reduction project constitutes such a change in
resource allocation that impacts personal and social wellbeing. The two central objectives of welfare
economics are the efficient allocation of resources and their fair distribution among the members of
society.
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While efficiency aspects can be tackled by means of the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks criteria, the analysis
of distribution entails the formulation of a social welfare function, implicitly including normative
value judgments about what is considered to be fair. The measurement of individual wellbeing
is based on ordinal utility functions that represent preferences and are neither comparable across
individuals nor do they possess a significance in absolute terms. Therefore, changes in welfare have
to be converted to monetary value to allow for an application of the Kaldor-Hicks test within CBA.
This is done by means of the willingness to pay (WTP) concept.
The WTP concept is a widely applied approach in economics particularly designed to derive prices
for goods that are not traded on markets. Human safety constitutes such a non market good
that may be valued by the WTP and standardized in the value of statistical life (VSL). It has
clearly been emphasized that the VSL does not place a value on a particular identifiable human life.
Instead, it is based on the statistical view that prevented fatalities due to an enhancement of safety
standards convert to reductions in mortality risk that are in turn enjoyed by any member of society.
These reductions in mortality risk permit the interpretation in terms of an economic good that is
appraisable by economic theory. Three commonly applied approaches to assess the VSL have been
reviewed and sample values from distinct studies have been collected from literature. While labor
market studies yielded VSL estimates in the range of US$ 7-8 million, consumer market studies and
stated preference approaches delivered values around US$ 5 million. Throughout the single studies
a large variance in the VSLs estimates could be observed.
As the single studies are designed to extract a VSL solely by focusing on one particular market or
a particular subgroup of the total population, it is not clear which of the values is best employed
in a public policy analysis potentially affecting the entire population. Addressing this question, a
theoretical model has been developed that quantifies the influence of safety on a market economy in
keeping with the individualistic welfare economic postulate. As the safety level that is enjoyed by
each individual is the result of both private and public precaution, good reason has been presented
to model the fraction of personal safety that is impacted by public risk reduction projects as a public
good.
This public safety level uniformly affects all consumers and producers interacting in the economy and
determines the circumstances under which economic decisions are made. Under this assumption it
has been shown, that an increase in public safety leads to the formation of new single market
equilibria and thus of a new general equilibrium. The social price for safety could then be determined
by monetizing the individual welfare effects in the move from status quo to post project equilibrium
and in a second step, their aggregation on social level. This has been shown to be admissible as
an increase in public safety permits the interpretation of an increase in public resource endowments
and accordingly, in economic efficiency.
Because of the stringent information requirements about peoples’ preferences, the valuation of non
market goods on population level often requires the departure from individualistic approaches and
the deployment of representative agents. These rely on few characteristics only and allow an assess-
ment in general equilibrium based on average values. This generally comes at the cost of a loss in
welfare economic soundness, as it is theoretically admissible under restrictive conditions only. Based
on a representative agent model, safety pricing rules in general equilibrium have been derived. It
turned out that the total social value of increases in the publicly provided safety level is decom-
posable in the direct benefits that accrue to the representative consumer and an increase in total
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economic output. Safety imposed price changes in contrast, could be neglected in the valuation. The
representative agent model provided the microfoundations for the Life Quality Index (LQI) concept
and is to be seen as the transition model from individualistic bottom up safety pricing strategies
to aggregate top down safety pricing models, that directly obtain a price on social level and are
macroeconomic in nature.
In presenting top down safety pricing strategies, firstly the traditional human capital approach has
been introduced. It is straightforward to apply and has frequently been used in the past, but it
has a number of serious drawbacks when its implications are examined in detail: the human capital
approach views life just as a factor of production and estimates the loss in production that accrues
due to a premature death. The quality of life that the individual derives from the pleasure of
living is not valued as individual preferences are completely neglected. The LQI has been developed
to approach this weakness. Based on the assumption that the average individual of society or
representative consumer derives satisfaction from income, longevity and leisure time, it combines
three macroeconomic indicators in one measure of utility or life quality.
It has been outlined however, that traditional LQI derivation approaches suffer from conceptual
weaknesses and a new economic consistent derivation approach in general equilibrium has been
presented that clearly reveals its relative position within economic theory. Based on the so obtained
results, the traditional net benefit criterion has been extended to account also for increases in
economic output that accrue as a result of an increased life expectancy. These new safety pricing
rules have been obtained for the single period model and extended for intertemporal aspects.
The innovative safety pricing rule yielded VSL estimates in the range of US$ 3-4 million for most
western economies. Furthermore, the new derivation approach revealed that it is advisable to employ
the full GDP in the safety pricing formula (instead of only 60%) in order to obtain a consistent value
of time. These advancements jointly led to a total increase well above 50% in the VSL estimates in
comparison to conventional LQI applications. Considering the fact that the traditional LQI based
VSLs are allocated at the lower end of the VSL range observed in safety literature, this is seen as a
valuable improvement.
Accounting for the fact that all estimations of cost and benefits of public risk reduction projects
are highly uncertain, a real option approach has been developed to include these uncertainties in
project appraisal. With the possibility to delay the investment initiation to a future point in time,
new information may be acquired that allows for a more precise estimation of the project’s cash flows.
The value of the possibility to postpone the investment has been assessed by modeling the evolution
of the total social value of the risk reduction project over time by means of a discrete stochastic
process. The latter accounted for expected value movements due to newly acquired information as
well as the possibility that a disaster occurs in the time of investment delay. By demonstrating the
analogy between financial options on stocks and the possibility to invest in a public risk reduction
project, eventually a price for the possibility to delay the investment has been derived on basis of a
modified version of the Cox, Ross and Rubinstein Binomial Option Pricing Model.
In order to validate the presented models, firstly a real world application based on the loss estimation
model HAZUS has been carried out. Subject of study constituted the city of San Francisco, California
that has been investigated with respect to earthquake risk. In particular, five different hazard
scenarios have been simulated with return periods ranging from 100 to 2500 years. By systematically
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analyzing damages, direct and indirect economic and human losses that are expected to go in line
with the events, the total risk of the city was estimated to equal US$ 283 million per year. In
a consecutive step a CBA has been carried out to evaluate two potential risk reduction strategies
of seismically retrofitting buildings of different design levels. It turned out that a rehabilitation
of the city’s low designed buildings to moderate code on portfolio level is to be considered as a
sound investment, while the second option to retrofit all non highly designed buildings to high code
is generally not cost efficient and thus recommendable only for essential and high potential loss
facilities that bring along further benefits not included in the analysis.
Eventually, an illustrative example for the application of the real option approach has been pre-
sented, by considering a risk reduction investment to protect a model region from flood risk by
the construction of a rain storage reservoir. Here, the general approach to practically implement
the procedure has been shown and the influence of the parameters employed in the option model
on the optimal project decision has been outlined. Lastly, reasonable calibrations have been pre-
sented where the innovative real option criterion differs from the classical net present value (NPV)
investment criterion to prevent the risk of misinvestment.
8.2 Conclusions and Outlook
To conclude, the present work developed new insights and concepts in the following fields:
1. The development of a clear structured framework for managing disaster risk. The important
contribution of this work in comparison to the author’s previous joint achievements [201] and
[208] is to be seen in the mathematization of the risk management process and the risk defining
terms. This is expected to contribute to more transparency in application.
2. The application of public good theory to model the impact of safety changes on a market
economy in a general equilibrium setting.
3. The economic analysis of the LQI and the presentation of a new time consistent derivation
approach in a general equilibrium setting.
4. The development of innovative LQI based safety pricing rules in general equilibrium.
5. The application of real option theory to public disaster risk reduction projects.
In the discussion of disaster risk management it has been outlined, that the common practice to
purely focus on expected values in the risk definition, evaluation and treatment is acceptable as
disaster risk constitutes a pure downside risk that is spread among a large number of people and
constitutes one among many other competing risks. In a sound risk treatment however, it is advisable
to include additional information about the statistical nature of risk in the management process. As
has been demonstrated, financial risk management offers a wide range of measures and advanced
methodologies to process risk information in decision making processes and might further be explored
in order to embed established financial risk management strategies in the context of disaster risk.
In this way, further advancements are expected to be achieved.
One of the main findings of this thesis in the context of WTP assessment has been the observa-
tion that there exists a certain discrepancy between theoretical soundness and practicability of the
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prevailing approaches. Individualistic bottom up approaches are conceptually most satisfactory but
a number of problems may arise in an implementation on large scales. Top down approaches in
contrast, are easy to apply and deliver stable values, but come at a violation of the individualistic
principle of welfare economics in general. The LQI has been demonstrated to be a first step to merge
aggregate individual preference information by means of the labor leisure trade-off and macroeco-
nomic indicators in one concept. An interesting idea for future research would be to "individualize"
the LQI or related representative agent models on a group level to improve the characteristics of the
agent by including individual preferences more precisely. In this way, the theoretical foundations
would be improved and at the same time practical tractability maintained.
Although the goal of identifying means to place a value on reductions in mortality risk that are stable
and employable across different fields has been formulated, it may not be possible (or desirable) to
have a unique value that can uniformly be used in all applications. Instead, it may turn out that
preferences are such that there is one value for a change in the probability of dying in a job accident,
another value for a change in the probability of dying in a traffic accident, and yet a third value for
a change in the probability of dying in a natural disaster - even for similar persons with identical
baseline risks and similar safety improvements. Given the great diversity of values now implicit in
public decision making, such a result would not be unexpected, but entails further empirical and
conceptual research.
It has been demonstrated, that the most crucial step in the LQI derivation and calibration lies in
the determination of the parameter q, which constitutes the elasticity of life quality utility. It has
been determined by relying on the labor leisure trade-off which may be interpreted as a decision that
individuals make short term. The common LQI practice to transfer this parameter to intertemporal
models however, is to be seen as rather critical, as the utility exponent in life cycle models refers to
the concept of intertemporal substitution between present and future consumption and thus, serves a
distinct purpose. In intertemporal models with endogenous labor supply these two effects are usually
being accounted for by defining utility functions with two distinct exponents. Further research on
this issue is needed, which entails the exploration of the LQI methodology in an intertemporal
macroeconomic growth model.
Lastly, the developed real options approach to price the flexibility to postpone the investment in
an uncertain world is to be considered as a first step in applying real options theory to disaster
management. Although several quite stringent simplifications and assumptions had to be placed to
guarantee the fulfillment of real option theory requirements, the model has provided sound insights
in the influence of parameter uncertainty on the project decision. One goal for future research would
be to improve the stochastic process that describes possible developments of the social risk reduction
project value over time. In particular, it would be desirable to render more precisely the project
value evolution in response to steady and disaster imposed information gains and to consistently
integrate the model in a continuous time framework. Accordingly, the model could be extended for
an application to more complex real world risk reduction investment decisions.
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Appendix A
Risk Management Glossary
System:
The object of investigation for which all Hazard sources are identified and Risk Analysis is being
performed. The System may be composed of a single building or infrastructure element, a suburb
of a city, a whole urban region or even an entire country.
Hazard: A potentially adverse physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may cause
harm to the predefined System. Harm can include injury or Loss of life, property Damage, CSH and
economic disruption or environmental degradation.
Hazard Analysis: Consists of three steps: Hazard identification, the determination of relevant
intensity levels and the estimation of the corresponding occurrence probabilities in a predefined
time period. Depending on the size of the System, the results may differ for each Element at Risk.
Element-at-Risk (EaR) and Elements-at-Non-Risk (EaNR): A single or a group of persons
or objects within the predefined System that are susceptible and exposed to the impact of a Hazard
are referred to as Elements-at-Risk (EaR). System elements that are not endangered by the impact
of the hazard are termed Elements-at-Non-Risk (EaNR). In order to guarantee a complete coverage,
all EaR and EaNR collectively should compose the entire System that is being investigated. This is
referred to as the "principle of completeness".
Exposure: System elements whose hazard load is expected to exceed a certain threshold level for a
given hazard intensity, so that damage is expected to occur. All exposed system elements constitute
Elements at Risk.
Structural Vulnerability: Is a specific characteristic of an Element at Risk that indicates the
physical susceptibility towards the impact of a Hazard. Thus, Structural Vulnerability links the
Hazard load to the Damage of an Element at Risk.
Damage: Describes the physical, biological or chemical effect on an Element at Risk caused by the
impact of a Hazard of a given intensity. Damage captures the material harm and is not expressed
in monetary terms.
System Vulnerability: Is a specific characteristic of an Element at Risk, that indicates the total
potential of a Hazard of a given intensity. Thus, System Vulnerability assigns a Loss value to each
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given Damage state of an Element at Risk. It is best described by a function that evaluates the
Consequences of a certain Damage state by taking into account the value of the Element at Risk
itself as well as its designated functionality within the System.
Consequences: This term captures and quantifies the various adverse effects a natural disaster
event of a certain intensity may have on the different Elements at Risk. Consequences can be
subdivided into Direct and Indirect Consequences.
Direct Consequences: Are harms that occur simultaneously to the time the disaster takes place
or by immediate follow-up physical destruction such as fires. Therefore, they can directly be related
to the disaster itself.
Indirect Consequences: Usually occur with a time shift as a result of the Direct Consequences.
They can be interpreted as follow up costs that result from the Element at Risk being unable to
carry out its designated functionality within the System after the disaster has occurred.
Moreover, Direct as well as Indirect Consequences may further be subdivided and classified into
economic, human, ecological and CSH Consequences due to the measure that is in use for their
quantification. As it is possible to assign a monetary value to economic Consequences in a direct
way, they are referred to as tangible. All other Consequences classes are termed intangible. In the
following several Direct and Indirect Consequences are outlined divided by consequence classes:
1. Direct Consequences:
• economic: Adverse effects on capital stock resulting from physical Damage of economic
value carrying objects.
• human: Injuries and fatalities due to the Damage of objects.
• ecological: Ground, air and water pollution, contamination of the environment or other
devastating effects on ecosystems caused for instance by releases of toxic substances.
• CSH: Adverse effects on capital stock resulting from physical Damage of CSH value
carrying objects, such as schools, hospitals, historical buildings and so on.
2. Indirect Consequences:
• economic: Business interruption, wage losses, production downtime and other harms on
the economy in the long term.
• human: The spread of diseases resulting from the absence of satisfactory hygiene within
the affected area, psychological post-disaster effects.
• ecological: Penalties due to the violation of environmental regulation laws.
• CSH: Adverse effects on the wellbeing of society resulting from the absence of the CSH
value carrying object.
Loss: Subdivided by consequence classes, this term accumulates all Direct and Indirect Conse-
quences a natural disaster of a certain intensity may have at the time the disaster occurs. To
quantify the Loss, the sum of all Direct and Indirect Consequences belonging to the considered
consequence class for each Element at Risk being part of the System has to be calculated. In this
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connection, the Indirect Consequences need to be discounted dependent on the time they occur by
taking a consequence class specific discount factor into account. The Loss can either be subdivided
into human, economic, ecological and CHS Loss or a total Loss measure may be implemented, if a
reasonable way has been found to convert the intangible losses to monetary value.
Risk: Risk is expressible in two distinctive ways. One possibility is to express Risk with respect
to the structural Damage (here called "Structural Risk"). The second way is to relate Risk to the
resulting Loss (here called "Total Risk").
Structural Risk: The Structural Risk is calculated by taking the products of the annual occurrence
probabilities of the Damages and the Damages themselves and summing up these products over all
Damage states.
Structural Risk = Probability x Damage [Damage measure / year]
Alternatively, the Structural Risk is directly relatable to the Hazard source, by taking the annual
Hazard occurrence probabilities times the Damages that are expected to go in line with them and
summing up these products over all Hazard intensities.
Total Risk: For each consequence class the Total Risk is calculated by taking the products of the
annual probabilities of occurrence of the Losses and the Losses themselves and summing up these
products over all Loss levels.
Total Risk = Probability x Loss [Loss unit / year]
Alternatively, the Total Risk is directly relatable to the Hazard source, by taking the annual Hazard
occurrence probabilities times the Losses that are expected to go in line with them and summing up
these products over all Hazard intensities.
In analogy to the Loss, the Total Risk may be split into the human, the economic, the ecological
and the CSH risk or alternatively, an overall Total Risk may be calculated, if a reasonable way has
been found to convert the intangible consequences to monetary units.
Risk Review: Due to the ever changing environment of the Risk influencing variables, the primary
purpose of Risk Review is to constantly include all new information, knowledge and experience about
the Risk and to perform a Risk update on a regular basis. It should be emphasized that the Risk
Review step is only being performed for already identified Risks which have run through the Risk
Assessment and Risk Treatment phase at least once. Consequently, in each Risk Review iteration
the effectiveness of possibly performed Risk reduction interventions is assessable.
Risk Monitoring: Accompanying all the steps of the Risk Management Framework, the Risk Mon-
itoring procedure captures the exchange of information among all stakeholders actively or passively
involved or participating in the Risk Management process. It includes the awareness of the System
to constantly survey already identified Risks and the record of potentially newly occurring Hazards.
As a result of the monitoring procedure the Risk evolution over time is registered.
Risk Management: Risk Management is defined as the systematic application of management
policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of identifying, assessing, treating, communicating,
reviewing and monitoring Risk.
Appendix B
Probability Theory
B.1 The Total Probability Theorem
For two continuous random variables X and Y that have the joint probability density function fX,Y
the marginal probability density functions of X and Y are calculated to be:
fX(x) =
∫
fX,Y (x, y)dy
fY (y) =
∫
fX,Y (x, y)dx
(B.1)
The conditional probability density functions are then defined by:
fX|Y (x, y) =
fX,Y (x, y)
fY (y)
fY |X(x, y) =
fX,Y (x, y)
fX(x)
(B.2)
Then, from equations B.1 and B.2 the marginal probability density functions of X and Y may be
reformulated to the following expression:
fX(x) =
∫
fX,Y (x, y)dy =
∫
fX|Y (x, y)fY (y)dy
fY (y) =
∫
fX,Y (x, y)dx =
∫
fY |X(x, y)fX(x)dx
(B.3)
This is called the law of total probability. Consequently, the marginal densities of X and Y can
be determined by integrating the product of conditional densities and the marginal density of the
respective other random variable over the respective other random variable, without referring to the
joint probability.
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B.2 First Order Stochastic Dominance
In first order stochastic dominance, a random variable X is said to stochastically dominate a random
variable Y , if for any parameter a the following relation holds
P (X ≤ a) ≤ P (Y ≤ a) (B.4)
indicating that the probability that the random variable X takes a value that is lower than a is
smaller than the probability that the random variable Y takes a value smaller than a. In other
words, higher values are more likely to be realized by X than by Y .
Figure B.1: First order stochastic dominance
If F and f denote the cumulative probability function and the PDF of the random variable X,
respectively and G and g represent the two respective functions of the random variable Y , first order
stochastic dominance may also be expressed as follows:
F (a) ≤ G(a) for all a (B.5)
and ∫ a
−∞
f(x)dx ≤
∫ a
−∞
g(y)dy for all a (B.6)
As a consequence of first order stochastic dominance the following relation holds for the expected
values:
E[X] ≥ E[Y ] (B.7)
Graphically, this implies that a dominating cumulative distribution F may never lie above the
dominated distribution G and that a dominating PDF f is located with more probability mass "to
the right" than the dominated PDF g, as illustrated in Figure B.1.
Appendix C
The Envelope Theorem in (Constrained)
Optimization Problems
A maximum (or minimum) value function is an objective function where the choice variables have
been assigned their optimal values. These optimal values of the choice variables are in turn functions
of the exogenous variables and parameters of the problem. Once the optimal values of the choice
variables have been substituted into the original objective function, the function indirectly becomes
a function of the parameters (through the parameters’ influence on the optimal values of the choice
variables). Thus the maximum value function is also referred to as the indirect objective function.
What is the significance of the indirect objective function? Consider that in any optimization
problem the direct objective function is maximized (or minimized) for a given set of parameters.
The indirect objective function gives all the maximum values of the objective function as these
parameters vary. Hence, the indirect objective function is an "envelope" of the set of optimized
objective functions generated by varying the parameters of the model.
C.1 The Unconstrained Case
To illustrate, consider the following maximization problem with two choice variables x and y, and
one exogenous parameter α:
max
x,y
U(x, y, α) (C.1)
The first order necessary conditions are:
∂U(x, y, α)
∂x
= 0
∂U(x, y, α)
∂y
= 0
(C.2)
If the second order conditions are met, these two equations implicitly define the solutions:
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x = x∗(α)
y = y∗(α)
(C.3)
If these solutions are substituted into the objective function, a new function is obtained:
V (α) = U(x∗(α), y∗(α), α) (C.4)
This function is the value of U when the values of x and y are those that maximize U(x, y, α).
Therefore, V (α) constitutes the maximum value function (or indirect objective function). If V is
differentiated with respect to α, the following expression is obtained:
∂V (α)
∂α
=
∂U
∂x
· ∂x
∗
∂α
+
∂U
∂y
· ∂y
∗
∂α
+
∂U
∂α
(C.5)
However, from the first order conditions it is known that ∂U∂x =
∂U
∂y = 0. Therefore, the first two
terms disappear and the result becomes:
∂V
∂α
=
∂U
∂α
(C.6)
This result states that, when α varies at the optimum, with x and y allowed to adjust optimally,
leads to the same result as if x and y were held constant. Note that α enters the maximum value
function provided in (C.4) in three places: one direct and two indirect (through x and y). Equations
(C.5) and (C.6) show that, at the optimum, only the direct effect of α on the objective function
matters. This is the essence of the envelope theorem. The envelope theorem states that only the
direct effects of a change in an exogenous variable need to be considered, even though the exogenous
variable may enter the maximum value function indirectly as part of the solution to the endogenous
choice variables.
C.2 The Constrained Case
Now, the attention is switched to the case of constrained optimization problems. Again, an objective
function U , two choice variables x and y and the exogenous parameter α are given. Additionally,
the following constraint is introduced
g(x, y, α) = 0 (C.7)
so that the constrained optimization problem becomes:
max
x,y
U(x, y, α)
s.t. g(x, y, α) = 0
(C.8)
The Lagrangian for this problem is:
Λ = U(x, y, α) + λg(x, y, α) (C.9)
The first order conditions are:
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∂Λ
∂x
=
∂U
∂x
+ λ
∂g
∂x
= 0 (C.10)
∂Λ
∂y
=
∂U
∂y
+ λ
∂g
∂y
= 0 (C.11)
∂Λ
∂λ
= g(x, y, α) = 0 (C.12)
Solving this system of equations yields:
x = x∗(α); y = y∗(α); λ = λ∗(α) (C.13)
Inserting these solutions into the objective function U gives
V (α) = U(x∗(α), y∗(α), α) (C.14)
where V (α) constitutes the indirect objective function, or maximum value function. It is the maxi-
mum value of U for any x and y that satisfy the constraint for a given level of α.
To address the question of how V (α) varies as α changes, V is differentiated with respect to α:
∂V (α)
∂α
=
∂U
∂x
· ∂x
∗
∂α
+
∂U
∂y
· ∂y
∗
∂α
+
∂U
∂α
(C.15)
In the constrained case however, equation (C.15) will not simplify to ∂V∂α =
∂U
∂α , since
∂U(α)
∂x 6= 0
and ∂U(α)∂y 6= 0 holds, as may be verified from the first order conditions (C.10) and (C.11). To
proceed further, the optimal values x∗(α) and y∗(α) are substituted in the constraint g to produce
the identity:
g(x∗(α), y∗(α), α) = 0 (C.16)
Differentiating equation (C.16) with respect to α yields:
∂g
∂x
∂x∗
∂α
+
∂g
∂y
∂y∗
∂α
+
∂g
∂α
(C.17)
Multiplying equation (C.17) by λ, combining the result with equation (C.15) and rearranging terms,
the following expression is obtained:
∂V (α)
∂α
= (
∂U
∂x
+ λ
∂g
∂x
)
∂x∗
∂α
+ (
∂U
∂y
+ λ
∂g
∂y
)
∂y∗
∂α
+
∂U
∂α
+ λ
∂g
∂α
(C.18)
From the first order conditions (C.10) and (C.11) it is seen that the first two terms are equal to zero
so that the following final expression is derived:
∂V (α)
∂α
=
∂U
∂α
+ λ
∂g
∂α
(C.19)
By sharply considering equation (C.19) it follows that the partial derivative of the value function
V with respect to any given indirect parameter α is equal to the partial derivative of the Lagrange
function Λ with respect to this parameter:
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∂V
∂α
=
∂Λ
∂α
(C.20)
This result holds also if more than one exogenous parameters enter the value function, as considered
in the main text. Consequently, the Langrange functions serves as the objective function in deriving
the indirect objective function.
It is important to note that some of the comparative static results depend critically on whether the
exogenous parameters enter only the objective function or whether they enter only the constraints,
or enter both. If an exogenous parameter enters only in the objective function, the comparative
static results are the same as for the unconstrained case. In any case, equation (C.20) is the proper
tool to analyze how the value function responds due to exogenous parameter changes.
Appendix D
The Consumer’s Utility Maximization
and Expenditure Minimization Problem
Figure D.1: Utility maximization and expenditure minimization
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Appendix E
Life Quality Index Derivations
E.1 The Original Derivation
The original life quality index derivation provided in [181] was carried out on basis of a differential
equation approach. As the whole life quality index discussion emerged from this first derivation, it
is briefly reviewed in the following.
It is firstly assumed that life quality has two dimensions and is basically derived from two factors:
intensity and duration of life. In this respect, the intensity of life is deduced from wealth production
and is measured by an increasing continuous monotonic differentiable function f of the GDP per
capita y. Then, another increasing continuous monotonic differentiable function h of time l̂ is taken
into account to incorporate a measure for the duration of life to enjoy that wealth into the concept.
The time l̂ represents the leisure time available to a person outside occupational activities that
produce y. If e denotes the total life expectancy at birth and a represents the total fraction of
lifetime that is devoted to income producing activities, the leisure time available to a person is
l̂ = (1− a)e. Thus, any product of the form
L = f(y) · h(l̂) (E.1)
represents a compound indicator of the duration and intensity of life. Now, in order to analyze how
marginal changes in income dy and leisure time dl̂ influence the general compound indicator (E.1),
the total differential is taken into account:
dL =
∂L
∂y
· dy + ∂L
∂l̂
· dl̂
=
df
dy
· h(l̂) · dy + dh
dl̂
· f(g) · dl̂
(E.2)
Dividing equation (E.2) by L in order to make relative impacts on the compound indicator visible
and by a rearrangement of terms the following expression is obtained:
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dL
L
=
y
f(y)
· df(y)
dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=k1
·dy
y
+
l̂
h(l̂)
· dh(l̂)
dl̂︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=k2
·dl̂
l̂
= k1 · dy
y
+ k2 · dl̂
l̂
(E.3)
The two factors k1 and k2 constitute the elasticities of df(y) and dh(l̂), respectively. The ratio of
these two factors k1k2 describes the relative impact of proportionate changes in GDP per person and
leisure time, which is dependent on life expectancy. It is further hypothesized, that the relative
impact of these two factors is independent of their absolute values, e.g. k1k2 = const. Under this
assumption the factors k1 and k2 must also be constant:
k1 =
y
f(y)
· df(y)
dy
= const. and k2 =
l̂
h(l̂)
· dh(l̂)
dl̂
= const. (E.4)
Equation E.4 constitutes a set of two first order differential equations which can be solved to yield
f(y) = yr and h(l̂) = l̂s, leading to:
L = yr · l̂s = yr · ((1− a) · e)s (E.5)
It is then assumed that individuals on average choose a to maximize their total life quality, so that
the function L is maximized with respect to a, i.e. the labor leisure trade-off is applied. The first
order condition dLda along with equation (E.5) leads to:
r = s · a
1− a (E.6)
Without loss of generality it is further assumed that r+ s = 1, so that r = a and s = (1− a). Thus,
from (E.5) the following equation is obtained:
L = ya · ((1− a) · e)1−a ≈ ya · e1−a · (1− a)1−a (E.7)
It is then proceeded by dropping the term (1 − a)1−a as it is practically constant, especially for
industrialized and developed countries [196], to obtain the LQI in its following final expression:
L = ya · e1−a (E.8)
Although the derivation of the LQI is a straightforward mathematical excercise, it provides little
intuitive explanation and conceptual discussion about its mathematical form and implications in
decision making, as admitted by the authors themselves [196].
E.2 The Lifetime Utility Approach
The basic idea behind the lifetime utility approach is that a person’s enjoyment of life stems from a
continuous stream of consumption over the remaining lifetime. If c(t) denotes the consumption rate
at time t and if it is further assumed that a time separable instantaneous utility function u(c(t))
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exists that is designed to quantify the level of satisfaction from consumption at each moment in
time, the lifetime utility U of a person of age x is represented by the following integral
U(x) =
∫ tmax
x
u(c(t))dt (E.9)
where tmax denotes the maximum attainable age, taken from life tables. Due to several psychological
and economic reasons, people tend to undervalue a prospect of future consumption in relation to
that of present consumption. This phenomenon is integrated in the lifetime utility concept by
introducing a suitable discount rate for utility r, which accounts for the individual’s time preferences
and economic growth:
Ud(x) =
∫ tmax
x
u(c(t)) exp
[
−
∫ t
x
r(τ − x)dτ
]
dt (E.10)
The realization of utility U(c(t)) at age t ≥ x is conditional on the individual’s survival up to age
t. If the probability of surviving until (at least) age t is given by the survival function S(t), the
expected value of remaining lifetime utility at age x is obtained:
L(x) = E [U(x)] =
1
S(x)
∫ tmax
x
u(c(t))S(t) exp
[
−
∫ t
x
r(τ − x)dτ
]
dt (E.11)
The survival function S(t) may easily be expressed by means of the age specific mortality rates µ(t):
S(t) := exp
[
−
∫ t
0
µ(τ)dτ
]
(E.12)
Furthermore, it is possible to include the discounting effect in the survival term so that
Sd(t) := exp
[
−
∫ t
0
µ(τ) + r(τ − x)dτ
]
(E.13)
is obtained, which is equal to the discounted probability of survival to age t. As a consequence,
equation (E.11) can further be simplified to:
L(x) =
∫ tmax
x
u(c(t)) exp
[
−
∫ t
x
µ(τ) + r(τ − x)dτ
]
dt
=
∫ tmax
x
u(c(t))Sd(t|x)dt
(E.14)
As discussed in the main text, under perfect markets with fair insurance available and time prefer-
ences equal to the interest rate, it can be shown that a constant consumption pattern is optimal,
i.e. c(t) = c, so that equation (E.14) is rearranged to:
L(x) = u(c)
∫ tmax
x
Sd(t|x)dt (E.15)
By remembering that total remaining life expectancy at age x is given through
e(x) =
∫ tmax
x
exp
[
−
∫ t
x
µ(τ)dτ
]
dt =
∫ tmax
x
S(t|x)dt (E.16)
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and total discounted remaining life expectancy at age x is defined as:
ed(x) =
∫ tmax
x
exp
[
−
∫ t
x
µ(τ) + r(τ − x)dτ
]
dt =
∫ tmax
x
Sd(t|x)dt (E.17)
equation (E.15) may eventually be expressed as
L(x) = u(c)ed(x) (E.18)
which is the optimal remaining lifetime utility and a surrogate measure of quality of life of a person
of age x.
Actual societies consist of people of all ages, so that equation (E.18) has to be averaged over the age
distribution of society in order to arrive at a life quality measure for the average individual. This is
done by taking the age distribution h into account
h(x, n) :=
exp[−nx]S(x)∫ tmax
0 exp[−nx]S(x)dx
(E.19)
where n denotes annual population growth. In real world applications population growth rates are
changing over time, so that (E.19) is to be seen as an approximation. Averaging ed(x) over the whole
population consisting of all age classes yields society’s age averaged discounted life expectancy e˜d:
e˜d = Eh[ed(x)] =
∫ tmax
0
ed(x)h(x, n)dx (E.20)
By means of the age averaged discounted life expectancy, social discounted lifetime utility may be
expressed as
L = u(c)e˜d (E.21)
which is to be seen as a social indicator, measuring the average individual’s life quality over the
remaining lifetime. Eventually, by assuming that u(c) represents a power utility function, the pa-
rameter q, that has been derived as illustrated in the main text, is substituted for the exponent of
the general utility function u(c) and consumption c is replaced by income y, yielding the social life
quality index with the following functional form:
SLQI = yq e˜d (E.22)
In order to judge on the effectiveness of safety improvements, equation (E.22) is then taken into
account for an application in the net benefit criterion (5.18) formulated in the main text.
Appendix F
HAZUS Simulation Results
F.1 Damage States by Design Level and Earthquake Event
Table F.1: Damage states by design level for 100-year event
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Table F.2: Damage states by design level for 250-year event
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Table F.3: Damage states by design level for 500-year event
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Table F.4: Damage states by design level for 1000-year event
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Table F.5: Damage states by design level for 2500-year event
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F.2 Casualty Rate Coefficients
Table F.6: Indoor casualty rates for extensive structural damage by building type [HAZUS technical
manual [106]]
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F.3 Number of Casualties by Design Level and Earthquake Event
Table F.7: Casualties by design level and earthquake scenario
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F.4 Direct Economic Loss by Design Level and Earthquake Event
Table F.8: Total direct economic loss results by design level and earthquake scenario
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F.5 Indirect Economic Loss by Design Level and Earthquake Event
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F.6 Total Loss Overview by Design Level and Earthquake Event
Table F.10: Total loss by design level and earthquake scenario
